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Abstract 
Currently the United Nations (UN) through its Security Council (UNSC) have issued a 
number of Resolutions that required member states to implement immediately, legislation 
which places severe restrictions such as assets freezing and travel bans on a number of 
individuals, groups and other entities who are believed to be involved in or connected to 
international terrorism, particularly those affiliated with Al Qaida. Those subjected to these 
sanctions have no ability to seek an independent judicial review or appeal capable of offering 
just satisfaction of their particular case at either national regional or international level due to 
the supremacy of the UN charter in international law. The UN itself currently has no judicial 
review or appeal mechanism capable of hearing complaints by those subjected to this system 
of ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions. In most cases, with one notable exception national and 
regional Courts have given supremacy to the UN’s decision over human rights concerns due 
their own obligations under the UN Charter. In particular the right to have an effective 
method of judicial review has been ignored. This study will concentrate on the inability of 
those subjected to these measures imposed on them under UN sanctions to have a suitable 
judicial review mechanism for violations of internationally accepted human right norms. This 
study will suggest a theoretical solution, which is however grounded in international law, to 
counter this inherent lack of judicial review at the level of the United Nations. It will contend 
that the measures currently employed by the UN appear to run counter to internationally 
accepted human rights norms and the accepted international standards for the rule of law that 
the UN has through its own rhetoric set for itself and the wider international community.
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Appendix 1 
 
The following diagram shows how the Charter-based and Treaty-based bodies work within  
the  framework  of  the  United  Nations  for  the  promotion  and  protection  of international 
human rights. NOTE HUMAN RIGHTS COMISSION IS NOW REPLACED BY THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL. 
 
 
Diagram courtesy of the Human Rights Education Association, available at; 
http://www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=437, accessed Jun 2012  
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Appendix 2 
Summary of Litigation relating to individuals and entities on the Consolidated List as of 
2011
1
. 
The legal challenges involving individuals and entities on the Consolidated List known to the 
Monitoring Team to be pending or recently concluded are described below. 
 
Canada 
1. On 7 June 2010, Abu Sufian Abd al-Razziq (QI.A.220.06) filed a suit in the Federal Court 
in Ottawa, Canada, to challenge the implementation of the sanctions against him by Canada. 
Specifically, Abd al-Razziq challenges the application of the implementing regulations 
against him adopted by Canada, known as the “United Nations Al-Qaida and Taliban 
Regulations”, and requests that the Court find these to be ultra vires: in violation of the rights 
of association under section 2(d) and of liberty and security under section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms; in violation of sections 1(a) and 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights; and in violation of international law
2
. (See chapter 3) 
 
European Union 
2. The General Court of the European Union, in a September 2010 ruling, ordered the 
annulment of the sanctions against Yasin Abdullah Ezzedine Qadi (QI.Q.22.01)
3
 after 
adopting a “full and rigorous” standard of judicial review. The Court found that the European 
Union authorities had not provided Qadi access to the evidence against him or addressed the 
“exculpatory evidence” he had provided. It criticized the wholesale adoption by the European 
Union of the 1267 Committee summary of reasons for listing that it found contained 
“general, unsubstantiated, vague and unparticularized allegations”, preventing Qadi from 
“launch[ing] an effective challenge to the allegations against him”. The Court concluded that 
Qadi’s fundamental rights, namely his right to defend himself, his right to an effective 
judicial review and his right to property, had been infringed. The European Union authorities 
and one Member State have appealed the decision. 
 
                                               
1 Taken from UN monitoring team first report to the General Assembly dated Nov 2010 
2 Abdelrazik et al v. Attorney-General of Canada (T-889-10); information provided by the Government of 
Canada. 
3 Judgement of the General Court of the European Union, case T-85/09, Kadi v. Commission, 30 September 
2010 (available at http://curia.europa.eu).Now superseded by decision of UNSC 5 Oct 2012 delisting Mr Kadi 
see chap 6 
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3. The General Court of the European Union decided in September 2010 on the matter of the 
challenges brought in 2006 by Abd al-Rahman al-Faqih (QI.A.212.06), Sanabel Relief 
Agency Limited (QE.S.124.06), Ghuma Abd’Rabbah (QI.A.211.06) and Tahir Nasuf 
(QI.N.215.06)
4
. Following the argument of the decision in the joint cases Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities,
5
 the General Court annulled the sanctions 
regulations with respect to these parties. 
 
4. Cases brought by Shafiq ben Mohamed ben Mohamed al-Ayadi (QI.A.25.01),
6
 
Faraj Faraj Hussein al-Sa’idi (now de-listed),f Saad Rashed Mohammad al-Faqih 
(QI.A.181.04) and Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia 
7
(QE.M.120.05)
8
 challenging the 
application of the sanctions against them remain pending before the General Court. 
 
5. Abdelrazag Elsharif Elosta, Abdulbasit Abdulrahim and Maftah Mohamed 
Elmabruk had filed cases challenging the sanctions measures in the European Union courts. 
However, the Committee removed their names from the List on 22 December 
2010. 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
6. The case brought by Youssef Mustapha Nada (now de-listed) in the European Court of 
Human Rights before the Grand Chamber. The Court found violations, inter alia, of article 8 
right to privacy and family life and article 13 concerning an effective remedy of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
9
. 
 
Pakistan 
7. The action brought by the Al Rashid Trust (QE.A.5.01) remains pending in the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan on the Government’s appeal from a 2003 adverse decision. The challenge 
                                               
4 Judgement of the General Court of the European Union in Joined Cases T-135/06, Al-Faqih v Council; T-
136/06, Sanabel Relief Agency Ltd v. Council; T-137/06, Abdrabbah v. Council; T-138/06, Nasuf v. Council, 29 
September 2010 (available at http://curia.europa.eu). 
5 Judgement of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of the European Union, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-
415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union 
and Commission of the European Communities (available at http://curia.europa.eu). 
6 Case T-527/09, Ayadi v. Commission (available at http://curia.europa.eu). 
7 Case T-322/09, Al-Faqih and MIRA v. Council and Commission (available at http://curia.europa.eu). 
8 Case T-4/10, Al Saadi v. Commission (available at http://curia.europa.eu). 
9 Nada v. Switzerland (no. 10593/08) (available at www.echr.coe.int). final judgment given in September 2012, 
see chap 5. 
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brought by Al-Akhtar Trust International (QE.A.121.05) remains pending before a lower 
court. In a case brought by Hafiz Saeed (QI.S.263.08), the Supreme Court quashed the 
Punjab government’s restrictive measures taken under the maintenance of public order act 
owing to “insufficient evidence”10. 
 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
8. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom decided on 27 January 2010 the consolidated 
cases of Hani al-Sayyid al-Sebai (QI.A.198.05) and Mohammed al-Ghabra (QI.A.228.06). 
The decision found against the Government on the grounds that the implementing order was 
ultra vires because it did not provide for a judicial remedy. According to the opinion, while 
the creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson and other improvements “are to be 
welcomed”, they failed to provide an “effective judicial remedy”11. 
 
United States of America 
9. Al-Haramain Foundation (United States of America) (QE.A.117.04) has appealed the 
decision against it in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon of 6 
November 2008,l in which the District Court upheld the designation of Al-Haramain 
Foundation as “rational and supported by the administrative record”. The appeal is currently 
pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
12
. 
 
10. On 16 January 2009, Yasin Abdullah Ezzedine Qadi (QI.Q.22.01) filed a lawsuit 
challenging his designation in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
13
 
The complaint alleges, among other things, that his designation and the freezing of his assets 
is a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and of his First, Fourth, and Fifth 
                                               
10 Information in this paragraph was provided by the authorities of Pakistan. 
11 Judgement of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v. 
Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC) (Appellants) Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v. Mohammed al 
Ghabra (FC) (Appellant) R (on the application of Hani El Sayed Sabaei Youssef) (Respondent) v. Her Majesty’s 
Treasury (Appellant), 27 January 2010 (2010) UKSC 2 (available at www.supremecourt.gov.uk). para. 78.See 
chap 6 
12 United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Civil Case No. 07-1155-KI, Al Haramain Islamic 
Foundation, Inc. and Multicultural Association of Southern Oregon vs. United States Department of the 
Treasury, Henry M. Paulson, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Adam J. Szubin, United States Department of 
Justice, and Alberto R. Gonzales. 
13 United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Case 1:09-cv-00108, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Henry 
M. Paulson, Adam J. Szubin, United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. 
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Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.
14
The case is fully briefed but had not 
been decided at the time of writing. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
Case 1:09-cv-00108, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Henry M. Paulson, Adam J. Szubin, United 
States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. First Amendment rights 
to freedom of speech and freedom of association; Fourth Amendment right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure; Fifth Amendment rights to due process and to just 
compensation for the taking of property.  
                                               
14 First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association; Fourth Amendment right to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure; Fifth Amendment rights to due process and to just compensation 
for the taking of property. 
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Appendix 3  
Example of a Model Communication form. Taken from UN Information sheet No 
7. As an example of the details that would be required for a Judicial 
Review/Appeal against imposition of being placed on any list of terrorist 
suspects by the United Nations. 
model communication  
Date: ................................................. 
Communication to:  
The Human Rights Committee  
c/o OHCHR-UNOG  
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland,  
submitted for consideration under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  
   
 I. Information concerning the author of the communication  
 
Name ....................................                                       First name(s) 
........................................  
Nationality...............................                                      Profession 
...........................................  
Date and place of birth 
.............................................................................................................  
Present address 
..............................................................................................................  
Address for exchange of confidential correspondence (if other than present address) 
..................................................................................................................... 
Submitting the communication as:  
(a) Victim of the violation or violations set forth below 
.............................................. ……………………………………………….. /_/  
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(b) Appointed representative/legal counsel of the alleged victim(s) 
........................................................................................  /_/  
(c) Other .........................................................................  /_/  
If box (c) is marked, the author should explain:  
(i) In what capacity he is acting on behalf of the victim(s) (e.g. family relationship or 
other personal links with the alleged victim(s)):  
............................................................................................................................ 
(ii) Why the victim(s) is (are) unable to submit the communication himself (themselves):  
............................................................................................................................ 
   
An unrelated third party having no link to the victim(s) cannot submit a communication 
on his (their) behalf.  
    
II. Information concerning the alleged victim(s)  
(if other than author)  
 
 
Name ....................................                                       First name(s) 
........................................  
Nationality...............................                                      Profession 
...........................................  
Date and place of birth 
.............................................................................................................  
Present address or whereabouts 
................................................................................................  
   
   
III. State concerned/articles violated/domestic remedies  
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Name of the State party (country) and the relevant International Covenant or Optional 
Protocol against which the communication is directed:  
............................................................................................................................ 
   
Articles of the allegedly violated:  
............................................................................................................................  
Steps taken by or on behalf of the alleged victim(s) to exhaust domestic remedies-
recourse to the courts or other public authorities, when and with what results (if 
possible, enclose copies of all relevant judicial or administrative decisions):  
............................................................................................................................ 
If domestic remedies have not been exhausted, explain why:  
............................................................................................................................  
IV. Other international procedures  
Has the same matter been submitted for examination under another procedure of 
international investigation or settlement (e.g. the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, the European Commission on Human Rights)? If so, when and with what results?  
............................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................  
   
  V. Facts of the claim 
Detailed description of the facts of the alleged violation or violations (including relevant 
dates)*  
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................
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............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................  
   
Author's signature: ....................................
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
 
3 Outline of chapters 
3.1 Chapter 1  
The first chapter will explain the aims of this research and the methodology employed 
throughout the study including a rational for choosing the particular methodology employed. 
3.2 Chapter 2 
This chapter provides an introduction and discussion into the development of the UN 
sanctions system from its use against states to the development of the smart or targeted 
system used against individuals and other entities allegedly involved in terrorism together 
with a discussion of the  ‘rule of law’ and the United Nations.  
3.3 Chapter 3 
This chapter will discuss in detail those United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolutions in relation to those suspected of international terrorism, in particular Al Qaida 
and the Taliban and how over time the violation of internationally accepted human rights 
norms has led to a change of policy including modification of the sanctions system to include 
a delisting procedure and the introduction of an Ombudsperson to assist with de-listing 
requests, however it will also suggest that even with these measures in place the present 
system is still lacking basic safeguards for those who are subjected to these measures and that 
they currently fall short of internationally accepted human rights norms.  
3.4 Chapter 4  
This chapter will consist of various case studies considering a number of different national 
and regional jurisdictions that have considered the matter of UN sanctions or UN supremacy, 
over national or regional jurisdiction, However the purpose of this study is not simply to 
clarify and re-state settled law but to show how current jurisprudence is failing to uphold 
international human rights standards in favour of maintaining peace and security, and the 
problems imposed by the UN Charter. 
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3.5 Chapter 5 
This study will focus on the lack of an effective judicial remedy available at the international 
level for those subjected to targeted sanctions by the United Nations and indeed more 
generally for those individuals that have no regional protection when states fail to comply 
with their international human rights obligations. The imposition of these measures and the 
lack of effective remedy undoubtedly breaches a number of fundamental human rights at the 
international level, such as the right to be heard and the right to have a competent tribunal 
which is capable of giving an effective remedy, it is therefore necessary at the outset to 
discuss in detail basic elements from various jurisdictions of what exactly is meant by a 
judicial review and for the purposes of this thesis and as importantly to define the concept 
and to consider what this study means by ‘human rights’. This last element will be dealt with 
by considering some of the ideals and ideologies which underpin contemporary concepts of 
human rights throughout the world and condense them into internationally accepted norms, 
whilst acknowledging some of the difficulties in doing so. 
3.6 Chapter 6  
This chapter has a dual purpose. Firstly, it outlines the functions and powers of the United 
Nations bodies in the field of human rights, including the availability and ease of individual 
access to those bodies. Secondly, and more importantly, it analyses the existing 
international mechanisms or procedures available to individuals, including the limitations 
or weaknesses of these procedures. Although there is not the slightest intention to 
overlook or diminish the strengths and benefits of the procedures, the author is of the 
view that a full analysis of their limitations is crucial for the purpose of this entire study to 
explain why the current systems available are unsuitable for any individual or entity to seek 
an effective remedy for the imposition of sanctions from the UN Security Council as well as 
in the wider context of the individual and their respective state. 
3.7 Chapter 7  
This chapter continues from the previous discussion in that it appears that individuals who 
claim to be the victims of human rights abuses recognised by international standards, even 
those who live and reside in States which do normally offer adequate legal procedures for 
defending their human rights, have little chance to obtain fair redress under the existing 
international channels for any violation caused by the UN itself, or nationally where 
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adherence to UN resolutions is uncompromising even when human rights appear to be 
contravened.
15
. As has previously been discussed States are unwilling to run counter to these 
resolutions even when clearly in contravention of human rights safeguards due to Article 103 
of the UN Charter
16
. The conflict between these institutions will be considered throughout. 
3.8 Chapter 8  
In this chapter the author contends that international judicial review is necessary in order 
to complement and strengthen the other existing international procedures for dealing with 
individual complaints of human rights violations as none of the existing procedures allow an 
individual or entity to challenge any acts of the United Nations level in a legal manner, even 
though it has been shown the Security Council has taken on a quasi-judicial role as law 
maker as can be shown when it has by naming individuals and entities to be included in its 
international list of those suspected of a connection to international terrorism. The chapter 
proposes that the International Court of Justice be empowered to allow individuals to have a 
judicial review mechanism involving breaches of international human rights such as those 
caused by imposition of UNSC ‘targeted’ sanctions. 
3.9 Chapter 9  
This chapter gives the ideas for further study and research suggesting that whilst the proposed 
changes to the ICJ statute is indeed only theoretical, it has an highly analogous to the ICC and 
should not be dismissed as purely an exercise in academic fantasy over pragmatic reality and 
is intended to contribute to the wider academic debate on the need to find a balance between 
the human rights and peace and security dichotomy that is grounded in the rule of law. 
Proposals are outlined for some form of procedure to enable a judicial review/appeal to take 
place at the level of the UN as well as the wider implications for terrorism. 
4 Aims of this doctrinal research and the contribution to learning 
This thesis has several aims which can be outlined as follows; 
 
                                               
15 B.G. Ramcharan, The Concept and Present Status of the International Protection of Human 
Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht Boston, 1989, p. 267. 
16 See for example cases from the European Court of Human Rights sho: Behrami v France ; Saramati v France, 
Germany and Norway (2007) 45 EHRR SE 85 , para 149 
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1. To consider, through a detailed discussion, the background to the UN policy regarding 
the targeting of individuals and other entities at the level of the UN with ‘targeted’ or 
‘smart’ sanctions that restrict the movements and freeze the assets of those named.  
2. To examine how this policy has evolved legally with reference to the wider 
implications for the ‘Rule of Law’ doctrine.  
3. To analyse from a human rights perspective whether the UN can under its charter 
obligations balance the competing needs of maintaining peace and security whilst 
upholding fundamental human rights.  
4. To discuss some of the leading cases at the national and regional level that involves 
these conflicts of interests and by examination of relevant judicial decisions discuss 
and the current legal position with regard to upholding fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Cases such as Kadi v Council of European Union will be compared with 
how the USA, Canada and the UK have dealt with the similar situations involving 
targeted sanctions regime through incorporation into their respective national and 
regional laws and how these have been dealt with.  
5. Examination of the various legal issues involving UN sanctions by examination of 
legislation and leading cases. At the regional level the role of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) will be considered and how this court has perceived the 
balance of upholding human rights over the need for peace and security in light of UN 
sanctions.  
6. A detailed examination of current international mechanisms for human right 
protections will be examined to see how current practice fails to allow an individual to 
bring any form of action against the UN Security Council. 
7. Finally this research will suggest that if national and regional courts are either 
reluctant or unable to counter decisions of the UN that run contrary to accepted 
international human rights norms then a theoretical legal solution is suggested, 
grounded in international law, which would allow the International Court of Justice to 
perform the act of judicial review or appellate function in this specific instance. 
 
5 Methodology 
5.1 Introduction  
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This chapter will explain in detail the methodology to be adopted for the completion of the 
thesis and why certain approaches have been considered and discarded. Although Silverman 
argues that ‘without theory there is nothing to research,17’ this author feels this statement is 
not the end but the beginning of the inquiry. Since “most researchers would accept that it is 
sensible to use a mixture of methods”18 this section will show the combination of approaches 
that will be taken in the body of the thesis. Although not all researchers agree, the author 
contends that legal research is in itself unique. Professor Brownsword supports this concept 
when he emphasises that legal researchers rarely start with a sharply specified research 
question, they do not have some hypothesis to be tested, they do not have a clearly articulated 
methodology and they do not have a clear sense of where their inquiry might lead. Much of 
the time, he states they are reacting to a rapidly changing legal landscape and trying to say 
something helpful or interesting about what is going on from a legal perspective, but they will 
often be able to put their research into some recognisable mould only when they have all but 
perhaps completed their inquiry.
19
This has certainly been true when completing this thesis; 
changes to the law and major case decision(s), (and/or lack of them) have meant that 
conclusions are in constant flux. Cryer et al
20
noticed that law students in general tend to be 
less methodologically self-aware and less adept at articulating the approach underpinning 
their thesis than those in other social science disciplines.  
 
There are of course a myriad of socio-legal methodologies which could have been considered 
in relation to this work, and many could have been partially successful. However, as 
Professor Reza Banakar suggests:  
 
 ‘Despite the social make-up of law and the kinship between legal theory and social 
 theory, the former being a branch of the latter and despite the efforts of socio-legal 
                                               
17 D. Silverman, ‘The logic of qualitative research’ in Miller & Dingwell (Eds) ‘Context & Methods in 
Qualitative Research’  Sage publishing, 2007, 87. 
18 P. McNeill., & S. Chapman., Research Methods,  Routledge; London, 2005,  22. 
19 R. Brownsword (Ed) In “What the World Needs Now: Techno-Regulation, Human Rights and Human 
Dignity” in (Vol IV of Global Governance and the Quest for Justice), Hart:: Oxford, 2004.  
20 R. Cryer, T. Hervey, B. Sokhi-Bulley and A. Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford , 2011. 
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 scholars over the past hundred years to integrate legal and sociological ideas, law and 
 sociology remain apart.’21   
Indeed, Schmidt and Halliday argue that scholars within the socio-legal sphere referred to by 
Banakar not only want to change the way that law is regarded in terms of research, but further 
“believe that law’s claim to autonomy and superiority must be laid bare.”22There exists, 
therefore, a clear tension between some of the legal approaches to research and some of the 
sociological approaches. There are also areas of overlap and where appropriate this is where 
the study will sit, using a combination of methods. 
This difficulty in defining legal research can pose problems for individuals undertaking their 
PhD when it comes to their viva voce which often consists of questions regarding the 
methodology used, such as why did you choose the particular project and what is so 
important about it. Answering these questions at the PhD level requires the student to be 
more explicit regarding theoretical assumptions about the nature and quality of law, and in 
this case current International law to be more specific.  
5.2 Methodology adopted and rational for its choice 
As much of this research will span several legal systems, including the systems used by the 
United Nations and other international organisations, so as well as International law generally 
one specific method adopted out of necessity will be to incorporate the use of comparative 
law
23
. This is an academic study of separate legal systems, each one analysed in its 
constituent elements; how they differ in the different legal systems, and how their elements 
combine or could combine into a single system of law. Comparative law is a very important 
discipline in communication between legal systems. It helps mutual understanding and 
prevents misinterpretation. In this globalising world as observed in this study, comparative 
law is important as it provides a platform for intellectual exchange in terms of law and it 
                                               
21 R. Banakar, Law Through Sociology's Looking Glass: Conflict and Competition in Sociological Studies of 
Law, in A. Denis, & D. Kalekin-Fishman, eds., The New ISA Handbook in Contemporary International 
Sociology: Conflict, Competition, And Cooperation, London: Sage 2009. 
22 P. Schmidt, and S. Halliday., Introduction: Beyond Methods – Law and Society in Action, in Halliday, S. and 
Schmidt, P., eds., Conducting Law and Society Research: Reflections on Methods and Practices, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009 4. 
23For a full explanation and discussion on comparative law see for example; M. Reimann. and R.  
Zimmermann,,The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, 2008; Peter De Cruz, 
Comparative Law in a Changing World, (3rd Ed) London: Routledge-Cavendish: London 2007. 
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cultivates a culture of understanding in a diverse world
24
. Furthermore, comparative law 
helps in broadening horizons for law reformers and legislators around the world. 
Comparative law is different from purely comparing the study of one of the branches of 
international law; comparative law helps inform all of these areas of normatively. For 
example, comparative law can help international legal institutions, such as those of the 
United Nations, in analysing the laws of different countries regarding their treaty obligations. 
Comparative law may also contribute to legal theory by creating categories and concepts of 
general application.
25
 This is very helpful when trying to define terms which can have widely 
different meanings such as the rule of law, judicial review and even human rights. 
5.3 Philosophical approaches that underpin this study 
Whilst this research project is grounded firmly in the principles of international law 
considered from a purposeful human rights approach, it has been rooted in a post-modernist 
philosophy. This term describes a range of conceptual frameworks and ideologies that are 
defined in opposition to those commonly attributed to modernism and modernist notions of 
knowledge and science, such as, materialism, realism, positivism, formalism, structuralism, 
dogmatism and reductionism. Postmodernist approaches are critical of the possibility of 
objective knowledge of the real world, and consider the ways in which social dynamics such 
as power and hierarchy affect human conceptualizations of the world to have important 
effects on the way knowledge is constructed and used. In contrast to the modernist paradigm, 
postmodernist thought often emphasize idealism, re-constructivism, relativism, pluralism and 
skepticism in its approaches to knowledge and understanding
26
. 
 
This is not a philosophical movement in itself, but rather, incorporates a number of 
philosophical and critical methods that can be considered 'postmodernism', the most familiar 
include feminism and post-structuralism. Put another way, postmodernism is not a method of 
doing philosophy on its own, but rather a way of approaching traditional ideas and practices 
in non-traditional ways that deviate from pre-established ‘super structural’ modes. 
 
                                               
24For a further discussion on globalisation democracy and governance see for example: Transnational 
Democracy; John S. Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy” and “Transnational Democracy”: Beyond the 
Cosmopolitan Model”, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberal, Critics, Contestations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001, Chs 4-5; W, Twinning. Globalisation and Legal Theory. London Butterworths 2000: 
25 Peter De Cruz, supra note 23. 
26 Christopher Butler, Postmodernism: a very short introduction, Oxford University Press, 2002 
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Postmodernism postulates that many, if not all, apparent realities are only social constructs 
and are therefore subject to change. It emphasises the role of language, power relations, and 
motivations in the formation of ideas and beliefs. In particular it attacks the use of sharp 
binary classifications such as male versus female, straight versus gay, white versus black, and 
imperial versus colonial; it holds realities to be plural and relative, and to be dependent on 
who the interested parties are and the nature of these interests. It claims that there is no 
absolute truth and that the way people perceive the world is subjective. Modernism and 
postmodernism are also understood as cultural stances or sets of perspectives. In critical 
theory, "Postmodernism" has influenced marketing, business and, of interest to this author, 
the interpretation of law, culture, and religion in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. 
Postmodernism, particularly as an academic movement, can be understood as a reaction to 
modernism in the Humanities. Whereas modernism was primarily concerned with principles 
such as: identity, unity, authority, and certainty, postmodernism is often associated with 
difference: plurality, textually, and skepticism. 
5.4 Sources used by this study 
The approach taken during this research will focus on primary and secondary texts as key 
sources of information. The basis of this work is in law; namely, the policy and legislation 
which forms the backbone of the regulatory structure surrounding targeted asset-freezing of 
individuals by the United Nations. Part of this research will uncover how ‘legislation’ the 
clearest mechanism by which policy makers give effect to their policies, has changed over 
time, discussing subsequent amendments and, where applicable, judicial interpretation of the 
legislation within a human rights framework.. One of the difficulties in considering this 
legislation and case law is that, as Becher and Trowler suggest, “…there is a constantly 
changing body of material arising from new legislation, and everything is in a state of flux.”27 
However, bearing this constant flux in mind, there are several ways of discovering what the 
legislation means, and as Professor Cownie states:  
 
 Traditionally law has been analysed from a doctrinal or ‘black letter’ perspective, 
 which concentrates on examining statutory materials and the reports of judicial 
 decisions as the sole means of understanding the law.
28
 
                                               
27 T. Becher., & P. Trowler., Academic Tribes and Territories: intellectual inquiry and the culture of disciplines, 
Open University Press,: Buckingham, 2001, 31 
28 F. Cownie., Legal Academics: Culture and Identities, Hart Publishing: Oxford,  2005, 35 
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In English law, black letter law is a term used to describe those areas of law characterized by 
technical rules, rather than those areas of law characterized by having a more conceptual 
basis. This doctrinal approach, which is also referred to as positivist
29,30
 and Technocentric
31
 
has been criticised for being too narrow in its scope, and thus, as Adams and Brownsword 
argue: 
…to say black-letterism is concerned with describing the operation of the law would 
be to overstate its scope; for what it purports to describe is the content of the formal 
legal materials, not the operation of these rules in practice.
32
 
Therefore only some aspects of the black letter approach will be retained as part of the 
“diversity of methods” and, in order to give effect to that approach, there are various other 
methods for interpreting the meaning of legislation which are used in case law. The three 
best-known approaches are the “literal”, “golden” and “mischief” rules” and where 
appropriate these will be also be considered, as will the teleological approach favoured by the 
European Court of Justice. All these methods will consider the ultimate aim of the relevant 
UN sanctions that target individual and other entities and whether the fundamental human 
rights have been violated by the Security Council in obtaining this goal. This study will also 
utilise secondary sources where appropriate considering a wide range of commentators and 
their opinions in relation to the areas under consideration. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
The type of methodology chosen for this study has been considered to give the opportunity to 
discuss proposals beyond merely a black letter approach as the research is not just purely 
theoretical but does try to offer a pragmatic solution to a legal conundrum. The main idea of 
the study is to contribute to the wider discussion of the issues outlined, as the internationally 
accepted legal view adapts and changes to consider the real threats posed by terrorism against 
protecting human rights and the rule of law post 9/11 and the death of Osama Bin Laden.  
                                               
29 Positivism, in short, takes the view that “there is a body of knowledge that existed independently of whether 
people knew it or not, and that the task of the scientist was to uncover that knowledge piece by piece, building 
up a more complete understanding of the laws of nature.” Source: P. McNeill, & S. Chapman, 2005, ibid note 
18, 116 
30 “The positive study of laws is concerned with the specific content of laws.” Source: G. Pendlebury., Action 
and ethics in Aristotle and Hegel: escaping the malign influence of Kant, Ashgate Publishing Limited: Farnham,  
2002, 64 
31 P. A. Thomas, Socio-Legal Studies: The Case of Disappearing Fleas and Bustards, P. A. Thomas., ed., Socio-
Legal Studies, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997.  
32 J. Adams., & R. Brownsword., Understanding Law, Sweet & Maxwell: London 1999, 30 
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CHAPTER 2 
UN SANCTIONS REGIME AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
1 Preliminary Remarks 
Whilst the term ‘UN sanctions’ is now in common use within our modern lexicon, it is easy 
to forget that there was once a time when the United Nations Security Council could not 
easily employ the ‘sanctions’ tool. For example from 1946 until the middle of 1990, due to 
Cold War politics, the Security Council were only able to impose the coercive sanctions 
provided for in Article 41
33
 of the United Nations Charter on two occasions
34
. In 1966 the 
Council imposed sanctions against Southern Rhodesia
35
 and in 1977 it applied them against 
South Africa.
36
 By contrast, the post-Cold War period has witnessed a dramatic increase in 
UN sanctions. Since August 1990 the Security Council has added twenty-three additional UN 
sanctions regimes
37
. Whilst it is generally accepted that UN sanctions form an important tool 
in international relations, this chapter will discuss their development from an instrument used 
against states for a variety of reasons to one employed against individuals and other entities 
in an attempt to defeat or supress international terrorist activities. This chapter will also 
discuss some criticisms of the UN sanction system and the UN’s view on the ‘rule of law’ 
suggesting that there is a lack of application to that principle when dealing with those 
sanctions concerned with terrorism and the individual
38
. 
 
                                               
33 Article 41 UN Charter, “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations 
to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, 
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.” Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml, accessed Jan 2010. 
34 James M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Law) 
Cambridge University Press. 2007, 1.  
35 See UNSC Resolution S/RES/232/1966, for a full list of all UN SC Resolutions see; 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml, accessed February 2013. 
36 See UNSC Resolution  S/RES/421/1977. 
37 See n 35 above. 
38 See for discussion on actions regarding terrorism and UN sanctions see; Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the 
effectiveness of the UN Security Council's anti-terrorism measures: The quest for legitimacy and cohesion. 
E.J.I.L. 2006, 17(5), 881-919, T. Biersteker, Targeted Financial Sanctions: a Manual for the Design and 
Implementation. Contributions from the Interlaken Process (2001); M. Brzoska, Design and Implementation of 
Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process (2001); P. 
Wallensteen, C. Staibano, and M. Eriksson, Making Targeted Sanctions Effective Guidelines for the 
Implementation of UN Policy Options (2003), Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 72 Nordic J Int'l L (2003) 159, at 164. 
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6 Historical and Political Development of UN Sanctions 
While from the historical perspective the end of Cold War allowed the resurgence of 
sanctions, two other factors have contributed to their rise. In the first instance, sanctions can 
often represent the least aggressive of the coercive alternatives available to the UN Security 
Council when faced with the task of taking action to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. From a political perspective, it can be extremely difficult to get the support 
necessary to authorise collective military action under Article 42
39
 of the UN Charter, as the 
governments which would be expected to shoulder the burden of collective forceful action 
are reluctant to assume responsibility for the serious financial, political and humanitarian 
consequences that are likely to flow from the use of military sanctions. The imposition of 
non-military sanctions, by contrast, is generally thought to entail fewer costs than the use of 
force. By authorising sanctions, the Security Council can be seen to be taking strong 
symbolic action against threats to international peace and security, without having to assume 
the responsibility for, or incur the costs of, using force
40
. Secondly, there is the perception 
that the potential of sanctions to achieve their policy objectives has increased with advances 
in international technology, communications and trade
41
. Globalisation has fostered a climate 
of growing interdependence, in which states are increasingly reliant upon trade and 
communication links with the international community. In such an interdependent economic 
environment, a stringent UN sanctions regime has the power to devastate a target economy 
and to curtail targeted political elites
42
. 
 
                                               
39 United Nations Charter Article 42 which states: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided 
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
40 See ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, New York, 2004 (UN Doc. A/59/565), para. 204: ‘[t]he effectiveness of the global 
collective security system, as with any other legal order, depends ultimately not only on the legality of decisions 
but also on the common perception of their legitimacy--their being made on solid evidentiary grounds, and for 
the right reasons, morally as well as legally.’ 
41 See See Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the Security Council’, 8 Global Governance 
(2002) 35, quoting B. Russett and J.S. Sutterlin, ‘The U.N. in a New World Order’, 70 Foreign Affairs (1991) 69 
and the seminal work of Claude Jr., ‘Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of the United Nations’, 20 
Int'l Org (1966) 367. 
42 See for further discussion see James M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, Cambridge 
Studies in International and Comparative Law (No 56), Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2009; Al-Amir 
A. Anbari,, ‘The Impact of UN Sanctions on Economic Development, Human Rights and Civil Society’, in 
Gowlland-Debbas (ed.), United Nations Sanctions and International Law, 371–380; Sydney. D. Bailey, The 
Security Council and Human Rights, St Martin's Press: New York, 1994. 
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The Security Council has employed a broad variety of sanctions, ranging from 
comprehensive measures which prevent the flow to and from a target of virtually all products 
and commodities,
43
 to simple measures that target specific items, such as arms,
44
 timber
45
 or 
diamonds,
46
 or particular activities, such as diplomatic relations
47
 or travel
48
. UN sanctions 
have been applied around the globe, from Southern Rhodesia to Yugoslavia and from Haiti to 
North Korea. They have targeted nations, rebel groups and terrorist organisations this will be 
dealt with in further detail when discussing individual and entity sanctions later in this 
thesis
49
. The Council has imposed sanctions for a range of objectives, including compelling 
an occupying state to withdraw its troops,
50
 preventing a state from developing or acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction,
51
countering international terrorism,
52
stemming human rights 
violations,
53
and even in promoting the implementation of a peace process
54
.  
 
Whilst the UN has deployed sanctions on a number of occasion and for a wide variety of 
reasons, their use has often been criticised for an array of reasons. Pape denounced the use of 
sanctions as ineffective
55
whilst others warn that sanctions can be counterproductive as they 
can incite opposition to UN intervention and strengthening the target government’s position 
of power.
56
Sanctions are also criticised due to the impact they can have on the innocent 
                                               
43 See Resolution 232 Southern Rhodesia, 757 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) (FRYSM), 
820 Bosnian Serb and 841 Haiti for details of their sanctions regimes. 
44 See Resolutions 418 South Africa, 713 Yugoslavia, 733 Somalia, 788 Liberia, 918 Rwanda, 1160 Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and 1298 Eritrea and Ethiopia for details of these sanctions regimes. 
45 1343 and 1521 Liberia sanctions regimes. 
46 See Resolutions 864 UNITA, 1132 Sierra Leone, 1343 and 1521 Liberia and 1572 Côte d’Ivoire sanctions 
regimes. 
47 See Resolutions 748 Libya and 1054 Sudan sanctions regimes 
48 See Resolutions 232 Southern Rhodesia, 661 Iraq, 748 Libya, 841 Haiti, 864 UNITA, 1054 Sudan, 1132 
Sierra Leone, 1267 Taliban and Al Qaida, 1343 and 1521 Liberia, 1493 DRC, 1556 Sudan, 1572 Côte d’Ivoire, 
1636 Hariri, 1718 North Korea and 1737 Iran sanctions regimes. 
49 See for example the following Resolutions which targets Rebel groups, 820 (Bosnian Serb), 864 (UNITA) 
and those of 1132 Sierra Leone and 1493 DRC sanctions regimes. 
50 See for example Resolution 661 sanctions regime against Iraq 
51 See for example Resolutions 418 (South Africa), 1718 (North Korea) and 1737 (Iran) sanctions regimes, this 
was also the primary reason for maintaining resolution 661 Iraq sanctions regime after the conclusion of 1991 
Gulf War hostilities. 
52 Preventing and responding to international terrorism was an objective of resolution 748 against Libya, 1054 
against Sudan and 1636 Hariri sanctions regimes 
53 This was seen as an objective of the following Resolutions: 232 (Southern Rhodesia), 418 (South Africa), 841 
(Haiti), 1160 (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)) and 1556 (Sudan) sanctions regimes. 
54 See Resolution 788 and 1521 Liberia, 864 UNITA, 918 Rwanda, 1132 Sierra Leone, 1493 DRC and 1572 
Côte d’Ivoire sanctions regimes in respect of promoting the peace process. 
55 Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work (1997) 22 International Security 90–136 
56 Johan Galtung, On the Effects of Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia, in Miroslav 
Nincic and Peter Wallensteen (eds.), Dilemmas of Economic Coercion (Praeger: New York 1983), 17–60, 46. 
  
14 
 
civilian populations,
57
with John and Karl Mueller describing them as ‘the UN’s weapon of 
mass destruction’.58 
Whilst sanctions of all types have their critics Farrall suggest that  no matter how ineffective, 
counterproductive or indiscriminate sanctions may appear, the Security Council is not about 
to remove them from its peace and security toolkit any time soon
59
. As Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan observed in his 2005 report ‘In Larger Freedom’, sanctions constitute ‘a 
necessary middle ground between war and words’. Enthusiasm for sanctions he suggests may 
wax and wane, but the Council may continue to implement sanctions when diplomacy is 
failing and other policy options are unpalatable or impractical
60
. 
7 Defining UN sanctions 
The term ‘sanction’ can mean different things, to different people. In the national sphere, 
sanctions generally represent a range of action that can be taken against a person who has 
transgressed a legal norm.
61
 Thus, a person who has committed the crime of manslaughter 
might receive the sanction of a term in prison. The nature, scope and length of potential 
national sanctions are generally determined by legislatures. The sanctions are then applied to 
specific cases by judiciaries or juries, and they are then enforced by police forces and penal 
systems. National sanctions may serve a number of purposes, including defining the limits of 
permissible behaviour, punishing wrongdoers and deterring potential future wrongdoers.
62
 
But whatever specific purpose a particular sanction may serve, the essence of national 
sanctions lies in their nexus with legal norms. This nexus separates sanctions from simple 
acts of coercion. In the national context, sanctions are imposed in order to enforce the law 
and they therefore aim to reinforce the rule of law.  
 
                                               
57 Geoffrey Simons, Imposing Economic Sanctions: Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool? (London: Pluto Press, 
1999); George E. Bisharat, Sanctions as Genocide (2001) 11 TLCP 379–425. 
58 Denis Halliday, Iraq and the UN’s Weapon of Mass Destruction (1999) 98 Current History 65–68; John 
Mueller and Karl Mueller, Sanctions of Mass Destruction (1999) 78(3) Foreign Affairs, 43–53. 
59 James M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law, 34. 
60 UN General Assembly, In larger freedom : towards development, security and human rights for all : report of 
the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, A/59/2005, UN Publications available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a54bbfa0.html, accessed 2 April 2012. 
61 Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems, Stevens & 
Sons: London1951, 706. 
62 Margaret P. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, 2nd ed, St Martin’s Press: New 
York, 1996, 7. 
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In the international sphere, however, the term ‘sanctions’ is commonly used to describe 
actions that often bear only a slight resemblance to their domestic relative. Media 
commentators, diplomats and scholars employ the term to refer to a wide range of actions, 
taken for a variety of purposes, by a range of actors against a variety of targets.
63
 The 
spectrum of action commonly described as ‘sanctions’ includes military and non-military 
action. The term ‘sanctions’ can be used to describe action which aims to place physical 
restrictions upon the ability of a target to engage in the use of force itself, or to depict action 
which seeks to restrict the target’s freedom in other respects, such as in relations of an 
economic, financial, diplomatic or representative, sporting or cultural nature
64
. 
 
The fundamental difference between the meaning of sanctions in the national context and the 
popular understanding of sanctions in the international context is that the action commonly 
referred to as sanctions in the international sphere does not necessarily serve the purpose of 
enforcing a legal norm.
65
 The term ‘sanctions’ is widely used to refer to action which seeks 
either to coerce the target into behaving in a particular manner, or to punish it for behaviour 
considered unacceptable by the sender. The motive for imposing sanctions may be to respond 
to a breach of a norm or to prevent such a breach, but it may also be to pursue a foreign 
policy agenda or to gain some advantage over the target.
66
 Some commentators have even 
employed the term ‘positive sanctions’ to refer to acts of a non-coercive nature which seek to 
induce a particular type of behaviour.
67
  
 
                                               
63 Galtung and Doxey both provide useful summaries of the different types of international ‘sanctions’: Galtung, 
‘On the Effects of Economic Sanctions’, p 21; Doxey, International Sanctions,  p 15. 
64 In fact, the resolutions concerning individuals and other entities discussed later in this study seems to fit the 
definition given by Yem, ‘legislative acts have three essential characteristics: they are unilateral in form, they 
create or modify some element of a legal norm, and the legal norm in question is general in nature, that is, 
directed to indeterminate addressees and capable of repeated application in time’: E. Yemin, Legislative Powers 
in the United Nations and Specialized Agencies (1969),  6. 
65 This can be said to be the case with UN sanctions, as it is not a requirement that they be applied in response to 
a violation of Charter obligations. Thus they can be interpreted as ‘political measures’ which the Security 
Council has the ‘discretion’ to apply in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. See Kelsen, 
ibid n 61,733. 
66 The US sanctions regime against Cuba is one example of a ‘sanctions’ regime imposed in pursuit of a foreign 
policy agenda. Since it first adopted a resolution on the subject in 1992, the UN’s General Assembly has 
condemned on an annual basis the continued application of US ‘sanctions’ against Cuba. For the initial 
resolution, see A/RES/47/19 (24 November 1992). For the most recent resolution, see A/RES/58/7 (18 
November 2003). For the annual resolutions in between, see A/RES/58/7 (18 November 2003), preambular 
para. 6. 
67 Peter A. G. Van Bergeijk, Economic Diplomacy, Trade and Commercial Policy: Positive and Negative 
Sanctions in a New World Order, Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994. 
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The range of actors who impose sanctions on an international basis includes individual states, 
groups of states, the international community as a whole, and non-state actors. When one 
state initiates coercive action, its actions are commonly referred to as ‘unilateral sanctions’. A 
prominent example of unilateral sanctions is the regime which has been maintained against 
Cuba by the United States since the Cuban missile crisis.
68
 When action is initiated by a 
group of states, the action becomes ‘multilateral’ or ‘regional’ sanctions. Examples of 
multilateral/regional sanctions regimes include those imposed against Haiti by the 
Organization of American States
69
 and against the former Yugoslavia by the European 
Union.
70
 When action is taken by a majority of states, it is referred to as ‘collective’ or 
‘universal’ sanctions. These terms have generally been reserved to describe sanctions applied 
by the League of Nations or the United Nations.
71
 Finally, even non-forceful coercive 
activities initiated by non-state actors, such as citizen-initiated boycotts, are sometimes 
described as sanctions.
72
 The range of actors who could potentially be the target of sanctions 
generally mirrors the actors who can impose sanctions. In practice, forms of sanctions have 
been imposed against one state, a group of states, and extra-state entities. 
 
In this study, the focus is upon the ‘collective’ or ‘universal’ sanctions applied by the United 
Nations against the non-state actor. The term ‘UN sanctions’ denotes binding, mandatory 
measures short of the use of force that are applied against particular state or non-state actors 
by the UN Security Council, as envisaged by Chapter VII and Article 41 of the UN Charter.
73
 
As provided in Article 41, ‘UN sanctions’ thus fall within the following description: The 
Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
                                               
68 For a comprehensive list of instances of unilateral sanctions, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and 
Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2nd ed (1990)Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics. 
69 For a detailed account of the Haiti sanctions, see Elisabeth D. Gibbons, Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and 
Democracy Under Assault (Westport: Praeger, 1999), especially chapt 3. 
70 See for example on the EU sanctions regime against the Former Yugoslavia, Christine Chinkin, ‘The Legality 
of the Imposition of Sanctions by the European Union in International Law’, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), 
Aspects of Statehood and Institutionalism in Contemporary Europe (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1997), pp. 183–
213; Jean-Pierre Puissochet, ‘The Court of Justice and International Action by the European Community: The 
Example of the Embargo Against the Former Yugoslavia’ (1997) 20 Fordham ILJ 1557–1576. 
71 M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions, Ideals and Experience: Routledge, London 1983, 56–
90. 
72 See for further discussion, Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Boycott in International Relations’ (1933) 14 BYIL 125–140; 
Maged Taher Othman, Economic Sanctions in International Law: A Legal Study of the Practice of the USA 
,Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, (1982), pp. 19–25. 
73 Like the general term ‘sanctions’, the term ‘UN sanctions’ can also be used to refer to a variety of measures. 
Without further qualification, UN sanctions may denote: military or non-military action; action that is authorised 
by the Security Council or the General Assembly; and action that is requested and thus ‘voluntary’ or action that 
is binding and thus ‘mandatory’. 
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employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. To reinforce the point made earlier, these may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
74
  
 
Since the inception of the United Nations the Security Council has acted upon its Article 41 
sanctions powers to create twenty-five UN sanctions regimes.
75
 In addition to its actions 
establishing and modifying those twenty-five sanctions regimes, the Security Council has at 
times requested states to impose measures that might be described as ‘voluntary sanctions’. In 
the cases of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, prior to the eventual imposition of 
mandatory sanctions, the Council requested states to take certain action against Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa, without requiring the application of such measures under Chapter 
VII
76
. Similarly, in the case of Cambodia, the Council requested states bordering Cambodia 
to prevent the import of timber products from Khmer-Rouge controlled areas. These 
instances are not covered as part of the current analysis, as the measures requested were 
neither imposed under Chapter VII nor framed in mandatory language. 
 
The Security Council has also taken some other initiatives that might be interpreted to fall 
within the scope of Article 41, due to the fact that they involved action short of the use of 
military force taken under Chapter VII and after the Council had determined the existence of 
a threat to the peace. These initiatives include the creation of two international criminal 
tribunals,
77
 which have in fact each determined that their establishment falls within the scope 
of Article 41.
78
  
 
                                               
74 Article 41, UN Charter. Article 41 was designed to be read in concert with Article 39, such that UN sanctions 
should be applied to maintain or restore the peace once the Security Council has determined the existence of a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. 
75 See n34 at Annex A 
76 M. McDougal, & M. Reismen, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern. 
The American Journal of International Law, 1968, 62(1), 1-19 
77 In May 1993 the Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the 
ICTY): SC Res. 827 (25 May 1993), paras. 1–2, annex. In November 1995 the Council established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the ICTR): SC Res. 955 (8 November 1995), para. 1 
78 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Case IT-94–1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, (2 October 1995), para. 36; 
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96–15-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (18 
June 1997), para. 27. 
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The Security Council has also applied wide-ranging measures short of the use of force in an 
effort to prevent and suppress terrorism
79
 and to prevent non-state actors from acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
80
 Whilst some suggest these 
instances are not to be treated as examples of UN sanctions regimes as they do not possess 
the key characteristics of UN sanctions regimes, which are applied traditionally against 
states
81
 or particular, readily identifiable groups of non-state actors for the purpose of this 
study those measures deployed against individuals and entities in relation to terrorism will be 
the basis of this study. 
 
8 The Rule of Law and the Security Council 
This thesis contends that Security Council sanctions used against individuals and entities 
have been applied in such a way that they have undermined the rule of law, therefore 
weakening the authority and credibility of the UN Security Council and its sanctions tool
82
. 
The end result is that sanctions are less effective than they could be. Until the UN Security 
Council’s sanctions practice can be reformed so that there is widespread confidence in its 
integrity, sanctions are less likely to serve as an effective tool for resolving international 
conflict. Without such reform, the UN sanctions system will be seen by some as a 
destabilising influence upon, rather than a symbol of, the rule of law in international society. 
The challenge is therefore to reform the UN Security Council’s sanctions practice so that the 
Council and the UN sanctions system command such respect and inspire such confidence that 
                                               
79 In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Council established a 
collection of mandatory counterterrorism measures to be taken against terrorists and terrorism and created a 
Counterterrorism Committee to monitor the implementation of those measures. See for example, SC Res. 1373 
(28 September 2001). See chapter 3 for further discussion. 
80 In April 2004 the Council adopted resolution 1540 (2004), requiring states to take a range of measures 
designed to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. 
The Council also established the 1540 Committee to administer the measures. See SC Res. 1540 (28 April 
2004).  
81 See: T. Biersteker, Targeted Financial Sanctions: a Manual for the Design and Implementation. 
Contributions from the Interlaken Process (2001); M. Brzoska, Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes 
and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process (2001); P. Wallensteen, C. 
Staibano, and M. Eriksson, Making Targeted Sanctions Effective Guidelines for the Implementation of UN 
Policy Options (2003);Chesterman, S., & Pouligny, B. (2003). Are Sanctions Meant to Work? The Politics of 
Creating and Implementing Sanctions Through the United Nations. Global Governance, 9(4), 503-518 
82 D. Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Legal Limits 
and the Role of the International Court of Justice (2001); Lamb, ‘Legal Limits to United Nations Security 
Council Powers’, in G. Goodwin-Gill and S. Talmon (eds.), The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour 
of Ian Brownlie (1999), at 361; Nolte, ‘The Limits of the Security Council's Powers and Its Functions in the 
International Legal System: Some Reflections’, in M. Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics 
(2000), at 315. 
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both states, other international organisations for example the EU,
83
 NGO’s and those 
individuals and entities subject to these sanctions both desire and feel compelled to comply 
with these sanctions regimes and thus implement sanctions effectively.  
 
This thesis will proposes a pragmatic model of how the UN Security Council practice can be 
modified to encompass the rule of law that is designed to be used in the context of Security 
Council decision-making on sanctions by enabling judicial review of the decisions they have 
made that affect the individual or entity concerned. If followed, this model would help to 
reassure the broader community of states that the Security Council is genuinely committed to 
the rule of law. By ensuring that its sanctions practice reinforces, rather than undermines, the 
rule of law, the Council could induce greater compliance with its sanctions regimes. 
 
Whilst the rule of law is a fluid concept and there are a divergence of views as to its meaning 
or key aim this study proposes that primary aim of the rule of law is to prevent the misuse or 
abuse of power at whatever level by those who made administer interpret and enforce it
84
. It 
proposes five basic principles of the rule of law that seek to prevent the misuse or abuse of 
power: transparency, consistency, equality, due process and proportionality. To the extent 
that the Security Council and its sanctions practice respect and promote those five basic 
principles, they reinforce the rule of law. 
 
In its role of overseeing peacekeeping operations, the Council frequently emphasises the 
importance of the rule of law, portraying it as one of the key building blocks of a stable 
society and routinely incorporating the objective of strengthening the rule of law in peace 
operation mandates. Yet when it comes to the decision-making process when imposing 
sanctions, the Council’s practice tends to undermine the rule of law. Sanctions are often 
applied and modified in an ad hoc and selective manner. Decisions are generally made behind 
closed doors, with little or no public record of the decision-making process. Sanctions tend to 
have disproportionate effects upon civilian populations and third states, that is those not 
                                               
83 In the context of the Council of Europe see ‘The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and 
United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctions’, Report prepared by Professor Iain Cameron (6 
Feb. 2006). 
84 H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations. A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (2001), at 735, 
Wood, ‘Comment on Erika de Wet's Contribution’, The Security Council as a Law Maker: The Adoption of 
(Quasi)-Judicial Decisions, in R. Wolfrum and V. Röben (eds.), Developments of International Law in Treaty 
Making (2005), at 227, 228. 
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directly or intentionally affected but who for example may find themselves unable to trade 
with or have an influx of refugees, as a result of sanctions imposed on a neighbouring state. 
Individuals subjected to sanctions are now subject to travel bans and assets freezing that 
affect not only them but their families and their ability to conduct genuine business activities. 
They are denied the availability of any effective form judicial review. 
 
9 The relevance of the rule of law to the UN Security Council’s activities 
It has been suggested that at the formation of the United Nations, the inclusion of the rule of 
law within the UN Charter was effectively disregarded. Despite concerted efforts at the San 
Francisco Conference to ensure that the principles of justice and the rule of law would guide 
the action of the UN Security Council,
85
 the concept of the rule of law is conspicuously 
absent from the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The UN Charter established the 
Security Council as a political organ, with primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.
86
 Although threats to international peace and security may 
take the form of violations of international law, these two concepts do not necessarily 
overlap.
87
 When acting in accordance with its power to maintain international peace and 
security, the Council does not necessarily respond to a violation of international law, or even 
to a violation of the UN Charter.
88
 In fact, some commentators have interpreted the broad 
discretion granted to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
‘security to mean that the Security Council is ‘a law unto itself’ that it can do and should act 
above the law.
89
 Why then should the Security Council be expected to take rule of law 
considerations into account when formulating its sanctions policy? 
 
While the Security Council’s political nature is undeniable,90 it does not necessarily follow 
that the Council is or should be uninterested in the rule of law. There are two persuasive 
reasons why the Security Council might be expected to take rule of law considerations into 
account when formulating sanctions policy. Firstly, the Security Council has a close 
relationship with and reliance upon law and the rule of law. Secondly, the Security Council 
                                               
85 See for example Herbert Vere Evatt, The United Nations, Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 1948, 36 
86 See UN Charter, Chapters III and V 
87 Ibid n 61, 724-731 
88 Ibid n 61, 732-737 
89 John F. Dulles, War or Peace, Macmillan: New York,  1950, 194-195. 
90 See for example Rosalyn Higgans, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of 
the United Nations, OUP: Oxford, 1963. 
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has increasingly proclaimed the importance of the rule of law within the actions of various 
states. 
 The Council’s close relationship with and reliance upon law 1.2
The relationship between the Security Council and law is complex and multifaceted. On the 
one hand, the Council is a political body which takes decisions in an environment that is 
highly charged. On the other, by virtue of its power to issue decisions that are legally binding 
upon UN member states,
91
 and authorise mandatory non-military and military coercive action 
to maintain or restore international peace and security,
92
 the Council is a body whose 
activities have profound legal implications.
93
 The Council thus sits prominently at the 
juncture between politics and law in international affairs. 
 
The Security Council’s ability to create legal obligations that are binding on practically all 
states has led some commentators to describe aspects of the Council’s activities as quasi-
legislative in character.
94
 Although the Council’s law-making process may be less 
sophisticated than the legislative process in many national parliamentary or congressional 
legislatures, the legal consequences flowing from Council decisions can bestow upon those 
decisions a quality akin to legislation such as the basis of this thesis namely the Council’s 
resolutions requiring states to take global action to counter terrorism, beginning with 
resolution 1373 (2001)
95
. Another example was its decisions in pressing for action to prevent 
the supply of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors, commencing with resolution 
1540 (2004). On occasion the Security Council has also declared certain activities to be 
illegal, thus interpreting and applying international law in a quasi-judicial manner.
96
 
Examples of the Council’s interpretive activities include declarations regarding the illegality 
of claims of statehood in the cases of Southern Rhodesia and the ‘Turkish Republic of 
                                               
91 See UN Charter, Articles  25 & 48 available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/, assessed Jan 2013. 
92 See UN Charter Chapter VIII, Articles 39, 41, 42 available as above 
93 See Articles 25 & 48  and 103 discussed later in chapter 3 and 4.  
94 See Paul C Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, (2002) 96 AJIL 900-905; Jose E Alvarez, 
International Organisations as Law Makers (2005) Oxford, OUP pp. 184-198, De Wet, ‘The Security Council 
as a Law Maker: The Adoption of (Quasi)-Judicial Decisions’, in Wolfrum and Röben (eds.), 
95 This resolution together with others in connection with terrorism will be discussed further throughout this 
thesis and in particular in chapter 3 and 4. 
96 See for further discussion; Oscar Schachter, ‘The Quasi-Judicial Role of the UN Security Council and the 
General Assembly (1964) 58 AJIL, 960-965; Bruno Simma (Ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary, 2nd Ed Oxford OUP (2002), 708 
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Northern Cyprus’, as well as declarations concerning boundary delimitation, as in the case of 
the border between Iraq and Kuwait.
97
  
 
That the Security Council has assumed a law-making role is particularly evident in sanctions 
practice where it has adopted both a quasi-legislative and a quasi-judicial role
98
. Whenever 
the Council applies sanctions, it takes on a quasi-legislative role. The mandatory provisions 
of its sanctions resolutions establish the contours of each sanctions regime, creating a new 
web of legal obligations. This amounts to legislation. The Council has also entered quasi-
judicial mode in connection with its sanctions regimes. Indeed, prior to establishing its very 
first sanctions regime, the Council characterised the white minority regime in Southern 
Rhodesia as ‘illegal’ and described its purported declaration of independence as having ‘no 
legal validity’. The Council has made other quasi-judicial proclamations in connection with 
its sanctions regimes against Iraq and Haiti. In 1990 it declared Iraq’s attempted annexation 
of Kuwait to have ‘no legal validity’ and stated that Iraq was liable under international law 
‘for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States’ as a result of its 
‘invasion and illegal occupation’ of Kuwait99. In 1994 the Council described as ‘illegal’ the 
de facto government which assumed control of Haiti following the ousting of the 
democratically elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  
 
In order for sanctions to be effective, the Security Council relies heavily upon the good will 
and good faith of states. UN sanctions are not self-implementing – it falls upon states to take 
the necessary steps to bring sanctions into effect. Article 25 of the UN Charter places a 
binding legal obligation upon states to implement the Council’s sanctions decisions, but if 
states choose not to comply with the Council’s decisions, sanctions will prove ineffective. 
The Council is therefore dependent upon the commitment of states to respect and act in 
conformity with the rule of law. The Council’s reliance upon the rule of law raises the stakes 
in relation to its own rule of law performance. States are more likely to implement sanctions, 
and thus to act in accordance with the rule of law, if they perceive the Security Council to be 
acting in accordance with its own responsibilities under the rule of law. 
 
                                               
97 See supra note 35 for a link to the full list of UN Sanctions Resolutions 
98 See A. Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for 
the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 AJIL (2001) 851, at 858-859. 
99 G. A. Lopez, & D. Cortright, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked. Foreign Affairs, 2004, 83(4), 90-103. 94 
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10 The increasing emphasis upon the rule of law in Security Council practice 
The expectation that the Security Council should respect the rule of law has also been 
prompted by the Council’s own practice. Despite the failure of attempts at San Francisco to 
enshrine the rule of law in the UN Charter as a guiding principle for Security Council action, 
the concept has exerted surprising influence over the Council’s activities. This influence, 
which has been particularly pronounced in the post-Cold War era, was foreshadowed at the 
Council’s very first meeting. At the inaugural Council meeting, held on 17 January 1946, a 
number of Council members emphasised that they expected the Council to play a pivotal role 
in strengthening the rule of law. France, for example, observed that
100
 :  
 
 The Security Council’s task is a heavy one, but it will be sustained by our hope, 
 which is shared by the people, and by our remembrance of the sufferings of all those 
 who fought and died that the rule of law might prevail.  
 
As the Cold War settled in, this utopian vision of a Security Council that would actively 
promote the rule of law quickly dissipated. The Council’s ability to fulfil its responsibilities 
under the UN Charter became severely circumscribed by the frequent failure of the Council’s 
permanent members to achieve consensus. The Security Council began to function less as an 
effective agent for the maintenance of international peace and security and more as a platform 
for ideological battles between East and West. During this period, the UN’s rule of law-
related activities tended to focus on the creation and expansion of international legal 
agreements. This approach of equating the promotion of the rule of law with the codification 
of international law can be seen in General Assembly resolution 2627 (XXV), adopted in 
October 1970 to mark the UN’s twenty-fifth anniversary. In that resolution, member states 
declared that: ‘The progressive development and codification of international law. . . should 
be advanced in order to promote the rule of law among nations.’101  
 
Following the end of the Cold War, the rule of law began its rise to prominence in the 
Security Council’s rhetoric and practice. In January 1992, world leaders gathered in New 
York for the first ever Security Council summit meeting, where they discussed the theme 
                                               
100 See  the statements made by Australia and France: Security Council Official Records, First Year Series, 
January-February 1946, at 6 & 9 
101 GA Res, 2627 (XXV) (24 October 1970), para. 3. 
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‘The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security’.102  
At that meeting, which set the agenda for UN action  post-Cold War, leaders from countries 
with a broad range of political and socio-economic traditions underlined the importance of 
strengthening the rule of law in international affairs.
103
The President of the United States, 
George H. W. Bush, urged the Security Council to ‘advance the momentous movement 
towards democracy and freedom. . . and expand the circle of nations committed to human 
rights and the rule of law’.104  
The importance of the rule of law has subsequently been reinforced at multiple high-level UN 
meetings. In September 2000, the UN adopted the Millennium Declaration.
105
 One of the first 
objectives from this declaration was strengthening respect for the rule of law in international 
affairs.
106
 Five years later, at the 2005 World Summit, leaders reaffirmed the Millennium 
Declaration.
107
 They acknowledged that ‘good governance and the rule of law at the national 
and international levels’ were ‘essential for sustained economic growth’ and they recognised 
that the rule of law belonged to ‘the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the 
United Nations’. Leaders further reaffirmed their commitment to ‘an international order 
based on the rule of law and international law’.108  
Within the Security Council itself, mounting interest in the rule of law led to the 
establishment in September 2003 of a thematic agenda item entitled ‘Justice and the Rule of 
Law’.109 Discussion in the Council’s debates on the rule of law has focused on the need to 
strengthen the rule of law within post-conflict societies. However, a number of speakers have 
taken the opportunity to emphasise that the rule of law is equally important in international 
affairs. The former Security General Kofi Annan, has observed that the Security Council has 
a ‘heavy responsibility to promote justice and the rule of law in its efforts to maintain 
international peace and security’.110  
 
                                               
102 See UN Doc S/PV.3046 31 January 1992 
103 See for example UN Doc S/PV.3046 Jan 1992, pp. 8-107 
104 Ibid., 50 
105 UN Doc A/RES/55/2 16 September 2000 
106 Ibid., 9 
107 UN Doc A/RES/60/1 24 Oct 2005 World Summit Outcome 
108 Ibid., para. 134 
109 See UN Doc S/PV.4833 24 Sep 2003 
110 See UN Doc S/PV.4833 24 Sep 2003 
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UN member states have also stressed that the Council should not only promote, but respect, 
the rule of law. Mexico urged that, ‘for the sake of justice and the rule of law, the Security 
Council must continue to act on the bases of legality that provide support for its mandate’ 
whilst Chile has underscored that the rule of law offers the Council ‘the possibility of basing 
its work on a concept that embodies the core values of the United Nations’. Austria has 
warned that a Security Council that is ‘dedicated to the resolute implementation of 
international law’ is ‘the best incentive for the implementation of law at the national level’.111  
The Council’s meetings on justice and the rule of law culminated in the adoption of two 
presidential statements devoted to the topic. Security Council presidential statements are 
adopted by the Council as a whole and must therefore be supported by all Council members. 
While they may not carry as much weight as Security Council resolutions, presidential 
statements nevertheless provide an important indication of the Council’s position on a given 
matter. In the first of these statements, adopted on 24 September 2003, the Council 
reaffirmed the ‘vital importance’ of justice and the rule of law. The Council also recalled the 
‘repeated emphasis’ given to justice and the rule of law in its own work, including with 
respect to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, peacekeeping operations and 
international criminal justice. In the second statement, adopted twelve months later, the 
Council stressed the importance and urgency of the restoration of justice and the rule of law 
in post-conflict societies. The Council also observed that justice and the rule of law at the 
international level were ‘of key importance for promoting and maintaining peace, stability 
and development in the world’.  
Although during the Cold War, the rule of law featured in Security Council resolutions only a 
handful of times, in the nine years from the beginning of 1998 until the end of 2006, the 
phrase ‘rule of law’ appeared in no fewer than sixty-nine Council resolutions.112 The Council 
has invoked the rule of law in a range of ways. It has called upon parties to an international 
conflict to resolve their differences in accordance with the rule of law, as in the case of the 
dispute between the governments of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It has emphasised the importance of (re-)establishing the 
rule of law in post-conflict situations and it has incorporated the task of promoting and 
strengthening the rule of law in peace operation mandates, including those in Afghanistan. 
 
                                               
111 See UN Doc S/PV.4835 24 Sep 2003 
112 Ibid note 35 above for a full list of UN Resolutions. 
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Although the Security Council’s resolutions have not drawn an explicit link between the 
application of sanctions and the promotion of the rule of law, this connection has been made 
during the Council’s debates surrounding the potential establishment or modification of 
sanctions regimes. In August 1990, when the Council debated the application of sanctions 
against Iraq, the United States emphasised that the proposed sanctions aimed to prevent 
‘disregard for international law’.113 Canada suggested that sanctions sought to ‘safeguard 
respect for the rule of law’ and the United Kingdom argued that sanctions would reinforce a 
‘world order based on respect for law’. In March 1992, when the Council met to consider 
applying sanctions against Libya, the United States argued that such a step would ‘preserve 
the rule of law’. In October 2005, when the Council prepared to apply sanctions against 
suspects involved in the terrorist bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq 
Hariri, Denmark observed that: ‘At stake are the sovereignty and integrity of Lebanon, the 
principle of the rule of law and the credibility of the Security Council in following through on 
its own resolutions.’ Sanctions have thus been portrayed in the Council’s debates as an 
instrument which can be used to strengthen, reinforce and promote the rule of law
114
. 
 
Council debates also demonstrate concerns with the potential negative impact of sanctions 
upon the rule of law. Speakers have stressed that the Security Council should not engage in 
‘double standards’ when choosing whether to impose sanctions and that, once sanctions are 
employed, they should be applied in a consistent and uniform manner.
115
 They have also 
called for the Security Council and its sanctions committees to act transparently emphasising 
the need to ensure that sanctions are applied proportionately, so that the negative effects upon 
civilian populations and third states are minimised.
116
  
 
The rule of law is therefore extremely relevant to the Security Council and its sanctions 
practice it is for this reason that it does seem inconceivable that the Security Council has 
imposed a sanctions regime against those suspected of involvement in terrorism that does not 
appear to comply with it. By not allowing those subjected to the considerable legal 
constraints of asset freezing and travel restrictions not to have any form of an effective 
judicial review or appeal to challenge these acts and to give legal protection to those placed 
under them The Council has increasingly championed the importance of the rule of law in its 
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own rhetoric and underline’s that it expects states and non-state actors to comply with the 
rule of law. But in order to ensure that its own actions genuinely promote the rule of law, the 
Council should ensure that its own extraordinary powers are not themselves susceptible to 
misuse or abuse.  This paper will suggest that the Council’s rhetorical commitment to 
promoting the rule of law does not yet extend to its sanctions practice and that legal 
safeguards currently in place do not meet the criteria of internationally accepted norms 
standards for the protection of individuals and other entities affected by them.  
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CHAPTER 3 
UN TERRORISM SANCTIONS INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS AND OTHER 
ENTITIES. 
 
1 Preliminary Remarks 
As was seen in the last chapter, following on from the cold war the UN has increasingly made 
use of sanctions in an attempt to maintain international peace and security with mixed success 
and various criticisms. As the new millennium approached the UN decided to turn its 
sanction tool for the first time towards a terrorist group and individuals having no official 
statehood or state control in an attempt to defeat or supress international terrorist activities. 
2 Basis of UN intervention 
Terrorism and terrorist activities are not a new phenomenon; over the years the UN through 
the General Assembly and the Security Council has played a major role in leading the fight to 
suppress terrorist activities
117
. What has changed since the end of the 20
th
 C and into the new 
millennium is the ‘globalisation’ of terrorism and the understanding that it has to be dealt 
with on the world stage
118
. As previously stated under the UN Charter only the Security 
Council is ‘responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security’119 capable of 
making decisions that are binding on its members through Security Council Resolutions
120
. In 
response to global terrorism they have adopted a number of robust measures
121
 requiring 
implementation by member states of various measures. These measures have included  
‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions’ against individuals and organisations and other entities have 
formed part of the on-going fight against terrorism both before and after, the terrorist attacks 
on the US World Trade Centre and Pentagon, collectively referred to as 9/11. 
                                               
117 See for example The UN General Assembly resolution 49/60, (1994) entitled "Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism," adopted on 9 December 1994, this resolution contains inter alia a provision defining 
terrorism as: “Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of 
persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be 
invoked to justify them.” 
118 Jesica Almquist, ‘A Human Rights Critique of European Judicial Review’: Counter-terrorism sanctions 
ICLQ 2008 57(2), 303-331 
119 Article 23 UN Charter  
120 Article 25 UN Charter 
121 For example the UNSCR 1267 (1999) Which called for further international cooperation to suppress and 
defeat terrorism reminding states of the need to implement their obligations under previous anti-terrorism 
treaties and to suppress terrorism in all lawful ways possible including those that prevent the financing of 
terrorist activities.   
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3 UN Action 
Under Article 41, the Security Council may decide what measures, not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. Buried amongst a number of 
miscellaneous provisions in Chapter XVI, is article 103, which provides: 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.  
As article 103 is concerned only with treaty obligations between member states it says 
nothing about the relationship between the Charter and the rights and freedoms of individuals 
in domestic law. Only treaty provisions that are incompatible with jus cogens, that is, a 
peremptory norm which is a fundamental principle of international law, accepted by the 
international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is ever permitted, (for 
example the prohibition on torture), are held to be void
122
. 
4 Historical development of terrorism measures 
In 1998 the UN Security Council declared through SCR1189 that every State has the duty to 
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another state 
or acquiescing in organised activities within its territory directed towards the commission of 
such acts. The bombing of United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam in 1999 
showed that international terrorism could not be defeated by simply asking states to desist in 
all forms of terrorist activity. SCR 1267(1999) provided for the freezing of funds and other 
financial resources derived from or generated from property owned or controlled by the 
Taliban or by any undertaking owned or controlled by them. A sanctions Committee was 
established to oversee implementation of these measures, known as the 1267 Committee. 
SCR 1333(2000) took this process a step further, it provided by that all states should freeze 
funds and other financial assets of Usama bin Laden and individuals and entities associated 
                                               
122 See R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, Court of Appeal, Civil Division, 
Judgment of 29 Mar. 2006, where a UK national court held that would be wholly unqualified to express an 
opinion’ on whether SC resolutions violate peremptory norms of international law. Along similar lines, the 
Court qualifies as ‘arguments that a national court cannot entertain’ the issue of whether the SC acted ultra vires 
and the problem of determining whether even human rights norms that have not attained the status of jus cogens 
should not be set aside by SC resolutions.(para 163) Oddly enough, the Court, in determining the proper scope 
of Article 103 of the Charter, preferred to rely on international legal scholarship as ‘it would be … quite wrong 
for a national court to indulge in an interpretative exercise of its own’(para 172) 
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with him to ensure that no funds were made available for the benefit of any person or entity 
associated with him, including the Al-Qaida organisation
123
. Although previous practice did 
not go this far, it has not been suggested that it lay outside the powers of the Security Council 
under article 41 to direct the taking of collective measures at an international level against 
individuals. The wording of article 41 contains an enumeration of the type of non-military 
measures that could be taken was accepted as being illustrative and non-exhaustive
124
.  
However, the measures taken (especially) against bin Laden represented a sea change in 
policy by directing UN action in this manner.  
 
SCR 1333(2000) was followed by a series of resolutions refining and updating the measures 
that were to be taken to deal with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and other 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them as designated by the 
committee established pursuant to SCR 1267. The preamble to SCR 1822(2008) declared that 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to 
peace and security. All states are required to take all the measures previously imposed by 
previous Resolutions with respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban “ and other 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, as referred to in the list 
created pursuant to Resolutions 1267(1999) and 1333(2000) (the ‘Consolidated List’)” , 
including, the freezing of funds and financial assets. SCR 1822(2008) reiterated the 
obligation of all Member States to implement and enforce the measures and urged all states to 
redouble their efforts. All Member States were to submit to the 1267 Committee for inclusion 
on the Consolidated List names of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities participating 
by any means in the financing or support of acts or activities of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden 
and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them. 
The persons on that list are the persons to whom the prohibitions in SCR 1267(1999) and 
subsequent resolutions applied. Provision was made for de-listing, review and maintenance of 
                                               
123 On the operation of the 1267 Sanctions Committee and its subsidiary bodies see Eric Rosand, ‘The Security 
Council's Effort to Monitor the Implementation of Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions’, 98 AJIL (2003) 745. 
As regards Resolution 1267 and its progeny, numerous adjustments have been made to the original supervisory 
machinery, which solely revolved around the Sanctions Committee. By means of Resolution 1333 the Sanctions 
Committee was complemented by a ‘Committee of Experts’ with the task of consulting with the Member States. 
By the same resolution, the Sanctions Committee was asked to consider, when and where appropriate, visiting 
countries bordering Afghanistan or any other country as may be necessary to improve the full implementation of 
freezing orders. The unsatisfactory results produced in terms of effectiveness of the sanctions led the SC in 
Resolution 1363 to create both a ‘Monitoring Group of Experts’ based in New York as well as a ‘Sanctions 
Enforcement Team’, located in the territory of states bordering Afghan territory. Both organs were to report to 
the Council through the Sanctions Committee. 
124 Bruno Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. (2nd ed)., Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2007, 737. 
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the Consolidated List. Individuals, groups, undertakings and entities have the option of 
submitting a petition for de-listing directly to a body known as the Focal Point. The 
Committee is directed to work, in accordance with its guidelines, to consider petitions for 
removal from the Consolidated List of those who no longer meet the criteria established in 
the relevant resolutions. While Resolutions 1267 and 1333 were relatively narrow in scope 
and the blacklist attached to them was at least quantitatively comparable to previous ones, 
Resolution 1390 presented different features. It was the first resolution of an open-ended 
nature with no apparent link to any specific territory. The Sanctions Committee, established 
under the three resolutions, later supplemented by other ancillary organs, is in charge of 
listing and de-listing individuals and entities as well as of reviewing the implementation 
reports submitted by states
125
. 
5 Widening the Net 
On 28 September 2001, as part of its response to 9/11, the Security Council broadened its 
approach to the problem still further. It decided that action was now required to be taken 
against everyone who committed or attempted to commit terrorist acts or facilitated their 
commission. It adopted SCR 1373(2001). The preamble to this Resolution recognised the 
need for states to complement international co-operation by taking additional measures to 
prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the financing and 
preparation of any acts of terrorism. Provision was made for establishing another Committee 
of the Security Council, consisting of all its members, to monitor implementation of the 
Resolution. This in effect now produces two sanction committees, the original 1267 
committee looking at specific groups and persons and this 1373 committee looking a 
terrorists generally.
 
 
Fassbender
126
, discusses the issue of targeted sanctions and due process, and suggests that it 
is the responsibility of the UN Security Council to ensure that fair and clear procedures are 
made available to individuals and entities targeted with sanctions, however his report does 
not make clear any specific suggestions on how this can be done or how the fundamental 
right to be heard can be respected by an individual whose assets are frozen and travel 
                                               
125 See I. Cameron, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights, 
72 Nordic J Int'l L (2003) 159, at 164. 
126 Dr Brian Fassbender, ‘Targeted Sanctions and Due Process’, The responsibility of the UN Security Council 
to ensure that fair and clear procedures are made available to individuals and entities targeted with sanctions 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 2006 (UN Publication). 
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restricted. In his view the machinery of the UN Security Council whilst normally political 
had definitely become quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative in nature when issuing such 
resolutions that impact on an individual without the right to effective judicial review. This is 
area will be explored throughout the remainder of this thesis, which offers a theoretical 
solution aimed at balancing both parts of the security, human rights equation. 
6 Role of the UN Ombudsperson 
Following 9/11 whilst there was an appetite on the international stage, led mainly, 
unsurprisingly, by the USA, to give the UNSC a broad discretion in the measures it decided 
and the methods it employed to deal with international terrorism. However, there were 
concerns regarding the lack of judicial protection for those subjected to these regimes and a 
call for fundamental human rights to be upheld. Provision was finally made in Resolution 
1822 (2008) for a de-listing procedure as well as a full review and maintenance of the 
Consolidated List. Individuals, groups, undertakings and entities were now given the option 
for the first time of submitting a petition for de-listing directly to a body known as the Focal 
Point. This Committee was directed by the UNSC to work, in accordance with the guidelines 
set by the Security Council
127
, however these only required consideration for any petitions to 
be removed from the ‘Consolidated List’ those whom the committee felt no longer met the 
criteria established in the relevant resolutions. However none of these processes actually 
entitle any person subjected to these measures to the right to be heard, or for the committee to 
actually take any notice of the submissions made by those subjected to the measure, or in fact 
any state actor, petitioning on their behalf.  
 
These reforms alone have not proved sufficient to satisfy the criticisms of those who advocate 
human rights including the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In the leading case involving 
UN sanctions, Kadi v Council of Europe
128
 the ECJ was asked to consider the legality of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 implementing UN sanctions, whilst this case is 
discussed further in the next chapter it should be noted that the ECJ found the denial of 
fundamental rights to Mr Kadi, in particular, the denial of the right to effective judicial 
review, was well founded. 
 
                                               
127 UN 1267 Sanctions Committee Guidelines see: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf accessed 17 August 2011. 
128 Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (Joined Cases C-
402/05P and C-415/05P). 
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In September 2009, the UN’s own United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in 
its report, entitled ‘Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism
129’commented that because individual listings are currently open-ended in 
duration, they may result in a temporary freeze of assets becoming permanent which, in turn, 
may amount to criminal punishment, due to the severity of the sanction. This, potentially, 
greatly exceeds the purpose of the United Nations to combat the terrorist threat posed by an 
individual case. In addition the report points out there are no uniform standards in relation to 
evidentiary criteria and procedures by member States. This poses serious human rights issues, 
as all punitive decisions should be either judicial, or subject to judicial review
130
. 
 
In light of the above issues, it appears that the UN had little option but to consider the process 
and procedure used by the Security Council and its committees when examining a request for 
de-listing by looking at ways it could attempt to be more transparent fair in its methods so 
that it complied with the rule of law.  
6.1 Introduction of Ombudsperson  
On 17 December 2009, the Security Council adopted SCR 1904(2009
131) (‘The Resolution’), 
which provides in para’s 20 and 21 that when considering de-listing requests, the (1267) 
Committee would now be assisted by an Ombudsperson appointed by the Secretary-General. 
The Ombudsman would deal with requests for de-listing from individuals and entities in 
accordance with procedures outlined in Annex II to the above resolution
132
.  
 
The Secretary-General, in close consultation with the Committee, was asked to appoint an 
eminent individual of high moral character, impartiality and integrity with high qualifications 
and experience in relevant fields, such as legal, human rights, counter-terrorism and 
sanctions. In June 2010, the Security Council Sanctions Committee appointed Judge 
Kimberly Prost,
133
 as the first ombudsperson in accordance with UNSCR 1904. She formally 
commenced her role on 17 July 2009. Although this role was seen by the UN as assisting the 
                                               
129 A/HRC/12/22: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, dated 9 September 2009.  
130Ibid, para 42. 
131 SCR1904(2009).  
132 Ibid, para 20-21 
133 The first Ombudsperson appointed under UNSCR 1904 is Judge Kimberley Prost. She has held many 
international judicial positions including Chief, Legal Advisory Section for the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC). Since 2006, she has been an ad litem judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia. 
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Committee in its consideration of delisting requests received from individuals and entities 
subject to the Security Council’s relevant sanctions measures, it did not give her any 
particular power or authority over that committee’s decisions or its processes. It seemed that 
whilst the UN Security Council were trying to appease growing international concern over 
this individual sanctions system, at the same time they were only paying lip service to the 
rule of law in providing effective counter measures for those involved
134
. 
 
The Ombudsperson was simply required to perform these tasks in an ‘independent and 
impartial manner’ and not to seek nor receive instructions from any government, in 
accordance with the procedures outlined in Annex II of the resolution, which gave details of 
the time line to be followed when considering de-listing applications. Under this resolution 
now that this appointment has been made, it is the Ombudsperson, not the focal point 
mechanism established by SCR 1730 (2006) that receives any requests for removal from the 
1273 Committee.  The Focal Point would continue to receive requests from individuals and 
entities seeking to be removed from other sanctions lists established under SCR 1333, thereby 
creating a two tier de-listing procedure for those placed on sanctions under each committee. 
The initial period for the appointment of the 1267 Committee Ombudsperson was for 
eighteen months. 
7 Delisting procedure 
Petitioners seeking delisting could now present their case to an independent and impartial 
ombudsperson, who, after a period of information gathering and dialogue with the petitioner 
and relevant states, and with the help of a Monitoring Team, would present a comprehensive 
report to the 1267 Committee laying out the principal arguments concerning the delisting 
request based on an analysis of all the information available to the Ombudsperson and the 
Ombudsperson’s observations.   
  
The Committee saw the appointment of the ombudsperson as an important step in ensuring 
that the Sanctions Committee’s procedures for removing individuals and entities from the 
‘Consolidated List’ were seen by the international community as being both fair and clear, as 
                                               
134 Jared Genser and Kate Barth, When Due Process Concerns Become Dangerous: The 
Security Council’s 1267 Regime and the Need for Reform, Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review, vol. 33, No. 1 (2010), 12 
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called for by the General Assembly in October 2005
135
. Whilst the Committee may have seen 
this appointment as going some way in address the concerns regarding transparency and 
fairness, the inability of ombudsperson to compel the sanctions committee to de-list anyone 
regardless of the evidence she may produce, or her lack of authority to compel states to share 
with her any information or evidence that may have used to instigate listing in the first place 
has done little to alleviate the criticism that the appointment is nothing more than superficial 
‘window-dressing’ and still fails to provide a competent tribunal. 
8 Conflict over Ombudsman appointment and ability to satisfy the rule of law 
Whilst giving judgement in the leading UK case involving UN sanctions, HM Treasury v 
Ahmed
136
 (also discussed in the next chapter), Lord Hope commented that whilst the 
implementation of an ombudsperson by the UN was to be welcomed in relation to the listing 
of individuals, it did not in his opinion amount to any form of effective judicial protection 
from those placed on the UN sanction list. In fact the inability of the 1267 Committee's 
procedures to provide an effective remedy meant that those subjected to this regime were 
unable to have their case heard by a competent tribunal, capable of providing an effective 
judicial remedy
137
. (This is discussed further throughout the study). 
 
In the present case he said was that what the complainants required was not a review from 
HM Treasury after the UK government had implemented the UN sanctions within its own 
domestic law and which due to the UK’s obligations under the UN charter it powerless to 
‘un-designate’, but an effective means of subjecting the 1267 Committee to judicial review, 
something which currently, even with the imposition of the ombudsperson, was not 
possible.
138
  
8.1 The First reports of the Ombudsperson and Monitoring Team 
The first mandate established under UNSC Resolution 1904 for both the Ombudsperson and 
the Monitoring Team expired on 17 June 2011, prior to it renewal, negotiations within the 
                                               
135 A/res/60/1, General Assembly of the UN Sixtieth Session dated 24 Oct 2005, para 109 full text available at: 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021752.pdf, accessed 17 Jun 2012 
136 HM Treasury v Ahmed (and others) [2010] UKSC 2 
137 Ibid, at para 80 
138 Ibid, para 81 
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UN seemed to be focused on a number of recommendations made by the ombudsperson and 
the monitoring team in their recent reports
139
. 
 
The ombudsperson submitted her first biannual report to the Council on 21 January 2011. 
The report summarised the initial phase of her office, outlining the structure of her office and 
identification of the issues involved for the Council to consider. These included the need for 
the committee to provide reasons for its decisions on delisting persons from the targeted 
sanctions list. Also, she raised the practical need for the ombudsperson to be able to disclose 
the identity of the designating state to the petitioner and other relevant states
140
.  
 
The 1267 monitoring team submitted its report to the committee on 22 February 2011
141
, it 
focused on two key issues, the first was how the committee could better promote peace and 
stability in Afghanistan and the second was the issue concerning the judicial process related 
to the sanctions regime. With regard to Afghanistan, the monitoring team recommended that 
the committee seek ways to expedite its consideration of delisting requests proposed by 
Afghanistan, for example, by creating a checklist of specific questions that the Afghan 
government would need to consider before submitting a delisting request. With regard to 
enhancing due process reforms to the regime, the monitoring team suggested that the 
committee increase transparency by publishing the ombudsperson’s observations on delisting 
requests (and reasons that committee members disagree with those observations, when that 
occurs). The report also suggested requiring the committee to reaffirm, by consensus, listings 
that have been considered by the ombudsperson
142
.  
 
On 16 May 2011, the chairs of the 1267 Committee, the CTC (1373 Counter-terrorism 
committee) and the 1540 committee (non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorism) addressed the Council in a regular biannual briefing
143
. The chair of the 1267 
Committee, Ambassador Peter Wittig of Germany, said that the Committee had built on last 
year's review of the consolidated list by approving the most comprehensive set of updates to 
the list in its history. The Committee had recently agreed to 78 list amendments and to 
making publicly available almost 200 additional summaries of reasons for listing. The 
                                               
139 UN Doc S/2011/29 24 January 2011 
140 Ibid at para 52 
141 UN Doc S/2011/245 accessible from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org, accessed 10 Jan 2012 
142 UN Doc S/2011/245 at 5 
143 UN Doc S/PV/6536 dated 16 May 2011; http://www.securitycouncilreport.org, accessed 15 September 2011 
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Committee is currently reviewing the listings of 48 individuals who are reported to be 
deceased and aims to conclude that review by the end of May 2011 before conducting other 
regular reviews requested in resolution 1904
144
. 
 
The informal group known as the ‘like-minded countries’ on targeted sanctions (which 
currently includes Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), Costa Rica sent a letter to the Council in 
April 2011
145
 outlining several proposals to improve and strengthen the sanctions regime 
these include requiring the Committee take delisting decisions by majority vote rather than by 
consensus, that the ombudsperson be allowed to recommend de-listings, which would 
automatically become final after 30 days if the Committee did not re-confirm the listing and 
that members provide reasons to the petitioner (via the ombudsperson) for any rejection
146
.  
 
Council members Germany and Colombia stated support for one or more of the proposals 
circulated by this group of like-minded states. The UK urged consideration of the idea of 
splitting the consolidated list into two distinct lists, the first would deal specifically with the 
Taliban and the second would deal with Al-Qaida. France also advocated taking into account 
how the relationship between the Taliban and Al- Qaida has changed over time. Russia 
however strongly argued in favour for retaining a unified consolidated list as currently exists 
and for ombudsperson to continue under the original mandate agreed by SCR 1904. Wittig 
reported that to date the ombudsperson had received ten delisting requests and had submitted 
her first report on a specific delisting request to the committee in February. Two further 
ombudsperson reports on delisting requests were completed in April. He said the Committee 
is considering these delisting requests. He also recalled that resolution 1904 encourages 
committee members to provide reasons for objecting to delisting requests. He had insisted 
that the committee members do so promptly.  
 
The Committee had reached consensus on the format in which reasons for the Committee’s 
decision could be communicated on a case-by-case basis. The Committee will also be 
                                               
144 UN Doc S/2011/29 at para 52 
145 Document submitted to the Security Council by Switzerland and the Like-Minded States in April 2011, 
‘Improving fair and clear procedures for a more effective UN sanctions system’, 
http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/22759.pdf, accessed July 2011 
146 UN Doc S/2011/29 at 12 
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considering a draft checklist of necessary supporting documentation for delisting requests 
from the government of Afghanistan.  
 
The Monitoring Team in its Eleventh Report to the 1267 Committee recommended that 
Member States treat listed Taliban and listed individuals and entities of Al-Qaida and its 
affiliates as two separate lists.
147
They also acknowledged that some form of judicial system 
was required to deal with the requests for de-listing they had received that would not be 
exactly the same as many national systems but would be unique to the Security Council.
148
 
9 Renewal of Ombudsperson Mandate UNSCR 1988 & 1989 (2011) 
On 17 June 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolutions 1988 (2011) and 
1989 (2011)
149
 as a successor to resolution 1904 (2009). By adopting these two resolutions, 
the Security Council extended the office of ombudsperson and the monitoring team for a 
further period of eighteen months and split the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime into 
two separate lists as suggested by the like-minded countries and the monitoring team. 
Resolution 1989 (2011) stipulates that the sanctions list maintained by the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) will henceforth be known as the 
“Al-Qaida Sanctions List” and include only names of those individuals, groups, undertakings 
and entities associated with Al-Qaida. Of course it should not be forgotten that those subject 
to individual sanctions by the UNSC under any other resolution do not have any recourse to 
the office of the Ombudsman.   
 
The latest resolution, 1989 (2011), in respect of the Ombudsperson recognises the 
administrative difficulties for that office and recommends that she is given more resources in 
order to fulfil her mandate which requires various actions to be completed within strict time 
limits that have been set. As far as extending her authority, the resolution makes it very clear 
                                               
147 Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team established 
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) and extended by resolution 1904 (2009) concerning Al-
Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, UN Doc S/2011/245, dated 13 April 2011.  
148 Ibid at para 36, New procedures have largely dealt with the issue of notification, and the narrative summaries 
of reasons for listing tell listed individuals why they are subject to the measures. However, the perception that 
listed persons continue to lack an effective remedy may yet require the Security Council to take further action. 
The Team believes that if that is so, there is room to develop the Ombudsperson process, but this will also 
require acceptance from the courts and Member States that an acceptable and equivalent level of review can be 
achieved through a system unique to the Security Council that does not precisely emulate a national judicial 
system.  
149 UNSC Res 1988 (17 June 2011) & 1989 (both dated 17 June 2011), 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions11.htm, accessed 2 Oct 2011  
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that although Member States should provide the relevant information to enable her to make 
the correct recommendations as to whether de-listing should take place, including, where 
appropriate, making available any relevant confidential information. When disclosing 
confidential information, the ombudsperson must still comply with any confidentiality 
restrictions which are placed on such information by the Member State providing it as she has 
been given no authority to decide herself what information may be released, effectively 
permitting the Ombudsperson to release only what the Member States allow. 
9.1 Updated delisting procedure 
Where multiple states have submitted names for inclusion on the sanctions list then the 
resolution insists there must be consensus amongst them all before de-listing can be 
recommended. States that have designated names for inclusion on the sanctions list are 
strongly urged, but not compelled, to allow the ombudsperson to reveal their identity as 
designating states.  
This resolution further requests that Member States and relevant international organizations, 
for example the ECJ, are to encourage individuals and entities that are considering 
challenging, or are already in the process of challenging their listing, through the national and 
regional courts, to seek removal from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List by submitting delisting 
petitions to the Office of the Ombudsperson in the first instance. Whether this will occur in 
practice remains to be seen. Certainly, unless those subjected to this regime consider that the 
process offers sufficient judicial protection and the ability to offer an effective remedy, it is 
difficult to imagine why they would engage in the process. The message seems far more 
likely to be for the benefit of states and other international organisations, such as the EU, in 
trying to control and direct their approach in dealing with UN sanctions in the light of the 
recent judgments and criticisms of the system for sanctions.  
Annex two of this resolution gives the mandate for the Ombudsmen in detail. It is similar in 
effect to the 1904 document.  Annexe 2 outlines the specific time scales to be employed when 
considering an application for de-listing and the ombudsperson is given four months in which 
to gather information from the petitioner who wishes to seek de-listing, during which period 
she must contact and inform the petitioner as to the procedure under the resolution as well as 
requesting all the relevant information from the State(s) concerned.  
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On completion of this phase there is a two month dialogue process in which the 
ombudsperson discusses with the petitioner the information she is able to disclose. During 
this period she may ask specific questions of the petitioner and can if necessary extend this 
time period in order to fully explore the answers given. Alternatively, if she feels she has 
concluded her enquiries she can shorten the process. At the conclusion the ombudsperson 
should obtain a signed statement that the petitioner is not, or is no longer involved with Al-
Qaida and nor will they be in the future. On completion of this phase, the ombudsperson 
compiles a written report for the committee in which she considers all the information 
available to her from the relevant member states and the petitioner.  She then makes her 
recommendations to the Committee as to whether de-listing should take place or not. The 
committee then has fifteen days to review this report and a further fifteen days to consider its 
recommendations.  
Should the ombudsperson recommend de-listing then the obligation of States to maintain 
sanctions on that petitioner will automatically cease after sixty days unless the Committee 
decides by consensus that the measures must remain. If consensus to maintain the petitioner 
on the list cannot be reached then a member of the committee may ask the chair to contact the 
Security Council for a decision, within a further sixty days, as to whether the petitioner 
should be delisted or not. If the Committee decides to reject a request for de-listing by the 
ombudsperson, then the Committee shall tell her their reasons for this decision. If the 
petitioner is not successful in their request, the ombudsperson should write to them 
explaining in as much detail as is allowed under the circumstances, the reasons for continued 
listing. Therefore, under this new resolution no matter before the committee should take more 
than six months to complete unless there are exceptional circumstances which will only be 
considered on a case by case basis. It is not made clear under what circumstances a petitioner 
may reapply for de-listing if unsuccessful this stage. 
10 Concluding Remarks 
Whilst the new UNSCRs’ make some minor changes in terms of time lines for reporting and 
an assumption that individuals and entities will be removed from the list unless the 
Committee makes a positive decision to the contrary, they are unlikely to be seen as going far 
enough by many to satisfy the concerns over judicial protection of those subject to the 
regime. The idea, now adopted, of splitting the list into two has been muted by many within 
the General assembly for some time. The office of Ombudsperson, whilst clearly a step 
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forward in offering some protection to those subjected to sanctions, does not carry any 
additional authority of ability to compel the Committee to accept her recommendations, 
disclose information or even reveal the composite identity of the States involved.  
The issues and concerns regarding judicial protection highlight the problems of having an 
essentially political body of the Security Council established under the UN charter to carry 
out the political acts of making and enforcing peace making what are essentially quasi-
legislative decisions. This in itself what not be problematic if it was not for the fact that under 
the UN Charter there is no separation of powers; the Security Council having been given all 
three roles; legislative executive and judiciary. Devoid of any enforcement powers, the UN 
Ombudsperson may have some political leverage, in that the Committee is compelled to 
explain why it should not follow any recommendation to de-list made by her. Whilst many 
agree that there are still significant shortcomings in the judicial safeguards for listing and 
delisting there is still major disagreement of how these issues should be tackled.  
Some members (including Germany) were supportive of imposing time limits or a sunset 
clause relating to listings (or at least certain categories of listings). However, the new 
resolution only requires review every three years it therefore it appears that long term 
inclusion on the list will remain the norm. Recent decisions emerging from the ECJ and other 
courts may be heralding a sea change, certainly of legal opinion, regarding sanctions that 
have been in place for nearly ten years post 9/11. With the recent death of Osama Bin Laden 
the mood to continue to allow the UN such unfettered autonomy to employing sanctions is 
slowly being challenged and eroded. It appears that many commentators within the 
international community are beginning to suggest that the UN cannot continue to impose 
measures contrary to its own charter obligations to uphold and promote human rights.  
 
In 2008 the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism Professor Martin Scheinin suggested in a 
report to the General Assembly in that; 
 At a minimum, the standards required to ensure a fair hearing must include the right 
 of an individual to be informed of the measures taken and to know the case against 
 him or her as soon as, and to the extent, possible, without thwarting the purpose of the 
 sanctions regimes; the right to be heard within a reasonable time by the relevant 
 decision-making body; the right to effective review by a competent and independent 
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 review mechanism; the right to counsel with respect to all proceedings; and the right 
 to an effective remedy
150
. 
Scheinin further advocates that In his assessment, the establishment of a some sort of quasi-
judicial review body capable of giving an effective remedy to those requesting de-listing and 
composed of security classified experts serving in their independent capacity would be likely 
to be recognized by national courts, the EU court and regional human rights courts as 
sufficient analogous protection of due process, so that courts would exercise deference in 
respect of the outcome
151
. 
The High Commissioner for Human Rights has also echoed the need for some form of body 
to effectively deal with these situations when by arguing that the longer individuals and 
entities remain on these sanction lists, the more it appears to be more of a criminal sanction 
where there is a need for full judicial protection and review which is not currently 
available
152. 
In the previous chapter, the UN’s wish to comply with the rule of law was discussed, this 
chapter has illustrated that in relation to individuals and the UN sanction system regarding 
counter-terrorist measures, and this has not taken place.  
10.1 Strengthening the role of the Ombudsperson 
Another consideration would be to consider if it is practical and feasible to increase the remit 
of the ombudsmen to take on the extra role or having full judicial review powers over those 
cases brought before it regarding targeted sanctions in order to address the rule of law 
concerns previously mentioned. Whilst this might seem an attractive idea at first glance on 
further analysis it is extremely unlikely for the following reasons: 
                                               
150 Martin Scheinin, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, address to the General Assembly on 22 October 2008 (available at 
www2.ohchr.org), accessed 10 April 2010. 
151 Ibid at 7. 
152 High Commissioner for Human Rights who, in a report to the General Assembly of the United Nations of 2 
September 2009, entitled ‘Report ... on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism’ (document A/HRC/12/22, point 42), makes the following statement: ‘Because individual 
listings are currently open-ended in duration, they may result in a temporary freeze of assets becoming 
permanent which, in turn, may amount to criminal punishment due to the severity of the sanction. This threatens 
to go well beyond the purpose of the United Nations to combat the terrorist threat posed by an individual case. 
In addition, there is no uniformity in relation to evidentiary standards and procedures. This poses serious human 
rights issues, as all punitive decisions should be either judicial or subject to judicial review.’  
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The present role of the Ombudsperson is to investigate and report findings to the terrorism 
panel, the role perhaps analogous with that of the Advocate General within the EUCJ. In 
order to elevate the role from its present mandate into that of a decision maker would require 
a sea change in thinking at the highest level of the UN.  
To enhance the role in order to fulfil the judicial review/appeal criteria this would in effect be 
to create a court of last instance, in other words a final decision making organisation without 
further appeal for those seeking redress against the UNSC. Therefore in accordance with 
judicial norms this would not be a role for a single judge and would require a panel of 
suitably trained international advocates to fulfil this role, with the additional burden of 
agreeing their selection, tenure, location and support.  
There are currently no rules of procedure or practice for any such panel to take effect, 
therefore the UN would have to create a brand new organisation, without the necessary 
jurisprudence or gravitas with the additional problems of obtaining any such agreement from 
the Security Council which would require further Security Council resolutions authorising the 
formation of this panel and giving it the power to overturn its own previous decisions.  
Whilst it can be seen that these issues are not insurmountable, and indeed the UN has 
authorised judicial tribunals through resolutions on previous occasion, there would be 
considerable difficulties in elevating the current ombudsperson into that sort of a judicial 
review panel with authority to scrutinise the legality of the Security Council and overturn 
previous decisions. However it is envisaged in this study, that the role of ombudsperson could 
be absorbed into the proposed procedure of utilising the International Court of Justice to take 
on the judicial review procedure, where the analogous role of the EUCJ AG fits much more 
comfortably. This role of the ICJ in this respect will be explored in chapter 7 and 8, 
particularly in relation to its standing with the UNSC. 
The next chapter will examine various case studies at both national and regional levels which 
are indicative of the lack of protection available to individuals and other entities, subject to 
UN sanctions, under international human rights norms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDIES INVOLVING THE UN’S TARGETED SANCTIONS AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL 
 
1 Preliminary Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider some of the leading cases that have involved 
national and regional courts with respect to dealing with issues involving conflicts with the 
UN charter in general and member state obligations with respect to ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ 
sanctions in particular. This chapter is seen as giving a contextual background to the 
difficulties involved when dealing with conflicts between fulfilling UNSC resolutions and the 
protection of human rights that national and regional courts can offer
153
. It is not meant to be 
an in depth discussion of the plethora of issues such as the territorial reach or full extent of 
any particular regional or national human rights document, or the rulings generally by any 
court regarding the coverage of those rights but rather highlight the thread of this thesis that 
without a suitable mechanism for international judicial review being available to the 
individual at the level of the UN then difficulties in balancing the human rights and peace and 
security conundrum will continue unabated, with ever more judicial inveigling required in 
order to reach a rights based solution. 
1.1 Background to the jurisdictional conflict 
As stated previously following the formation of the United Nations, member states bound 
themselves through the UN’s Charter to maintain international peace and security by taking 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of any threat to this peace and to promote 
and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 1)
154
. The United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) was given primary responsibility for maintaining this 
peace and security and member states agreed through the charter to carry out the decisions or 
resolutions of the Security Council in order to achieve this end (Article 24). 
1.2 Article 41 and 103 
                                               
153 For further discussion on cases involving challenging acts of the UN and other international organisations  
see for example; A. Reinisch (Ed), Challenging Acts of International Organizations Before National Courts, 
OUP, 2010; A. Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council:Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions, 
Oxford, 2011 
154The Charter of the United Nations, available at the UN website, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/, 
accessed 2 March 2012 
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Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. Among a number of 
miscellaneous provisions in Chapter XVI is one of the most important charter articles, 103, 
which provides; 
 In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
 Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
 agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
155
  
 
Generally only treaty provisions that are incompatible with jus cogens, such as the 
prohibition on torture are automatically considered void. Obligations under the decisions and 
enforcement measures of Chapter VII prevail over other commitments of the members 
concerned in international law
156
.  
2 Dealing with UN sanctions within the UK 
3.1 Legislative background 
Within the UK in order to give direct effect to its United Nation Charter obligations under 
domestic law, the UK under its ‘dualist system’ introduced the United Nations Act 1946157. 
This act allows the Government to introduce secondary legislation by making various orders 
in council to give effect to relevant SCR’s. It should also be noted that prior to the events of 
9/11 the UK Government had already enacted the Terrorism Act 2000 for the creation of a 
criminal regime dealing specifically with the funding of terrorism. In response to 9/11the 
Government introduced further legislation in the form of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001. Part 2 of the 2001 Act provided specifically for the making of freezing 
orders. However following various UN resolutions discussed below the UK along with all 
                                               
155 For a full discussion of the implications and meaning of Article 103 see; Rain Liivoja, The scope of the 
supremacy clause of the United Nations Charter, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 2008, 57(3), 583-
612   
156 For Comment see: Bruno Simma, (Ed), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary (2nd Ed), OUP, 
2002, especially at 1295. 
157The 1946 United Actions Act Section One states:“ If, under article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations 
signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 (being the article which relates to measures not involving the use of 
armed force) the Security Council of the United Nations call upon His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom to apply any measures to give effect to any decision of that Council, His Majesty may by Order in 
Council make such provision as appears to Him necessary or expedient for enabling those measures to be 
effectively applied, including (without prejudice to the generality of the preceding words) provision for the 
apprehension, trial and punishment of persons offending against the Order.”   
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other member states were obliged to introduce further legislation in order to comply with 
their UN charter commitments. 
3.2 The Terrorism Order (TO) 
The previously discussed SCR 1373 was given effect in UK domestic law by introducing the 
Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2001 (SI 2001/3365), in October 2001. The 
wording of its leading provision was modelled on that of the SCR, making it a criminal 
offence for any person who, except under the authority of a licence granted by the Treasury, 
makes any funds, financial or related services available directly or indirectly to or for the 
benefit of a person who commits, attempts to commit, facilitates or participates in the 
commission of an acts of terrorism. It also includes those people who may be controlled 
either directly or indirectly and those who act on behalf or at the direction of, anyone 
involved in terrorism. The lack of Parliamentary debate regarding the introduction of this 
major terrorist legislation is typical of the UK Parliament’s response to any matter involving 
‘terrorism’, which nearly always passes through both houses with little or no debate. Perhaps 
most infamously demonstrated by recalling the introduction of the 1911 Official Secrets Act 
which became law the same day it was introduced to Parliament, leaving the iniquitous 
Section 2 on the statute books for over sixty years.  
3.3 The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 
The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 (SI 2006/2657) (the TO) was also 
introduced as an order in council under the same act. It gave effect to SCR 1373(2001) and 
SCR 1452(2002), revoking the 2001 order. The new order allowed for the Treasury to give a 
direction as to who could be designated provided they are satisfied under the grounds of 
reasonable suspicion that the person is or may be, a person who commits, attempts to 
commit, participates in or facilitates the commission of acts of terrorism or merely a person 
identified in the Council Decision. The order also applies to those allegedly controlled either 
directly or indirectly, or acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated person. 
Designation imparts a very onerous regime on those selected. No one including the 
designated person may deal with funds or economic resources belonging to, owned or held by 
a person referred to in the order, unless he does so under the authority of a licence granted by 
the Treasury. A person who contravenes the prohibition is guilty of an offence.  The phrase 
“deal with” in this order was written in terms which are designed to catch every imaginable 
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kind of transaction in respect of funds and economic resources. The Treasury may authorise 
certain transactions under licence. These may be general or granted to a category of persons 
or to a particular person, they may be subject to conditions and may be of indefinite duration 
or subject to an expiry date. The Treasury may vary or revoke the licence at any time. This 
gave extraordinary power to HM Treasury in respect of a person’s assets without that person 
being convicted, charged, arrested or even questioned, over their alleged involvement in 
terrorism.  
 
On 10 August 2009 the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2009 (SI 2009/1747), 
came into force. Like the 2001 and 2006 Terrorism Orders, to give effect to SCR 1373(2001). 
It revoked the 2006 Order, but it provided that persons who had been designated under the 
2006 Order were to remain subject to its terms until 31 August 2010, unless their designation 
was revoked by that date.  
3.4 Differences between the 2006-9 Orders 
There were some technical differences between the 2006 and the 2009 Orders, such as to the 
definition of dealing with an economic resource, which improved to a slight degree the 
difficult effects of the regime on spouses and other third parties who interacted with the 
designated person. The prohibitions that the 2009 Order imposed on making funds, financial 
services available for their benefit and on making economic resources available to them or for 
their benefit, apply only if the benefit that the person would obtain or is able to obtain is 
significant. An additional pre-condition for designation is that the Treasury must consider 
that the direction is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public 
from the risk of terrorism. Subject to these minor adjustments, the impact of the regime on 
the designated person himself continued as rigorously as it was under the 2006 Order, and the 
phrase “reasonable grounds for suspecting” in the 2006 Order was retained in the 2009 
Order.  
3.5 The Al-Qaida and Taliban Order 
The Treasury's response to the Security Council's directions that measures that were to be 
taken to deal with Al-Qaida, Usama Bin Laden, the Taliban and other individuals, groups 
undertakings and entities associated with them as designated by the committee established 
pursuant to SCR 1267 was to make the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) 
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Order 2002 (SI 2002/111). It was replaced by Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations 
Measures) Order 2006, in November 2006 (AQO). As in the case of the Terrorism Order, this 
Order sets out a rigorous system of prohibitions and licences which is applied to persons who 
are designated persons for its purposes. The Treasury's may give a direction that a person 
identified in the direction is designated for the purposes of this Order, if they have reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that the person is or may be, Usama Bin Laden, a person designated 
by the Sanctions Committee, a person owned controlled by a designated person or a person 
acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated person. The Treasury were given the 
power to vary or revoke these directions at any time. 
3.6 The issues involved in both orders 
The fundamental issue in HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 5 (SC) (the ‘A’ case) was 
whether or not the Treasury, in effect the executive were empowered by the United Nations 
Act to allow the introduction of both the Terrorism Order and the Al-Qaida Order, by Order 
in Council. The contention was that these Orders were ultra vires on three grounds. Firstly, 
they passed into effect without Parliamentary scrutiny, secondly, they lacked legal certainty 
and proportionality and thirdly, there was no procedure available to allow any challenge to 
their designation on the list in the first place. From a Human Rights perspective it was argued 
that both sets of Orders were incompatible under the European Convention of Human rights 
(ECHR) with articles 8, the right to family life, privacy and correspondence, article 1 of 
Protocol 1 which deals with the right to peacefully enjoy ones property. There was also a 
complaint under article 6 of the convention regarding the lack of access to a court for an 
effective remedy.   
3.7 The Facts of the A Case 
A, K and M are brothers with UK citizenship. In August 2007 they received letters which 
stated that under the Terrorism Order (TO) a direction had been made because the Treasury 
had reasonable grounds for suspecting that they were persons who facilitate or commit acts in 
the commission of terrorism. The restrictions they were placed under as a result of 
designation put a great burden on their wives and families, created significant mental health 
difficulties and ultimately have been blamed for the breakdown of their marriages.  
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It is important to reiterate that A, K and M, have never been charged with, or arrested for, any 
terrorism related offence. It was not until September 2007 that the Treasury provided some 
details about the factual basis for the decision to make the directions, although this was 
limited again due to the sensitive nature of some of the material. 
G, another appellant, was also informed in December 2006 that a direction had been made 
against him under the TO. He was not told until later that his original listing had been at the 
request of the United Kingdom. It was not until March 2007 that he was told that his listing 
meant that he was now a designated person under the AQO.  
3.8 The appeals procedure 
They all issued proceedings in the Administrative Court, seeking to set aside the directions 
made against them in pursuance of the two orders made by the Treasury. In April 2008 
Collins J held that the TO and the AQO were ultra vires and he quashed both Orders
158
. 
Following an appeal by the Treasury in October 2008, the Court of Appeal allowed the 
appeal in part. It held that the provisions of the AQO were lawful but stated that any person 
designated under these orders was entitled to seek judicial review of the merits of the 
decision. A, K, M and G were also given further leave to appeal following an application 
made in March 2009. The third proceedings were brought by HAY an Egyptian national, who 
also resident in the United Kingdom. His name was added to the Consolidated List by the 
1267 Committee in September 2005. As a result he also became a designated person for the 
purposes of the AQO. Unlike G, the proposal that his name be added to the list was not made 
by the United Kingdom. It provided no information to the 1267 Committee in relation to its 
decision to add his name. Numerous attempts by Hay’s legal team via the FCO failed to 
establish which state had in fact designated him, although it was understood not to be the UK. 
In fact the Foreign Secretary has made an application to the 1267 Committee for HAY's name 
to be removed from the list, as he considers that Hay's listing is no longer appropriate. The 
High Court
159
concluded that the AQO was ultra vires of the 1946 Act. The Court held that 
the practical effect of the AQO was to preclude access to the Court for protection of what 
Hay contended were his basic rights. The Treasury appealed against this decision. In response 
to representations made by Hay's solicitors the Treasury amended his licence conditions 
which have enabled his wife to obtain welfare benefits. However despite the Home 
                                               
158HM Treasury v Ahmed (and others) [2008] EWHC 869 (Admin), [2008] 3 All ER 361. 
159 [2009] EWHC 1677 (Admin) 
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Secretary’s intervention, Hay must remain subject to the AQO unless and until the 1267 
Committee decides to remove him from the Consolidated List.  
3.9 Considerations of the application of the orders 
The TO and AQO impose extremely onerous regimes, every transaction, however small, 
which involves the making of any payments or the passing of funds or economic resources 
whether directly or indirectly, for the benefit of a designated person is criminalised. This 
affects all aspects of life, including the ability to move around at will by any means of private 
or public transport. However, a Treasury system of regulated licensing has evolved to enable 
payments to be made for basic living expenses. Although their interpretation of the sanctions 
regime, and of the system of licensing and the conditions that it gives rise to, is extremely 
rigorous. The overall result is very burdensome on all the members of the designated person's 
family. Sir Anthony Clarke MR accepted that the orders are oppressive in their nature and 
that they are bound to have caused difficulties for the appellants and their families
160
. Wilson 
LJ said that they imposed ‘swingeing disabilities upon those who were designated.’161 The 
House of Lords described the regime as it applied to HAY's wife as ‘disproportionate and 
oppressive’. They continued that the invasion of the privacy of someone who was not a listed 
person as ‘extraordinary.’162  
3.10 The Judgment 
The Supreme Court ruled by majority that both Orders were ultra vires, albeit on slightly 
different grounds. Lord Brown dissented on the grounds that the wording of the AQO was the 
same as the UNSCR and therefore was in direct compliance of the UNSCR which the UK 
was obliged to carry out as a member of the UN no matter what the Court felt. This meant in 
his opinion that, in the presence of a clear UN mandate, the principles governing the 
separation of powers and the protection of human rights within the UK would have had to 
defer to the need to fulfil UN Charter obligations. 
 
The majority felt that there was no indication that Parliament had anticipated the adoption of 
                                               
160 [2009] 3 WLR 25 , para 25 
161 R(M) v HM Treasury [2008] 2 All ER 1097 para 152  
162 R(M) v HM Treasury [2008] 2 All ER 1097, para 15 
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such draconian measures when it enacted the 1946 Act.
163
 On the contrary, the Court applied 
the “Simms principle164” which dictated that Parliament could only depart from fundamental 
rights through express and unambiguous language. When the measures required by a UN 
Resolution affect the rights of an individual so profoundly there were limits to their adoption 
by means of Orders in Council under the general enabling power of the 1946 Act.  
3.11 The Courts reasoning 
The Court held that the TO was ultra vires by introducing a “reasonable suspicion” test, it 
went beyond the requirements of Resolution 1373 and therefore beyond what is allowed 
under executive discretion granted by the 1946 Act (Lord Rodger dissenting). Only 
Parliament could properly decide to impose more stringent measures upon individuals than 
provided for in a UN measure, (Lord Rodger agreeing). Lord Brown would have allowed 
“reasonable grounds for believing165” and Lord Mance suggested proof on the ‘balance of 
probabilities’.166Lord Rodger even accepted “reasonable suspicion” as “expedient” within 
section 1(1) of the 1946 Act, albeit only on a temporary basis pending rapid replacement by 
an Act of Parliament.
167
 Lord Phillips suggested that the purpose of the Resolution extended 
only to freezing the assets of “criminals” and not mere “suspects”,168an argument rejected by 
Lord Rodger as “an impractical approach which would emasculate the very international 
system the Security Council wished to create.
169”   
 
The court held that the orders went beyond their remit when even though the executive 
measure fell within the scope of a UNSC Resolution, the interference with fundamental rights 
was such that it could only be authorised by the democratically elected Parliament. In the 
absence of any effective and independent review at UN level it left no means to contest their 
designation. The Court did clarify that although Article 103 of the UN Charter displaced the 
applicants' ECHR rights and thus prevented any claim that the AQO was unlawful under the 
Human Rights Act, notwithstanding that the right of access to a court had long been 
recognised in the common law as fundamental to the rule of law, and could only be 
                                               
163 Lord Hope (with whom Lord Walker and Lady Hale agreed) para 61, Lord Phillips para 145-155 and Lord 
Mance para 239-241.  
164 R v. Home Secretary ex parte Simms [1999] 1 A.C. 69 
165 Lord Brown at para 199 
166 Lord Brown at para 230 
167 Lord Rodger at para 176 
168 Lord Philips at para 129-143 
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overridden by clear Parliamentary wording.  
Restrictions upon the rights of citizens were made conditional upon the explicit seal of the 
democratic process. Lord Brown, dissenting in part, identified a “clash of conflicting 
principles”170 on the one hand, the UK's UN Charter obligations, and on the other the Simms 
principle that human rights infractions need to be explicitly sanctioned by Parliament. Lord 
Brown concluded that, while the TO was ultra vires of the 1946 Act, the AQO was not 
because it was categorically mandated by a UNSC Resolution. Lord Brown thus resolved the 
conflict by giving precedence to the UK's duty under Article 25 of the UN Charter to carry 
out UNSC Resolutions. The majority rejected such a conclusion; they felt that such 
restrictions upon individual rights always need Parliament's express consent. While 
Parliament can choose to legislate contrary to fundamental rights, it can also decide that 
certain measures required by a UNSC Resolution are too onerous to be given direct effect in 
the UK through secondary legislation.  
3.12 The Treasury’s response 
The Treasury reacted to the Supreme Court's judgment by publishing the Draft Terrorist 
Asset-Freezing Bill 2010 and by securing the rapid passage of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 2010. The latter deems all of the impugned Orders in Council 
under the 1946 Act to have been validly adopted and therefore retains in force all directions 
made under those Orders regardless of the fact that the Home Secretary wished Hay to be 
removed from the designated list. The Act expired in December 2010, and was replaced by 
the Terrorism Asset Freezing etc., Act 2010.  This Act now provides a statutory basis for the 
UK's asset freezing regime. Under this new Act there are two designation powers available to 
the Treasury, final and interim. Interim designations are based on the lower ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ standard rather than the more generally accepted ‘reasonable belief’. Interim 
designations only may last up to 30 days, but can be renewed, while final designations based 
on ‘reasonable belief’ expire one year from being made unless also renewed.  There is a 
provision within the Act which provides for judicial review of any Treasury decision made 
but that is unlikely to help anyone placed on the UN’s consolidated list. It would appear that 
victory of the successful applicants in the Ahmed case has proved extremely short-lived. 
3.13 The first report into the operation of the Terrorism Freezing Etc; Act 2010 
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In December 2011 the first report into the operation of the Terrorism Freezing Etc; Act 2010 
was published.
171
 One positive note was that to incur designation now required both a 
necessity to protect the public and the burden of reasonable belief rather than reasonable 
suspicion; although it was found questionable if the required necessity test had been met in 
all cases
172
. There is a recommendation that the HM Treasury should be required to explain to 
Parliament the basis on which it considers the necessity test will be satisfied and that it is 
proportionate. The report recognises the lack of judicial input into designation process such 
as required in the use of control orders and unlike the procedure adopted in France and 
Ireland
173
. This gives wide powers to the executive and recommends that it should be a last 
option with prosecution being preferred with its inherent protections for the accused. 
Improved clarity in Treasury reports and its website is recommended to improve transparency 
of the Act as a whole. Licensing and compliance under the Act needs to be clearer in order 
assist those designated in understanding what they are and are not permitted to do
174
. There 
was also concern that the names of those designated are made public without the person 
being in a position to know the case against them or therefore to defend themselves from 
unknown allegations. The author of the report acknowledges many improvements over the 
previous regime and cooperation from the Treasury itself as well as a sharp decline in the 
number of people designated.
175
 
3.14 Concluding remarks 
Critics may argue that there was a lack of consistency in the Lordships judgments and that the 
decision itself in this case is divisive, however taken overall the Court has produced a 
coherent view. In the main, they have suggested that to implement such measures which 
directly affect in such a grave manner an individual’s fundamental rights is a matter that 
should be put before Parliament and not left to the Executive alone. Unfortunately their 
reasoning that this would allow full democratic debate before implementation has proved 
hypothetical. Lord Rodger in his judgement stated that it really did not matter by what means 
the SCR’s were introduced into our domestic law, as they inevitably will be because of our 
international obligations under the UN Charter. Whilst ultimately this has have turned out to 
                                               
171 David Anderson, First Report on The Operation of The Terrorist Assest Freezing ETC Act 2010, (Dec 2011), 
The Stationary Office, London.  
172 Ibid, 4. 
173 Ibid, 68.  
174 Ibid, 72. 
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be true, perhaps the point is missed that under the UK’s dualist system it should be for 
Parliament to discuss the ramifications to our democratic society of implementing 
international measures that have such a draconian effect on an individual’s rights. There is a 
danger that by accepting these resolutions as ‘incremental infringement’ of our liberty there is 
a danger that Parliament will accept one type of control as necessary in one area of law to 
then justify its application to another
176
.  
 
This Court’s ultimate decision to find both orders ultra vires does show an attempt to protect 
the individual from excessive executive power, whilst supporting the concept of 
Parliamentary supremacy and emphasises the respect of the judiciary for the separation of 
those powers, contrary to much recent media reporting. The Government in turn has shown 
unwavering support for almost unrestricted authority of the UNSC with their innate lack of 
effective judicial review or democratic accountability. The UN is essentially a political body 
that has none of the inherent safeguards we consider necessary to protect those subject to its 
decisions in a democracy. Surprisingly perhaps, although the ECtHR has effectively played 
no part in protecting an individual from the excess of any SCR, they have made clear in 
various judgments that under article 103, the UNSC will always take precedent over any 
other international agreement.  
 
Whilst the primary aim of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security, it 
seems that when doing so human rights are seen as secondary, there is a disregard for 
fundamental rights and an inherent lack of judicial protection available to those subjected to 
these sanctions as shown in ‘A’ case. The view that peace and security and fundamental 
human rights are mutually exclusive is thought by some, if not all commentators to be simply 
untrue
177
. They argue that any lasting strategy for peace and security that is not anchored in 
respect for human rights and civil liberties is essentially a strategy of insecurity
178
. Whilst this 
is clearly only one view, it could be argued that whenever national or international security is 
threatened, states should uphold human rights not dispose of them on the grounds they are 
                                               
176 Richard Stone, Civil Liberties & Human Rights, (6th Ed): OUP, Oxford, 2006,  9. 
177 See for example those who advocate a strong human rights approach: Christina Pantazis, Simon Pemberton, 
From the "old" to the "new" suspect community: examining the impacts of recent UK counter-terrorist 
legislation, 2009, British Journal of Criminology; O Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law 
(2006) 26 OJLS 235-256:; see for example those who suggest the more open a democracy, the more likely 
terrorists can operate within it; James Lutz & Brenda Lutz, Democracy & Terrorism, Perspectives on Terrorism,  
Journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative, 2010, Vol 4 No1 1  
178 Dora Kostakopoulou, How to do Things with Security Post 9/11, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol: 28 (2) 
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luxuries that cannot be supported. Fundamental rights such as: the right to a fair trial, family 
life, peaceful enjoyment of possessions and an effective judicial review are surely equally 
important to a strong democratic society as peace and security. These rights are clearly 
missing from the SCR now implemented into UK domestic law. One view is that by treating 
both security and human rights as equal, it may actually lead to a more ‘rights’ based 
democratic society, one possibly be less susceptible to cause and effect of terrorism in the 
first place. 
 
The reasoning behind the sanctions imposed by the UN are of course laudable in their overall 
aims of attempting to maintain peace and security by suppressing international terrorism, one 
that operates without borders or even a substantive organisation to hold to account.  However 
to use such a blunt international instrument as UN sanctions against individuals with its real 
and personal consequences as shown in the A case is something that Parliament was unlikely 
to have foreseen when it introduced the UN Act in 1946 and one that should have perhaps 
been debated more stridently by Parliament before introducing any new asset freezing 
legislation. Whilst this lack of real debate is disappointing it is not surprising when 
considered in the historical context of terrorism debates generally within Parliament.  
 
Sir Anthony Clarke MR when overturning an earlier decision in this case accepted that the 
orders are oppressive in their nature and that they are bound to have caused difficulties for the 
appellants and their families
179
. Wilson LJ said in that they imposed swingeing disabilities 
upon those who were designated
180
. In R(M) v HM Treasury [2008] 2 All ER 1097 the House 
of Lords described the regime as applied to Hay’s wife as disproportionate and oppressive 
and the invasion of the privacy of someone who was not a listed person as extraordinary
181
: 
As a permanent member of the Security Council it appears that the UK government has done 
little to uphold our own democratic principles within the asset freezing regime currently 
initiated by the UN. Although these sanctions are not supposed to be criminal in nature but a 
preventative civil measure,  those subjected to them, many for over ten years now, they may 
have good grounds to suggest they are in effect a punitive measure with few safeguards 
available under national law. Generally speaking the UK has a robust human rights protective 
mechanism in form of the Human Rights Act enshrining rights agreed in ECHR, however the 
                                               
179 A, K, M and G v Her Majesty’s Treasury [2008] EWCA Civ 1187, [2009] 3 WLR 25 
180 Ibid at para 152 
181 Ibid para 156 
  
56 
 
A case and the subsequent implementation of the new asset freezing legislation has 
highlighted the vulnerability to interference and erosion of those rights through instigating 
SCR at the international level, something perhaps we should all be concerned about.  
 
4 The Regional Courts of Europe and UN targeted sanctions 
4.1 Preliminary remarks 
The European courts experience of dealing with issues involving the UN Resolutions and 
member states obligations under its charter, have taken two very distinctive paths. European 
Council’s human rights court; the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has habitually 
taken a subservient role to the UN when balancing cases involving member states obligations 
under both treaties, citing the supremacy of article 103 over any other international 
obligations that member states may have, this stance however seems to be changing as will be 
shown in recent developments in the Al Jedda
182
 and Nada
183
 cases. In contrast the European 
Union’s Court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has recent taken a very dualist approach 
to dealing with the implementation of UNSC resolution, deciding that the EU is a separate 
organisation with a distinct legal system separate from that of the UN. It has taken stance 
very much in line with individual human rights when dealing with the issue of targeted 
sanctions and asset freezing as will be seen in the leading case of Kadi
184
 that is discussed 
first.  
4.2 Brief historical background to the European Court of Justice 
The ECJ was set up under the Treaty of Paris (1951) to implement the legal framework of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). When the European Community was set up 
under the Treaty of Rome (1957), the ECJ became its court. When the European Union was 
created under the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the ECJ's powers were again expanded to cover 
the broader legal remit of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) again extended the ECJ's remit 
to include, among other areas, Justice and Home Affairs, as well as renaming the courts the 
'Court of Justice of the European Union'. The number of cases sent to the ECJ has grown 
dramatically since the institution was established. As a result, a Court of First Instance (CFI) 
was set up in 1989 to assist by dividing the workload. The Court of First Instance was 
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renamed the 'General Court' in the Lisbon Treaty. In addition to this the Civil Service 
Tribunal was set up in 2005 to adjudicate in disputes between the EU and its civil service. All 
three Courts are based in Luxembourg. 
4.3 Development of the ECJ 
In a world increasingly concerned with globalisation, the role of the European Union (EU) as 
a separate political and legal entity is seen as ever more important and with it has grown a 
larger role for its court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which is the only arbiter of EU 
law
185
.  
Within the EU legal order only the ECJ is capable of carrying out the function of judicial 
review of EU law in the form of the annulment procedure
186
. That means if any of the 
member states, certain organs within the EU such as, the Council, the Commission or (under 
certain conditions) the European Parliament believes that a particular EU law (that is 
regulation or directive) is illegal, they may ask the Court to annul it. Unlike most 
international law regimes EU law endows the individual with rights and grants locus standi 
under certain conditions for an individual to bring an action directly against the EU for 
breaches of their rights under EU law
187
. 
4.4 Development of human rights within the EU 
                                               
185 For a full discussion and explanation of the workings of the EU, from its inception to the present day see for 
example: Jo Steiner & Lorna Woods, EU Law (10th Ed) OUP, 2009;Paul Craig, Grainne de Burca, EU Law: 
Text Cases and Material, (5th Ed), Oxford, 2011; Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four 
Freedoms (3rd Ed): OUP, 2010 
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recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-
vis third parties. It shall, for this purpose, have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European 
Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of 
powers. The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought by the Court 
of Auditors and by the ECB for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives. Any natural or legal person may, 
under the same conditions, institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision 
which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual 
concern to the former. The proceedings provided for in this article shall be instituted within two months of the 
publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it 
came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.  
187 For a full explanation of Article 230 EC in relation to the individual  see; Ewa Biernat, The Locus Standi of 
Private Applicants under article 230 (4) EC and the Principle of Judicial Protection in the European 
Community, EU Jean Monnet Chair NYU Law School: Jean Monnet Working Papers, accessed  4 Jan 2012. In 
relation to discussion of the individual post the Lisbon Treaty see: Agne Limante, Action for annulment before 
ECJ after the Lisbon treaty: Has the access to justice improved? Conference paper presented at EPGA 
conference Budapest 2011, accessed 10 March 2012 
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Under the original treaty of Rome
188
 (which established the original European Community), 
there was no comprehensive list of ‘Human Rights’ to be protected under Community Law, 
the Community Court has developed its own case law in this area and in doing so has 
confirmed that human rights form an integral part of the Community legal order
189
. The 
introduction of further treaties has strengthened the awareness of human rights within the EU. 
Under Article 6 of the TEU, the EU ‘shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’190.  
 
The EU as an entity is not (yet
191
) a member of the Council for Europe and is therefore not an 
actual signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in its own right, 
although all member States of the EU are and therefore bound to act within the terms 
contained of the ECHR
192
and the decisions made by its court (ECtHR). This has led 
historically to the development of two sets of jurisprudence, with occasional conflicts
193
 
however the ECJ has mostly accepted and referred to development of human rights from the 
ECtHR as part of their own case law
194
. Note, the EU is also not a signatory to the UN charter 
(yet) although all of its member states are. 
5 UN targeted sanctions and the EU 
Within the European Union (EU) the Security Council resolution 1390 (2002) which 
incorporated several previous UNSCR regarding the freezing of terrorist assets was 
incorporated by (EC) Regulation No 881/2002. It ordered the freezing of the funds and other 
economic resources of the person and entities whose names appeared on a list annexed to that 
regulation that was supplied by the UN.  
                                               
188 Treaty of Rome established the European Community 1957, now replaced but still available at the EU 
Website, accessed  10 March 2012 
189 E. Ellis,  & T. Tridimas, Public Law of the European Community, Text, Materials and Commentary, Sweet & 
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190 Article 6 TEU states: “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. The 
Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”  
191 For a full discussion and explanation of the Treaty of Lisbon/Reform treaty and its full implications on this 
should it ever becomes ratified see; Jukka Snell, European Law Review, 2008,"European constitutional 
settlement", an ever closer union, and the Treaty of Lisbon: democracy or relevance? E.L. Rev. 2008, 33(5), 
619-644. 
192R. Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights, (3rd Ed), 2007, Oxford, 103. 
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with the result in Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Women v Ireland (1992) Series A No 246, in the 
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5.1 Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v the Council of the European Union 
The most significant case to come before the EU Courts is without doubt the conjoined cases 
of Yusuf and Kadi.
195
 These are highly complex cases which have exercised many legal 
synapses over the last few years with much written on the subject matter. For the purposes of 
this study however, the author will only consider the cases in relation to the conflict between 
the UNSC wishes and the ECJ’s determination to uphold human rights norms together with 
the proposition that only a fully constituted judicial review at the international level will 
alleviate future problems of this magnitude and complexity. 
 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi, a resident of Saudi Arabia, and the Al Barakaat International 
Foundation, established in Sweden were designated by the UN Sanctions Committee as being 
associated with terrorist activities. Consequently, on October 19, 2001 the names of Mr Kadi 
and Al Barakaat were placed on the list of names annexed to the regulation.  As the two cases 
are nearly identical, Kadi will be the one referred to throughout the article. In the background 
of the case are the sanctions originally established by the Security Council in its Resolution 
1267 (1999) against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The sanctions regime was expanded 
by subsequent resolutions to the Al-Qaeda network and persons associated with it.
196
 The 
Council set up a Sanctions Committee as its subsidiary body to monitor the implementation 
of sanctions, which maintained lists of suspected terrorists. UN member states were obliged 
to enforce sanctions against these listed individuals. Having this sanctions regime in place, 
the member states of the European Union (EU)
197
 decided that instead of implementing this 
regime individually in their respective domestic legal systems, they should do so through EU 
mechanisms.  
 
The EU Council thus adopted several common positions, as well as Regulation No. 881/2002, 
implementing the sanctions regime. Annexed to the Regulation, was the list of persons whose 
funds were to be frozen, on the basis of the lists made by the Sanctions Committee of the 
Security Council. As Community law, the Regulation had direct effect in the legal orders of 
                                               
195 Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533; Case T-
315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649. 
196 See generally,Chia Lehnardt, European Court Rules on UN and EU Terrorist Suspect Blacklists, January 31, 
Volume 11, Issue 1 2007, The American Society of International Law, www.asil.org/insights070131.cfm, 
accessed 9 August 2011 
197 The terms, European Union (EU) and European Community (EC) will be used interchangeably throughout 
this paper, as will EU law, EC law and Community law. 
  
60 
 
the member states and took precedence over any contrary domestic legislation. The assets of 
the applicant in Kadi were frozen in this manner. He complained to the CFI, seeking to annul 
the implementing Regulation on the grounds that it violated his fundamental human rights as 
protected by primary EU law (that, under long-standing jurisprudence, protects as general 
principles a corpus of fundamental rights, including the rights enshrined in the ECHR), 
including the right to a fair hearing, the right to property and the right to judicial review.
198
 
One of his key arguments was that [T]he Security Council resolutions relied on by the [EU] 
Council and the Commission do not confer on those institutions the power to abrogate those 
fundamental rights without justifying that stance before the Court by producing the necessary 
evidence. As a legal order independent of the United Nations, governed by its own rules of 
law, the European Union must justify its actions by reference to its own powers and duties 
vis-à vis individuals within that order.
199According to Kadi’s argument, he was entitled to 
human rights protections under EU law, and that legal order “was independent of the United 
Nations.” The Security Council resolution could not prevail over these rights, as it could not 
penetrate this independent legal order.
200
 
 
The magnitude of this argument cannot be overemphasized, as it challenges the most 
fundamental operating assumption of Article 103 of the Charter. Like any hierarchical rule, it 
can only prevail over a norm which is a part of the same legal order. As the United States 
Constitution is the supreme law only in the United States legal system, but not in the legal 
orders of France or China, so Article 103 of the Charter is only superior law in the 
international legal system. 
5.2 Decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
The CFI rejected all the pleas in law raised by Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat and confirmed the 
validity of the Regulation
201
 however it did suggest in its reasoning that it could possibly 
review the actions of the UN, albeit in very limited circumstances as a violation of the legal 
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principle of ‘jus cogens’202. Brown suggests that the ability to consider ‘any limit on the 
determinations of the Security Council is very encouraging
203’. Bianchi considers the use of 
‘jus cogens’ to review these resolutions as a ‘novel approach’ as many commentators still 
consider the UN as a ‘higher authority’204. The Courts reasoned that although it was not in a 
position to check whether the requirements of the Security Council action under Chapter 
VII
205
 of the UN Charter had been met, nor if they were legitimate and proportionate, it 
affirmed that it should be able to control, at least to some extent, whether the Security 
Council had respected the area of human rights. To this end, it held that the Security Council 
is directed to act ‘in accordance with the Purpose and Principles of the Charter206 which 
includes compliance with human rights. The Court considered the main area of complaint, the 
right to property and the right to a fair hearing, then considered if these fell within the 
concept of ‘jus cogens’, however no matter how novel or remarkable this legal reasoning may 
have been, ultimately the CFI decided they did not. 
5.3 Case Comment on CFI action 
Whilst the outcome of the Kadi case is entirely predictable in that the traditional stance 
regarding supremacy of the UN charter by the CFI regards EU law as subservient, given that 
Member States are required to comply with UN Security Council resolutions by the terms of 
the UN Charter, which states it takes precedence over Community law. What is remarkable is 
that the CFI felt competent to even consider the decision of the Security Council under the 
concept of jus cogens. Almquist agrees that although the court might have had some 
difficulty in linking the deprivation of property to such a ‘threat to life’ as to be part of ‘jus 
                                               
202 Latin meaning "compelling law." These are known as peremptory norms of general international law or jus 
cogens. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines these norms as those “accepted and recognized 
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of jus cogens is prohibited and any treaty that conflicts with jus cogens is void, Article 53 of the VCLT: “A 
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law”. 
In addition, Article 64 provides: “If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing 
treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates”. States or international organisations for 
that matter cannot contract out of it in their bilateral relationships. For further discussion see for example; R 
Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights, (3rd Ed), OUP, 2007, 7. 
203 R. Brown, ‘Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities: 
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cogens’ as arrangements were in place to allow for humanitarian relief207. She does feel they 
might have had a made a more persuasive legal argument in asserting the lack of any forms 
of ‘judicial review’ which was contrary all international human rights instruments208. This, 
she argues, is because they form part of the category of peremptory norms from which there 
can be some restriction but not total derogation and therefore may be part of ‘jus cogens’209. 
Bianchi states that regardless of their final outcome and the somewhat convoluted reasoning, 
what is important is that as an international tribunal it has considered judicial scrutiny of 
Security Council resolutions on the basis of jus cogens norms, this qualifies as constituting an 
international public order of sorts
210
. Ultimately perhaps the concept of ‘jus cogens’ is, as Ian 
Brownlie observed, the vehicle that remains in the garage
211
. 
5.4 ECJ Grand Chamber 
Kadi and Al Barakaat appealed the CFI decision and the case was heard before the Grand 
Chamber of the ECJ in September 2008. The ECJ accepted that the EU had to perform a 
balancing act between achieving its legitimate aims and the rights of an individual (or entity). 
They agreed that under the present Regulation of imposing freezing orders there was no need 
to provide either appellant with prior warning of the seizure, or allow them a right to be 
heard, prior to being placed on the list, as this, they said, could frustrate the very intention of 
the action
212. As to the CFI decision on ‘jus cogens’ the ECJ was critical of the lower Courts 
reasoning in the matter, but decided this was an irrelevant issue as the ECJ was capable of 
reviewing the UNSC sanctions when seen, not as an international agreement, but as being 
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211 Ian Brownlie, Discussion Statement, in A. Cassesse and J. Weiler, (Eds.), Change and Stability in 
International Law-making: European University Institute, Berlin, 1988, 110. 
212 Kadi Ibid,  377. 
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part of EU law via the relevant regulations, so in effect they were not reviewing the SC but 
their own EU law as a separate legal system
213
.  
 
In light of the actual circumstances surrounding the inclusion of the appellants' names in the 
list of persons and entities covered by the restrictive measures contained in Annex I to the 
contested regulation, the ‘rights of the defence’, in particular the right to be heard and for an 
effective judicial review of those rights, the court felt were patently not respected
214
. Whilst it 
may have been necessary to act without their prior knowledge, they should have been told the 
grounds for their inclusion and allowed a judicial remedy as soon as was practicable, and this 
was not the case. The court felt that according to previous EU case law, the principle for an 
effective judicial protection is a ‘general principle’ of Community law, stemming from the 
‘constitutional conditions’ common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Arts 
6
215
 and 13
216
 of the ECHR
217
. 
 
The AG, Poiares Maduro, argued that it would be wrong to conclude that, once the 
Community is bound by a rule of international law, the Community Courts must bow to that 
rule with complete acquiescence and apply it unconditionally in the Community legal order. 
The relationship between international law and the Community legal order is governed by the 
Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that legal order only under 
the conditions set by the constitutional principles of the Community.
218
 
 
The AG could see nothing in the EU and EC treaties that would absolve measures 
implementing UN Security Council resolutions from the fundamental rights guarantees of the 
Community legal order. The AG was furthermore not persuaded by the argument of the EU 
institutions and the United Kingdom (relying on Behrami
219
) that, in similar situations, even 
the European Court of Human Rights would not exercise jurisdiction. According to the AG, It 
is certainly correct to say that, in ensuring the observance of fundamental rights within the 
                                               
213 Ibid 342. 
214 Ibid 344. 
215 Article 6 ECHR, Which relates to the Right to fair trial. 
216 Article 13 provides for the right for an effective remedy before national authorities for violations of rights 
under the Convention. The inability to obtain a remedy before a national court for an infringement of a 
Convention right is thus a free-standing and separately actionable infringement of the Convention. 
217 Kadi v Council of the European Union (C-402/05 ) 344. 
218 Case C-402/05 Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro (16 Jan.2008), 
para. 24 (footnote omitted). Accessed 19 March 2011. 
219 See Behrami and Behrami v. France (C:71412/01) and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (C: 
78166/01). 
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Community, the Court of Justice draws inspiration from the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights. None the less, there remain important differences between the two courts. 
The task of the European Court of Human Rights is to ensure the observance of the 
commitments entered into by the Contracting States under the Convention. Although the 
purpose of the Convention is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of the individual, it is designed to operate primarily as an interstate 
agreement which creates obligations between the Contracting Parties at the international 
level. This is illustrated by the Convention’s inter-governmental enforcement mechanism. 
The EC Treaty, by contrast, has founded an autonomous legal order, within which States as 
well as individuals have immediate rights and obligations. The duty of the Court of Justice is 
to act as the constitutional court of the municipal legal order that is the Community. The 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice are therefore unique as regards 
their jurisdiction ratione personae and regards the relationship of their legal system with 
signatory states seen as creating obligations in public international law.  
 
The AG proceeded to review the applicant’s human rights claim on the merits, finding that 
there is no reason for any sort of circumscribed review,
220
 and concluded that his right to be 
heard by EU institutions and his right to effective judicial review were infringed by the 
impugned regulation, taking into account the lack of a genuine and effective mechanism of 
judicial control by an independent tribunal at the UN level.
221
 On appeal, the ECJ agreed 
entirely with the main strands of the AG’s reasoning.222 It first held that the Community is 
based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member states nor its institutions can avoid 
review of the conformity of their acts with the basic constitutional charter, the EC Treaty, 
which established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to enable the 
Court of Justice to review the legality of acts of the member states. Therefore obligations 
imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the 
constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle that all Community 
acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness 
which it is for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal remedies 
established by the Treaty.
223
 The ECJ further noted that international law in no way prohibits 
                                               
220 Ibid. paras. 44-46. 
221 Ibid. paras. 54-55. 
222 Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Comm’n, 
Judgment, (Sept. 3, 2008) 
223 Ibid. at para. 285 
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the judicial review of domestic measures implementing a state’s international obligations, 
including obligations stemming from Chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council.
224
 The 
Court thus concluded that the review by the Court of the validity of any Community measure 
in the light of fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression, in a community 
based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an 
autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an international agreement.  
 
For the AG and the ECJ, the EU legal order is not just autonomous, but also domestic, 
municipal, and, most importantly, constitutional.
225
 According to the AG and the ECJ, it is 
Community law that determines how international law operates within it, not the other way 
around. For them, the annulment of a regulation implementing a Security Council resolution 
and violating fundamental rights is a purely domestic affair, just as it would be for a United 
States court to review the implementation of a statute against the Constitution. This is a 
familiar debate. For most international lawyers, EU law might not be “just” regional 
international law, and it is certainly to a large degree self-contained. But it still remains a 
derivative of international law, if for no other reason because its founding instruments are 
treaties concluded between states.
226
 
In Kadi, the AG concluded his opinion by discussing the lack of judicial review at the UN 
level:  
 Had there been a genuine and effective mechanism of judicial control by an 
 independent tribunal at the level of the United Nations, then this might have released 
 the Community from the obligation to provide for judicial control of implementing 
 measures that apply within the Community legal order. However, no such mechanism 
 currently exists. As the Commission and the Council themselves have stressed in their 
 pleadings, the decision whether or not to remove a person from the United Nations 
 sanctions list remains within the full discretion of the Sanctions Committee a 
 diplomatic organ. In those circumstances, it must be held that the right to judicial 
 review by an independent tribunal has not been secured at the level of the United 
                                               
224 Ibid. at paras. 298-99. 
225 See Comment by Andreas Paulus, in Can the Security Council Displace Human Rights Treaties? (Al-Jedda, 
Part 2) at: Opino Juris Blog, online at www.opiniojuris.org, accessed 3 Jan 2012. 
226 See, e.g., Trevor Hartley, International Law and the Law of the European Union –A Reassessment, 72 Brit. 
Y.B. Int’L L.1, 2–3 (2001); Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained 
Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483, 516 (2006); Alain Pellet, Les fondements juridiques 
internationaux du droit communautaire, 5 Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 193, 249 (1994) 
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 Nations. As a consequence, the Community institutions cannot dispense with proper 
 judicial review proceedings when implementing the Security Council resolutions in 
 question within the Community legal order.
227
 
 
In his opinion and that accepted by the Court Mr Kadi’s claim was well founded and the 
regulation was annulled. 
Following this landmark decision, the Commission attempted to amend the regulations to 
comply with the Courts ruling. On 28 November 2008, the Commission adopted Regulation 
(EC) No 1190/2008 amending for the 101st time, Regulation No 881/2002. The effect was 
that Mr Kadi remained on the sanction list and he therefore made a further complaint to the 
ECJ.  Following a lengthy judgment by the ECJ on 2 September 2010, the main Court again 
upheld Mr Kadi’s claim that his right to be heard by a competent tribunal and seek a suitable 
remedy had been denied. The Court dismissed the Commission’s attempts to amend the 
regulation and once again annulled it. The Court stated in its findings that it was apparent 
from the examination of the second plea that the contested regulation was adopted without 
furnishing any real safeguard which would enable Mr Kadi to put his case to the competent 
authorities, in a situation in which the restriction of his property rights must be regarded as 
significant, having regard to the general application and duration of the freezing measures to 
which he is subject. The appeal from this case is currently before the Grand Chamber and a 
final decision is pending. 
5.5 Concluding comments on the Kadi case 
In On 5 October 2012, the Security Council removed Mr Kadi from the UN list, ‘after 
concluding in its consideration of the delisting request submitted by this individual through 
the Ombudsperson that he should no longer we maintained on the list
228’. A week later, the 
EU followed suit and finally removed Mr Kadi off its own list as well
229
. According to Larik 
the fact that it took close to eleven years to resolve this issue is perhaps more of a cause 
for critical reflection on the effectiveness of multilevel governance than a reason for 
                                               
227 Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, para. 54 
(Jan. 16, 2008), <http://curia.europa.eu/ jcms/jcms/j_6/home> Accessed  3 Jan 2012. 
228 SC/10785/2012 full text available at; http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/sc10785.doc.htm, assessed 1 
December 2012. 
229 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 933/2012 of 11 October 2012 amending for the 180th time 
Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain 
persons and entities associated with the Al Qaida network, full version available at; http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:278:0011:01:EN:HTML, assessed 18 December 2012  
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elation. Furthermore, neither is the fact, on its own, of the EU being compliant with 
international obligations a joyful occasion, nor is that of the UN finding a solution on its 
own terms. The UN appears to have diffused the situation by simply removing Mr Kadi 
rather than a thorough examination in a judicial fashion the processes involved
230
.  
 
The Kadi case raises many important legal issues
231
particular to the protection of the 
individual against the State. This more proactive stance taken by the ECJ can be viewed as 
extending human rights within the EU.
232
Professor Tridimas suggested that the ECJ's 
commitment to the protection of fundamental rights was to be applauded, but that as regards 
the exercise of finding a balance between the overriding interests of public security and the 
rights of the individual it marked the beginning rather than the end of the inquiry
233
. 
 
The Kadi case is perhaps a yardstick of just how far Europe is prepared to act in deference to 
this type of international law making. One drawback is although much has been discussed on 
the issue through the proceeding there is still no codification of jus cogens within 
international law, even though there is a wealth of material written about it.
234
 However 
perhaps Kadi confirms that the Security Council does not enjoy limitless power, it should 
operate within the rule of law and the principles of its own charter to uphold and promote 
human rights.
235
 
 
                                               
230 Joris Larik, Kadi Delisted, a cause for celebration? European Law Blog, 30 October 2012 at; 
http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=1192, assessed 4 March 2013. 
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fundamental right: Michael Bothe, ‘Security Council's targeted sanctions against presumed terrorists’: the need 
to comply with human rights standards Journal of International Criminal Justice 2008, 6(3), 541. 
232 Tawhida Ahmed & Israel De Jesus Butler, The ‘European Union and human rights’; an international law 
perspective E.J.I.L. 2006, 17(4), 771. 
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Helsinki, 1988); G Gaja, ‘Jus cogens beyond the Vienna Convention’ (1981) 172 Recueil des Cours 271;  
235 See S. Lamb, Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Power in GS Goodwin-Gill, and S Talmon, 
(Eds.), The reality of International Law, Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie: OUP, Oxford, 1999, 261; K 
Zemanek, ‘Is the Security Council the sole Judge of its Own Legality?’ in E Yapo and T Boumeda (Eds), Liber 
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In this respect as Cananea suggests only judicial review will provide the proper test for 
evaluating measures that collide not only with property, but also with human dignity
236
. 
Bothe
237
 supports this argument by stating that the right to a remedy is a ‘fundamental human 
right’. It applies, first of all, to the protection of the individual against the state. This 
proactive stance taken by the ECJ can only be seen as extending human rights not only within 
the EU but within the international plane as well.
238
  
6 Brief background to the ECtHR 
The European Court of Human Rights is an international court set up in 1959 by the Council 
of Europe
239
. It rules on individual or State applications alleging violations of the civil and 
political rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights
240
. Since 1998 it has sat 
in Strasbourg as a full-time court and individuals can apply to it directly. In almost fifty years 
the Court has delivered more than 10,000 judgments. These are binding on the countries 
concerned and have led governments to alter their legislation and administrative practice in a 
wide range of areas. The Court’s case-law makes the Convention a powerful living 
instrument for meeting new challenges and consolidating the rule of law and democracy in 
Europe. 
6.1 The Behrami case 
A starting point purely for this study is the Behrami case. In Behrami
241
 the ECtHR had 
received a complaint regarding the actions and inaction of members of an international 
security force (“KFOR”) that had been deployed in Kosovo pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1244(1999) following the breakup of the Balkans. This action had led the 
complainants to believe that there was a breach of their rights, under the ECHR, by 
signatories of that Convention in complying with their commitments under the UN 
resolutions. When the case came before the ECtHR, the Grand Chamber, it ultimately held 
                                               
236 Giacinto Della Cananea, European Law Review, 2007, Case Comment, Return to the due process of law: the 
European Union and the fight against terrorism, E.L. Rev. 2007, 32(6), 896-90. 
237 Michael Bothe, Legal Journals Index, Security Council's targeted sanctions against presumed terrorists: the 
need to comply with human rights standards,  Journal of International Criminal Justice, J.I.C.J. 2008, 6(3), 541-
555 
238 Tawhida Ahmed & Israel De Jesus Butler, The European Union and human rights: an international law 
perspective, E.J.I.L. 2006, 17(4), 771-801. 
239 The Council of Europe http://www.coe.int/ accessed 15 March 2012. 
240 The European Convention on Human rights http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-
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that the applications were not admissible on the ground that the Court was not competent 
ratione  personae. This was because the individual respondents were to be treated as part of 
KFOR
242
 and KFOR was exercising powers ‘lawfully delegated under Chapter VII of the 
Charter by the UN Security Council’. In these circumstances the actions of the respondents 
were ‘directly attributable to the UN, an organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its 
imperative collective security objective’.243 Under the heading “Relevant Law and Practice” 
the Court in Behrami made the following observations about article 103 of the UN Charter,  
 
 ‘The ICJ (International Court of Justice244) considers article 103 to mean that the 
 Charter obligations of UN member states prevail over conflicting obligations from 
 another international treaty, regardless of whether the latter treaty was concluded 
 before or after the UN Charter or was only a regional arrangement’.   
 
It should be noted at this point that the ICJ has also found Article 25 to mean that UN 
member states' obligations under a UNSC Resolution prevail over obligations arising under 
any other international agreement.
245
   
 
Later in its judgment, the Grand Chamber under article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties they found that treaties were to be interpreted in accordance with the 
Convention subject to article 103 of the UN Charter.
246
 The ECtHR went on to make the 
following observations about the Convention and the UN acting under Chapter VII of its 
Charter, The Court first observed that nine of the 12 original signatory parties to the 
Convention in 1950 had been members of the UN since 1945, that the great majority of the 
Contracting Parties joined the UN before they signed the Convention and that all Contracting 
Parties were members of the UN. Indeed, one of the aims of the Convention was the 
collective enforcement of rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the General 
                                               
242 KFOR is the NATO led Kosovo Force which derives its mandate from UNSCR 1244 of 10 June 1999 and 
the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. 
KFOR is operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, as such, is a peace enforcement operation, which is 
more generally referred to as a peace support operation. Initially, KFOR’s mandate was to deter renewed 
hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces, establish a secure environment and ensure 
public safety and order, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, support the international humanitarian effort 
and coordinate with and support the international civil presence. For further information see; 
http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor.aspx 
243 Behrami v France ; Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (2007) 45 EHRR SE 85, para 151. 
244 For a full discussion on the role and purpose of the ICJ including suggested amendments see chapter 8. 
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Assembly of the UN. More generally, the Convention had to be interpreted in the light of any 
relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between its 
Contracting Parties. Lord Hope stated in the HM Treasury v Others
247
 said that the ECtHR 
had made a very strong statement in Behrami
248
where it said that the Convention cannot be 
interpreted in a manner which would subject the acts and omissions of contracting parties 
which are covered by UNSCRs to the scrutiny of the court, as to do so would be to interfere 
with the fulfilment of the UN's key mission to secure international peace and security. 
Although the European Convention on Human Rights was a leading human rights instrument, 
article 103 of the UN charter clearly supersedes it and leaves no room for manoeuvre by its 
reference to ‘any other international agreement’.  
6.2 Al Jedda & Nada cases at the ECtHR 
The ECtHR has since altered its position considerably to the question of UN supremacy 
through article 103. This can be seen in the cases of Al Jedda, and Nada with Milanovic 
suggesting that the former represents a significant developments with regard to issues such as 
the dual attribution of conduct to states and to international organizations, norm conflict, the 
relationship between the ECHR and general international law, and the ability or inability of 
UN Security Council decisions to displace human rights treaties by virtue of Article 103 of 
the UN Charter
249
. In the case of Nada v Switzerland this is perhaps the next stage in the 
development of exerting human rights norms over UN Charter obligations and raises several 
interesting issues although ultimately the case has yet to be decided by the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court of human Rights (ECtHR). 
6.3 Background to the Al Jedda case 
The applicant was detained by British forces who were occupying Southern Iraq in 2004. He 
was detained not under the law of occupation, nor on a criminal charge in pre-trial detention, 
but under the authority to detain preventively which was arguably granted to the US and UK 
by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1546.
250
 He claimed that his detention was 
                                               
247 HM Treasury v A (others) (Lord Bingham) para 74.  
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unlawful under Article 5 ECHR, which, absent any derogation, does not allow for such 
preventive security detention, without judicial review. The UK had argued that under Article 
103 of the UN Charter, the grant of a detention authority in Resolution 1546 prevailed over 
the contrary prohibition in Article 5 ECHR. During the protracted judicial proceedings 
through the various Courts there were a number of significant developments. Firstly the 
imposition of targeted sanctions against suspected terrorists by the Security Council under 
resolutions 1267 and 1373 and the reliance by states on Article 103 to preclude any human 
rights-based challenge to these sanctions.  
 
Secondly the ECtHR decided the Behrami and Saramati case,
251
 which in many ways 
mirrored Al-Jedda. Specifically, Mr Saramati was detained by international forces in Kosovo 
(KFOR) on preventive grounds, on the basis of purported detention authority in Security 
Council resolution 1244, which was argued to prevail over Article 5 ECHR. In its decision, 
however, the Court did not reach the Article 103 issue, holding instead that the actions of 
KFOR troops were not attributable to individual troop contributing states, but to the UN, as 
by authorizing the military mission in Kosovo the UN Security Council supposedly exercised 
‘ultimate authority and control’ over it. The Behrami ruling had been heavily criticized,252 
again not merely for its end result, but for its numerous methodological flaws and its failure 
either to apply or at least openly to disagree with the effective control rule codified in the 
draft Article 5, and now draft Article 7, of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO)
253
, as finally adopted 
by the ILC on second reading on 3 June 2011.
254
 Indeed, the ILC itself considered and 
explicitly rejected Behrami.
255
 Most importantly, from a law of international responsibility 
                                                                                                                                                  
referred to were sent to the Council by the then U.S. Secretary of State, Mr Colin Powell, and the interim Prime  
Minister of Iraq, Dr. Ayad Allawi. Mr Powell’s letter outlined the duties of the MNF forces, stating that these  
‘will include combat operations against members of [insurgent] groups, internment where this is necessary for  
imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq’s 
security’: UN Doc S/RES/1546, para. 10.  
251 App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01, Behrami and Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany and 
NorwayC] (dec.), Judgment, 2 May 2007. 
252 See for example; Sari, ‘Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The 
Behrami and Saramati Cases’, 8 Human Rts L Rev (2008) 151; Mujezinovic Larsen, ‘Attribution of Conduct in 
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standpoint, Behrami did not even consider the possibility that attribution of conduct may be 
dual or even multiple, i.e., that the same action or inaction can be attributable both to a 
member state or states and to an international organization. Indeed, when it comes to troop 
contingents or other military assets that states put at the disposal of international 
organizations, for example in peacekeeping missions, the default rule of attribution continues 
to apply: being organs of the state, the conduct of the troops will be attributable to the state, 
under Article 4 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. The same conduct may also be 
attributable to an organization, but it requires more than mere attribution to the organization 
for that conduct to cease being attributable to state, and this is the scenario which the DARIO 
effective control criterion was meant to encapsulate.  
 
When Al-Jedda came before the House of Lords 65 it raised three major issues. First, after 
Behrami was decided, the UK government started arguing that the acts of its soldiers in Iraq, 
which were after resolution 1511 (2003) there under Security Council authorization, were not 
to be attributed to the UK, but to the UN. Accordingly, if the acts of UK soldiers in Iraq were 
not attributable to the UK, then the UK could not have exercised Article 1 jurisdiction over 
Mr. Al-Jedda. Secondly, the Lords had to deal with Mr Al-Jedda’s argument that Article 103 
was inapplicable, since resolution 1546 merely authorized the UK to detain people con-
sidered to be security threats, but did not oblige it to do so, while Article 103 accords pre-
eminence only to obligations under the Charter. Lord Bingham did not find that argument 
persuasive. He considered that both state practice and academic opinion clearly favoured the 
applicability of Article 103 to Council authorizations, because the importance of maintaining 
peace and security in the world could scarcely be exaggerated, and since authorizations have 
effectively replaced the system of collective security that was envisaged by the drafters.
256
 
Thirdly, finding that there was indeed a norm conflict between resolution 1546 on one hand 
and Article 5 ECHR on the other, Lord Bingham held that pursuant to Article 103 that 
conflict had to be resolved in favour of the resolution, and that its prohibition of preventative 
detention was accordingly displaced or qualified. However, Article 5 could be displaced only 
to the absolute minimum necessary so that ‘the detainee’s rights under article 5 are not 
infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in such detention’.257 
6.4 Al-Jedda Before the ECtHR 
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In Strasbourg, the applicant emphasized the ECtHR’s own qualification of the ECHR as the 
‘constitutional instrument of European public order’,258 and the ECHR as a self-contained 
regime, which could give way to other norms only through derogation. Not only was 
resolution 1546 an authorization, rather than an obligation, under the Charter, which would 
render Article 103 inapplicable, but even if it did apply the Security Council could not just 
extinguish the ECHR on a whim. The applicant urged the Court to rely on the ECJ’s decision 
in Kadi, and say that UNSC resolutions could not affect human rights protections under the 
ECHR as far as the ECHR itself is concerned, or rely on its own decision in Bosphorus
259
 and 
say that UNSC resolutions could potentially displace the ECHR only if the UN provided 
equivalent protection of human rights, which it obviously does not in this particular instance. 
Both of these avenues, in effect, asked the Court to declare the ECHR to be independent of 
the UN Charter and general international law, requiring it to fragment the international legal 
order for the benefit of human rights. 
On the issue of supremacy of the UN Charter under article 103, the apparent norm conflict 
between the ECHR and resolution 1546, the Court held that as follows:  
In its approach to the interpretation of Resolution 1546, the Court has reference to the 
considerations set out in paragraph 76 above. In addition, the Court must have regard 
to the purposes for which the United Nations was created. As well as the  purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security, set out in the first subparagraph of 
Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, the third subparagraph provides that the 
United Nations was established to “achieve international cooperation in . . . promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Article 24(2) 
of the Charter requires the Security Council, in discharging its duties with respect to 
its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to 
“act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. Against 
this background, the Court considers that, in interpreting its resolutions, there must be 
a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on 
Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights. In the event of any 
ambiguity in the terms of a Security Council Resolution, the Court must therefore 
choose the interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the 
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Convention and which avoids any conflict of its obligations. In the light of the United 
Nations’ important role in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights, it is 
to be expected that clear and explicit language would be used were the Security 
Council to intend States to take particular measures which would conflict with their 
obligations under international human rights law.
260
 
 
This is an important development from the ECtHR, here the Court has laid down a clear 
statement for interpreting UNSC resolutions that could go a long way in providing a 
meaningful human rights check on the Security Council. Sir Nigel Rodley argued for 
precisely such an interpretative rule in his separate opinion in the Sayadi case before the 
Human Rights Committee
261
. Since Article 5 therefore continued to apply in full force, the 
Court found that Mr. Al-Jedda was unlawfully detained.
262
 
6.5  Case Implications and conclusion 
This ruling is important in as far as is gives a clear indication that the ECtHR is prepared to 
join the growing calls for accountability of unbridled UNSC power and respect for the rule of 
law. Like that of the ECJ in Kadi and the UK supreme Court decision in Ahmed (& others) 
the ECtHR has recognised that if there is a conflict between the need for peace and security 
and upholding human rights, then at the very least it will require the UN to produce its 
Resolutions in clear and unambiguous language if it wishes remove human rights from them. 
This would require its members to take political responsibility for their actions. However the 
Court did not examine the fundamental question of whether resolution 1546 could have 
prevailed over the ECHR even if it did satisfy the presumption. Perhaps that argument can be 
taken as implicitly accepted, so that the UNSC could displace the ECHR, the ‘constitutional 
instrument of European public order’, of which the ECtHR is the ultimate guardian. The 
Court also did not address the issue of whether authorizations are capable of being covered 
by Article 103.
263
 Therefore the issue regarding Article 103 remains unresolved on this issue, 
whilst bearing in mind the strong presumption that the Court has created. Al-Jedda is still 
likely to produce a ripple effect in all situations involving UNSC sanctions that may have an 
adverse impact on human rights, however, it is yet to be seen how far the ECtHR and other 
European domestic Courts will be prepared to take the Al-Jedda presumption. 
                                               
260 Al-Jedda GC para. 102. 
261 Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v. Belgium, CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, 29 Dec. 2008, 
262 Al-Jedda GC, The Court awarded the applicant €25,000 in damages, para. 114. 
263 See, in that regard, the dissenting opinion by Judge Poalelungi. 
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6.6 Nada v Switzerland264 
Another interesting case following on from Al Jedda in the UN Charter Article 103 and 
human rights compliance debate within Europe is that of Nada v. Switzerland. The 
application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 19 February 2008. It 
was communicated to the Swiss authorities, with questions from the Court, on 12 March 
2009. The Governments of France and the United Kingdom were authorized by the Chamber 
to intervene as third parties (Article 36 and 2 of the Convention).On 30 September 2010, the 
Chamber to which the case had been allocated relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the 
Grand Chamber.  
5.6.1 Facts of the case 
This case concerns an Italian national resident in the Italian enclave of Campione in 
Switzerland, who was placed at Switzerland’s request on a terrorist suspect list by the 
UNSCR 1267 Committee, and subjected to targeted sanctions. Among these sanctions is a 
travel ban that Switzerland implemented through its domestic legal mechanisms. 
Accordingly, the applicant was denied permission to transit through Switzerland from 
Campione, thus rendering him unable to move even to other parts of Italy, let alone anywhere 
else, essentially confining him to the 1.6 square km of Campione. Mr. Nada complains that 
the Swiss travel ban violates his rights under Arts: 5 (personal liberty), and 8 (private life), of 
the ECHR.  
5.6.2 Reasoned Outcomes 
Prior to the final decision on the case in September 2012 many commentators speculated 
regarding what the ECtHR would do in these circumstances. It was thought that the Court 
could make several possible decisions which may affect dramatically the supremacy of 
UNSC Resolutions over regional human rights protection.  
5.6.3 Non applicability 
The simplest course would be for the Court could to say that Mr. Nada’s ECHR rights are not 
even engaged. Alternatively, it could balance these rights away and justify this with 
Switzerland’s need to comply with its obligations under the UN Charter. 
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6.7 Reading down of charter or ECHR obligations 
The Court could have tried ‘reading down’ the relevant UNSC resolutions instead. As per Al 
Jedda, where the Court could employ an interpretative presumption to the effect that the 
UNSC should be presumed not to have intended to violate the basic rights of individuals in 
the absence of explicit language to the contrary; it is only if such language existed, that Art. 
103 could be said to override contrary norms in human rights treaties. However, on the facts 
of Nada, it is unlikely that such a presumption can be employed with much effect. The UNSC 
resolutions are quite clear that member states have to take very specific measures against 
individuals listed by the Sanctions Committee. Only an exceptionally strong presumption that 
would require something like a ‘notwithstanding clause’ in UNSC resolutions (e.g.‘states are 
required to apply these measures notwithstanding their obligations under applicable human 
rights treaties’), could do the necessary work, and it is doubtful whether courts generally, or 
herein, the European Court specifically, have both the gumption and the political legitimacy 
to devise it. 
6.8 Asserting ECHR as a separate legal order concluding remarks 
A third possible avenue of norm conflict avoidance would be an assertion, in a milder or 
more overt form, that the ECHR is an independent legal order beholden to no other, one that 
does not accept the supremacy claim in Art 103 of the Charter. As per the ECJ in Kadi when 
it asserted that EU law and EU guarantees of fundamental rights were independent from the 
UN Charter and international law. The Swiss government has already gone some way in 
indicating its intention to disobey the instructions of the Security Council in relation to 
individual sanctions when, in March 2010, the Swiss government informed the Security 
Council that it has been instructed by the Swiss Parliament to disobey the Security Council’s 
instructions and cancel targeted sanctions against specific individuals on the basis of Swiss 
guarantees of human rights
265
. Finally, the Court might take the simplest route and accept that 
the UNSC has the power to override the ECHR pursuant to Art. 103 of the Charter, however 
given the ruling in Al Jedda, this seems remote. 
6.9 Case Outcome 
                                               
265 See page 6 of letter of the attempted intervention in Nada by the CoE Assembly; 
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The applicant successfully argued, relying on the Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria
266
 case that the 
competing interests of the protection of sources and information critical to national security, 
on the one hand, and the right to an effective remedy, on the other, could be reconciled 
through a specially adapted procedure. In the present case, however, no such procedure had 
been available, either before United Nations bodies or before the domestic authorities. 
 
The Court observed that Article 13 guarantees under the ECHR the availability at national 
level of a remedy by which to complain about a breach of the Convention rights and 
freedoms. Therefore, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the 
manner in which they conform to their obligations under this provision, there must be a 
domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of 
the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief. The scope of the obligation 
under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint under the 
Convention, but the remedy must in any event be “effective” in practice as well as in law, in 
particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or 
omissions of the authorities of the State. 
The Court would further refered to the finding of the ECJ that; 
“it is not a consequence of the principles governing the international legal order under 
the United Nations that any judicial review of the internal lawfulness of the contested 
regulation in the light of fundamental freedoms is excluded by virtue of the fact that that 
measure is intended to give effect to a resolution of the Security Council adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
267”  
 
The Court was of the opinion that the same reasoning must be applied, mutatis mutandis, to 
the present case, more specifically to the review by the Swiss authorities of the conformity of 
the Taliban Ordinance with the Convention. It further found that there was nothing in the 
Security Council resolutions to prevent the Swiss authorities from introducing mechanisms to 
verify the measures taken at national level pursuant to those resolutions. Court found that the 
applicant did not have any effective means of obtaining the removal of his name from the list 
annexed to the Taliban Ordinance and therefore no remedy in respect of the Convention 
violations that he alleged. The Court dismissed the preliminary objection raised by the 
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Government as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and, ruling on the merits, found 
that there has been a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 8 and awarded 
damages. 
6.10 Concluding Remarks re Nada 
According to Theinal
268
, fundamentally, the Court considered that Switzerland had violated 
the applicant’s rights under Article 8 (respect for private and family life and for the home) by 
failing to take measures in the applicant’s favour within the constraints of the sanction’s 
regime or ancillary to the sanctions regime. Thus, Switzerland ought to have alerted Italy (as 
the applicant’s state of nationality) and, via Italy, the Security Council’s Sanctions 
Committee, to the fact that there was no reasonable suspicion against the applicant. 
Switzerland was also required ‘to adapt the sanctions regime to the applicant’s individual 
situation’ (para 196 of Nada) and to mitigate the effects of the sanctions on the applicant. 
This it had not done to any sufficient extent.  
Having found a violation on this approach, the Court left undecided whether Switzerland was 
also obliged flatly to disobey the Security Council. It specifically left open whether the UN 
Charter did or did not trump the Convention. This general question under Article 103 of the 
Charter remains unanswered. The Court avoided the issue by concentrating on violations 
committed just outside the sanctions regime. 
Regarding the right to an effective remedy (Article 13 ECHR), the problem was that the 
Swiss Federal Court had declined to strike down any of the UN sanctions as contrary to Swiss 
human rights law. In this regard, the Court followed Kadi in holding that UN law did not 
prevent judicial review of the domestic implementation of sanctions. In effect, it appears that 
the European Court has not taken a Kadi approach in itself, but has mandated domestic courts 
to take it in domestic law. If so, this is quite interesting. The Court appears to have overcome 
its own international limitations by putting itself in the shoes of a domestic judge, through a 
review of that judge’s jurisdiction under Article 13. As always only time will tell what the 
future implications on human rights law will be and their implication for UN targeted 
sanctions. 
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7 Concluding remarks on European regional courts 
According to De Burca
269
 the different approaches taken by the various European judicial 
courts to the question of UN Security Council accountability exhibit a fascinating range of 
responses to the question of the authority of international law within Europe’s regional legal 
order. Ultimately and perhaps surprisingly, it was the ECtHR that initially displayed the 
greatest deference to the UN Security Council and an unwillingness to question Security 
Council measures by reference to European human rights norms. The ECJ has since adopted 
a strongly pluralist approach, treating the UN system and the EU system as separate and 
parallel regimes, without any privileged status being accorded to UN Charter obligations or 
UN Security Council measures within EC law. De Burca argues it would have been better to 
adopted a soft-constitutionalist approach which would seek to mediate the relationship 
between the norms of the different legal systems, and which would have perhaps involved the 
ECJ more in the process of shaping customary international law, however from a rights based 
approach, the ECJ has shown that the UN cannot simply act in a manner not in keeping with 
its own principles. The recent decision from the ECtHR in Al Jedda and the potential 
outcome in Nada has shown that there is a growing consensus in Europe’s regional courts, at 
least, that protection of fundamental rights should be given more prominence in trying to 
balance both them and peace and security. The lack of an effective judicial procedure at the 
UN level only compounds this growing sentiment and is at the very heart of this thesis.  
8 Other jurisdictions – the Canadian case of Abdelrazik 
Mr Abdelrazik is a dual Canadian-Sudanese citizen who came to Canada as a refugee. 
Abdelrazik knew Ahmed Ressam, the so-called "Millenium Bomber," who was convicted in 
the US for plotting to blow up the Los Angeles Airport
270
. Abdelrazik was not implicated in 
the plot and voluntarily testified against Ressam.  
                                               
269 Grainne de Burca “The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi”, Harvard 
Law Journal Volume 51, No 1, winter 2010. 
270 United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2007) Ressam was convicted of (1) conspiring to commit an 
act of terrorism transcending national boundaries, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2332b(a)(1)(B); (2) conspiring to 
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into the United States contrary to law,in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545; (7) transportation of explosives, in 
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In March 2003, Abdelrazik travelled to Sudan whilst there he was arrested on suspicion of 
involvement in terrorism. Initially When Abdelrazik went to Sudan, he had a valid Canadian 
passport, which would have still been valid had he returned at the time of his arrest, but it 
expired during his period of detention. In 2004 he tried to return to Canada and whilst the 
Canadian authorities initially assisted him in purchasing a plane ticket, the airline refused to 
fly him back, as was now on the US "no-fly" list. In 2005, the Sudanese government issued a 
letter exonerating Abdelrazik, however the US government listed him on its US Department 
of Treasury as having high-level affiliations with al Qaeda and his name was added to the 
1267 list. 
Inclusion on the 1267 list as previously discussed carries with it a number of sanctions, 
including asset freezing and a global travel prohibition. Canada had instigated regulations 
under its own UN Act
271
 implementing the UNSC resolution 1267
272
, which, among other 
things, prohibits anybody from providing financial assistance to a person on the list. 
Abdelrazik sought help from the Canadian government in being taken off the list, and with 
apparent support from both CSIS and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Canada initially 
requested his removal from the list. The request was denied in 2007 with no reasons being 
given. 
In April 2008, six years after his initial visit to Sudan, the Canadian Government obtained 
clearance from the 1267 Committee to provide expenses for Abdelrazik's basic necessities. 
Whilst in Sudan, Abdelrazik had applied for a renewal of his Canadian passport. The initial 
application had been made in 2005, to which he received no response. He tried again in 2008, 
after the Canadian government publicly announced that it would provide emergency travel 
documents for him when he was cleared to travel. In August 2008, Abdelrazik was able to 
secure a flight back to Canada, but the Canadian government refused to issue a passport. He 
was notified that the reason was based on national security. 
8.1 Abdelrazik v Minister of Foreign Affairs [2009] FC 580 
In April 2009, Abdelrazik was again scheduled to leave on another confirmed flight, but 
Canada again denied his request for travel documents. Abdelrazik received the denial, with 
no explanation. Abdelrazik's continued to remain in Sudan with the Canadian government 
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blocking his return. This led to considerable publicity within Canada which has a strong 
human rights culture. In 2009, the case came before the Federal Court
273
. Citing Section 6(1) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
274
, which expressly provides, among other 
things, that Canadian citizens have a right to enter Canada, the Court ordered the Canadian 
government to issue emergency travel documents and to help Abdelrazik arrange travel back 
to Canada. Justice Zinn said; 
  I add my name to those who view the 1267 Committee regime as a denial of basic 
 legal remedies and as untenable under the principles of international human rights. 
 There is nothing in the listing or de-listing procedure that recognises the principles of 
 natural justice or that provides for basic procedural fairness. … It can hardly be said 
 that the 1267 Committee process meets the requirement of independence and 
 impartiality when, as appears may be the case involving Mr Abdelrazik, the nation 
 requesting the listing is one of the members of the body that decides whether to list or, 
 equally as important, to de-list a person. The accuser is also the judge.
275
 
8.2 The Canadian Federal Court decision 
Justice Zinn found that Mr Abdelrazik's right to return had been denied to him because he 
was listed and that under that listing, the facilitating of his return by purchasing an airline 
ticket, even by others, was precluded by the ban on transferring assets to a listed entity. 
Therefore his right under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to return to his own 
country had been breached. He held that the remedy to which Mr Abdelrazik was entitled 
required the Canadian Government to take immediate action so that he be returned to Canada, 
which he was allowed to do.   
After his returned to Canada Abdelrazik's remained on the 1267 list, this prohibited him from 
employment, and even those offering him financial assistance for living expenses faced the 
possibility of criminal prosecution. Abdelrazik was the only Canadian on the UN’s list. 
Although Canada supported Abdelrazik's request early on, it later took a "neutral" position on 
his removal from the list. In December 2011, eight-and-a-half years after he first went to 
Sudan, Abdelrazik was removed from the 1267 list. He was not told why he was removed. 
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8.3 Concluding remarks 
The "case" against Abdelrazik highlights the problems of not having an effective 
international judicial review process. His case appears to have been based on nothing more 
than flimsy associational allegations. He knew somebody who was criminally prosecuted for 
terrorism, but he was not implicated, and he voluntarily helped the US government in its 
prosecution case. Abdelrazik's liberty had been deprived based on alleged associations with 
other people who were not even, themselves, ever proven to have any association with 
terrorism before a competent judicial body. 
Eight-and-a-half years later, Abdelrazik is back in Canada, free, and removed from at least 
one of the blacklists, although he reportedly remains on the US lists. Canada has not charged 
him with any criminal offenses, further supporting an implication that there is no proof of any 
wrongdoing as Mary Duffy commented; 
There is no equitable solution in this situation. Turning the life of an innocent man into a 
protracted nightmare with no proof of wrongdoing does nothing to keep anybody safer from 
terrorism. What it does is harm the credibility of those governments and entities that claim to 
be champions of human rights
276
.  
8.4 The USA case: Kindhearts277 
Not surprisingly the US has been one of the main driving forces for the instigation of UN 
sanctions post 9/11. There are few cases involving individuals or entities successfully 
challenging the US government on their imposition within the USA. One case worth 
mentioning for the reasoning of the Court is that of the Charity ‘Kindhearts’ discussed below. 
8.5 Case background 
KindHearts v. US Treasury.
278
The US Treasury had frozen its funds and seized all 
KindHearts' assets in February 2006, pending an investigation into whether the group 
provided material support to Hamas, which has been designated as a terrorist organization by 
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the United States government. To date KindHearts has not been designated. Its efforts to 
defend itself have been hampered by lack of specific allegations to respond to and lack of 
deadlines or procedures for Treasury reconsideration. The Treasury has denied KindHearts' 
requests to have its funds released for aid through other organizations. 
8.6 Court Decisions to date 
In August 2009 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio upheld a 
challenge to a provisional determination under President Bush's Executive Order No. 
13224
279
 of 24 September 2001 by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Treasury 
Department that KindHearts was a specially designated global terrorist organisation on the 
ground that blocking access to its assets pending investigation was contrary to its Fourth 
Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure
280
. The judge held that 
the Office's handling of KindHearts' request for access to blocked assets to pay counsel's fees 
had been arbitrary and capricious without individualised consideration of the facts of the 
case.  
On May 10, 2010, based on his August 2009 ruling that the government violated KindHearts 
for Charitable Humanitarian Development's (KindHearts) Fourth and Fifth amendment rights 
in shutting it down "pending investigation" (into whether it should be listed as a supporter of 
terrorism), Judge James Carr of the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
ordered new proceedings to remedy the lack of adequate notice and opportunity to defend and 
freezing of assets without a warrant.   
8.7 Case comment 
It is, of course, worth noting that the President's EO was issued before the Security Council 
adopted SCR 1373(2001) and therefore was not a direct challenge to the UN authority under 
its targeted sanctions policy, however there are similarities. The main question before the 
court was not whether or not KindHearts supported Hamas and was therefore a designated 
supporter of terrorism, but whether the legal process used in the process of freezing their 
assets was constitutional. Kindhearts is significant because it appears to be the first time in 
US case law that the taking of kind of action has been successful in the United States. Of 
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course, the decision of the Court was not made under reference to an international human 
rights instrument such as the European Convention, however it does show that the USA’s 
own constitution requires a high degree of ‘due process’. In an earlier case of Diggs v 
Shultz,
281
 the US Federal Court of Appeals had held that it lacked the authority to compel the 
President to comply with a UNSCR obligation regarding sanctions against Rhodesia, as 
subsequent legislation by Congress (which plainly contravened the SCR) had equal status to 
the obligations under the treaty. Whilst this authority is dated, it does appear to show that 
where necessary, even the USA can decide not to follow the will of the Security Council. 
9 Concluding Remarks  
Eight sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, have been established with the purpose, inter alia, of designating individuals and 
“entities” (as defined non-uniformly under the different regimes) as targets of sanctions. 
Usually, these sanctions encompass a travel ban, an assets freeze and an arms embargo. In 
five of the eight sanctions regimes, lists have been established with the names of designated 
individuals and entities. Of the various sanctions regimes, those established against 
individuals and entities belonging to, or associated with, Al-Qaida and/or the Taliban 
(Resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999 and following resolutions) are of particular interest to 
this study (see Chapter 3).
282
  
This sanctions regime also differs from the others in that, after the Taliban were removed 
from power in Afghanistan, there is no particular link between the targeted individuals and 
entities and a specific country. Targeted individuals and entities are not informed prior to 
their being listed, and accordingly do not have an opportunity to prevent their inclusion in a 
list by demonstrating that such an inclusion is unjustified under the terms of the respective 
Security Council resolution(s). There exist different de-listing procedures under the various 
sanctions regimes (as explained in chapter 3), but in no case are individuals or entities 
allowed directly to petition the respective Security Council committee for de-listing. 
Individuals or entities are not granted a hearing by the Council or a committee. The de-listing 
procedures presently being in force place great emphasis on the States particularly involved 
(“the original designating government” which proposed the listing, and “the petitioned 
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government” to which a petition for de-listing was submitted by an individual or entity) 
resolving the matter by negotiation with the Ombudsperson acting as an impartial go 
between. Whether the respective committee, or the Security Council itself, grants a de-listing 
request is entirely within the committee’s or the Council’s discretion; no legal rules exist that 
would oblige the committee or the Council to grant a request if specific conditions are met.  
 
As has been shown there are few effective opportunities provided for a listed individual or 
entity to challenge a listing before a national court or tribunal, as UN Member States are 
obliged, in accordance with Article 103 of the UN Charter, to comply with resolutions made 
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Even if exceptionally, a 
domestic or regional legal order did allow an individual directly to take  legal action against a 
Security Council  resolution as per Kadi, the United Nations enjoys absolute  immunity  from 
every  form of  legal proceedings before national courts and authorities, as provided for  in 
Article 105, paragraph 1, of  the UN Charter, the General Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations (General Assembly Resolution 1/22A of 13 February 1946) 
and other agreements.
283
 
On  the  basis  of  constitutional  and  statutory  rules  and  practices  common  to most States 
and regions of the world, and as guaranteed by universal and regional human rights 
instruments, rights of due process, or “fair trial rights”, have generally been recognized in 
international law as protecting individuals from arbitrary or unfair treatment by State 
organs
284
. Generally recognized ‘due process’ rights include the right of every person to be 
heard before an individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken, and the 
right of a person claiming a violation of his or her rights and freedoms by a State organ to an 
effective remedy before an impartial tribunal or authority. These rights can be considered as 
part of the corpus of customary international law, and are also protected by general principles 
of law in the meaning of the Statute to the International Court of Justice
285
. 
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The UN Security Council being a principal organ of the United Nations
286
, a legal obligation 
of the Council to comply with standards of due process, or “fair and clear procedures”, for the 
benefit of individuals and “entities” presupposes that the United Nations, as a subject of 
international law, is bound by respective rules of international law
287
. In accordance with the 
established system of sources of international law, the United Nations could be obliged to 
observe such standards by virtue of international treaties (including the UN Charter as the 
constitution of the United Nations), customary international law, or general principles of law 
recognized by the members of the international community
288
. 
As the United Nations is not a party in its own right to any universal or regional treaty for the 
protection of human rights, it could be argued that it is not directly bound by the respective 
treaty provisions guaranteeing rights of due process. The United Nations being an 
autonomous subject of international law, it does not follow from the fact alone that its 
Member States have ratified certain human rights instruments that an according obligation of 
the Organization has come into existence
289
. 
However, the emergence of “supranational” organizations of the type of the European 
Community has changed this traditional picture. The law of the European Community 
(European Union) has made both human rights treaty obligations of EC (EU) Member States 
as well as “constitutional traditions common to the Member States” sources of Community 
(Union) law from which direct obligations of the Community (Union) itself arise. There is 
good reason to expect that the law of other international organizations, including the United 
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Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,  Martinus Nijhoff: 
The Hague, 2001, 5-33. 
288 See Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism, OUP: Oxford, 2003,  90. See also 
Karel Wellens, Remedies against international organisations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, at 
89: “[T]he lack of an appropriate remedial mechanism within the international organisation to carry out the 
legality test, let alone upon a private individual’s request, leaves him or her without direct means of protection”, 
and Gerster & Rotenberg. p. 1318: “As long as alternative means of legal recourse (internal appeal procedures; 
arbitration) are at the claimant’s disposal, neither Art. 10 of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights nor 
constitutional guarantees by States compel national courts to deny [the UN] immunity and to start legal 
proceedings against the UN” (emphasis added). 
289For the interpretation of Article 14 of the ICCPR by the Human Rights Committee see Dominic McGoldrick, 
The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 395-458; and Alfred de Zayas, ‘The United Nations and the 
Guarantees of a Fair Trial in the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture’, in David Weissbrodt & Rüdiger 
Wolfrum (eds.), The Right to a Fair Trial, Berlin: Springer, 1998, pp. 669-696. For an analysis of the travaux 
préparatoires  of  the ICCPR’s fair trial provisions, see Weissbrodt,  35-91.  
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Nations, should be influenced by that development as they, too, begin to engage in 
“supranational” law making with a direct effect on individuals290. 
 
At present, customary international law does not provide for sufficiently clear rules which 
would oblige international (intergovernmental) organizations to observe standards of due 
process vis-à-vis individuals. To the extent that rules of customary law exist with respect to 
such standards, they address obligations of States in the sphere of domestic law, and not 
obligations of international organizations. However, a trend can be perceived widening the 
scope of customary law in regard to due process to include direct “governmental” action of 
international organizations vis-à-vis individuals
291
. To this development, the law of the 
European Community (European Union) has strongly contributed. The due process rights of 
individuals recognized as general principles of law are also applicable to international 
organizations as subjects of international law when they exercise “governmental” authority 
over individuals
292
. 
The development of international human rights law, to which the work of the United Nations 
has decisively contributed, has given grounds for legitimate expectations that the UN itself, 
when its action has a direct impact on the rights and freedoms of an individual, observes 
standards of due process, or fair and clear procedures, on which the person concerned can 
rely. This finding is in line with essential notions of the concept of international 
personality
293
. 
It was already anticipated by the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that 
the respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms called for by the 
Declaration would not only be demanded from States but also from other bodies and 
                                               
290 See Iain Cameron, The ECHR, Due Process and UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctions, Report 
prepared for the Council of Europe, 6 February 2006, at p. 2: “The effects of blacklisting [a person] may be 
sufficiently serious to be the ‘determination of a criminal charge’, triggering the application of Article 6 [of the 
European Convention of Human Rights] in its entirety.” 
291This expression  is  taken  from  the  ILC Articles  on  Responsibility  of  States  for  Internationally Wrongful 
Acts  (Annex  to UN General Assembly Res. 56/83 of 12 December 2001), Arts. 5, 6, 7 and 9. 
292 See for example See also Carol Harlow, Access to Justice as a Human Right: The European Convention and 
the European Union, in Philip Alston (ed.), The European Union and Human Rights, University Press: Oxford, 
1999, 187-213. 
293See for example Richard Clayton & Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000, at p. 550. 
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institutions exercising elements of governmental authority, including international 
organizations
294
. 
Notwithstanding the growing legal importance, for the United Nations, of human rights treaty 
law on the one hand and constitutional values and traditions common to UN Member States 
on the other hand and the extension of rules of customary international law and general 
principles of law about due process to international organizations, the principal source of 
human rights obligations of the United Nations is the UN Charter. All UN organs are bound 
to comply with the rules of the Charter as the constitution of the United Nations. Today, the 
Charter obliges the organs of the United Nations, when exercising the functions assigned to 
them, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals to the greatest 
possible extent
295
. 
 
The human rights and fundamental freedoms which the organs of the United Nations are 
obliged to respect by virtue of the UN Charter include rights of due process, or “fair and clear 
procedures”, which must be guaranteed whenever the Organization is taking action that 
adversely affects, or has the potential of adversely affecting, the rights and freedoms of 
individuals
296
. 
 
When imposing sanctions on individuals in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
the Security Council must strive for discharging its principal duty to maintain or restore 
international peace and security while, at the same time, respecting the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of targeted individuals to the greatest possible extent
297
. The United 
                                               
294 See for example Sarah Joseph et al., The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2nd ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2004,  394 
295 See August Reinisch, Securing the Accountability of International Organizations, in Global Governance, 
vol. 7 (2001), 131-149, at 137 et seq., 141-143, where he is arguing that the UN is bound “transitively” by 
international human rights standards as a result and to the extent that its members are bound (“functional treaty 
succession by international organizations to the position of their member states”). 
296 See Frédéric Mégret & Florian Hoffmann, The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections 
on the United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities, in Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 25 (2003),  
314-342, at 314 
297 See Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers: Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005, at 16: “A domestic public or administrative law principle is arguably only applicable to the 
exercise by an international organization of governmental power where this principle can be identified as 
applying to the particular power within the domestic public and administrative law systems of a number of 
member States, since only then can it be considered as a general principle of law and thus a formal source of law 
applicable to international organizations”. These conditions appear to be met in the case of certain due process 
rights of individuals. For the applicability of general principles of law in the law of international organizations 
See also August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security 
Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, in American Journal of International Law, vol. 95 (2001), 
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Nations would contradict itself if, on the one hand, it constantly admonished its Member 
States to respect human rights and, on the other hand, it refused to respect the same rights 
when relevant to its own action. As another author wrote, “[i]t is self-evident that the 
Organization is obliged to pursue and try to realize its own purpose.”298 
 
There of course a duty of the Council to balance the general and particular interests which are 
at stake. Every measure having a negative impact on human rights and freedoms of a 
particular group or category of persons must be necessary and proportionate to the aim the 
measure is meant to achieve
299
. While the circumstances and modalities of particular 
sanctions regimes may require certain adjustments or exceptions, the rights of due process, or 
fair and clear procedures, to be guaranteed by the Security Council in the case of sanctions 
imposed on individuals and “entities” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter it is suggested 
that it should include the following elements
300
: 
(a) the right of a person or entity against whom measures have been taken to be informed 
about those measures by the Council, as soon as this is possible without thwarting their 
purpose; 
(b) the right of such a person or entity to be heard by the Council, or a subsidiary body, 
within a reasonable time; 
(c) the right of such a person or entity of being advised and represented in his or her dealings 
with the Council; 
(d) the right of such a person or entity to an effective remedy against an individual measure 
before an impartial institution or body previously established. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
851-872, at  869: “When the United Nations–the major promoter of human rights in the international arena–
takes enforcement action, it can be legitimately held to show respect for human rights in an exemplary fashion.” 
298 See Zenon Stavrinides, Human Rights Obligations under the United Nations Charter, in International Journal 
of Human Rights, vol. 3 (1999),  38;. See also Mégret & Hoffmann, supra note 296, at 317 
299 If the UN rejected such standards as being of no importance or consequence for its own action vis-à-vis 
individuals, it violated the legal maxim of Venire contra factum proprium (nemini licet / nulli conceditur / non 
valet): No one is allowed to act contrary to, or inconsistent with, one’s own behaviour. See Detlef Liebs, 
Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter, 3rd ed., Munich, 1983,  216.  For the relationship between 
this rule and the concept of estoppel, see Robert Kolb, La bonne foi en droit international public. Contribution à 
l’étude des principes généraux de droit, Paris, 2000,  357  
300  See Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005, at p. 16: “A domestic public or administrative law principle is arguably only applicable 
to the exercise by an international organization of governmental power where this principle can be identified as 
applying to the particular power within the domestic public and administrative law systems of a number of 
member States, since only then can it be considered as a general principle of law and thus a formal source of law 
applicable to international organizations”. These conditions appear to be met in the case of certain due process 
rights of individuals. 
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The following chapters will discuss in detail the available international human rights systems 
currently available for the individual the concept of an international judicial review 
mechanism and the proposal for the International Court of Justice to be given the power and 
function of this role when considering cases involving human rights violations at the UN 
level for those subjected to targeted or smart sanctions.
301
It will be shown that at present there 
is no satisfactory system within the international systems of protection and that domestic and 
regional courts are currently unable to offer ‘just satisfaction’ 302.  
                                               
301 For the principle of proportionality as a limit to the Security Council’s discretion under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, see Nicolas Angelet, International Law Limits to the Security Council, in Vera Gowlland-Debbas 
(ed.), United Nations Sanctions and International Law: Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2001, 71-82, at 
72-74, where she comments that judicial review of Security Council resolutions is a responsibility which could 
only be entrusted to the International Court of Justice. There is an extensive literature addressing this issue. See 
Bardo Fassbender, ‘Quis judicabit? The Security Council, Its Powers and Its Legal Control (Review Essay), in 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 11 (2000),  219-232; John Dugard,  Judicial Review of Sanctions, in 
United Nations Sanctions and International Law, The Hague: KluwerLaw, 83-91. 
302 These existing sanctions regimes which target individual persons and other entities affect amongst other 
things, the right to property, which is protected by regional human rights treaties and today possibly also by 
customary international law, the freedom of movement and the freedom of association. Sanctions may also 
affect the right to respect for family and private life and the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution. Further, the right to reputation is affected which is a (civil) right in the meaning of Art. 14, 
para. 1, ICCPR and Art. 6, para. 1, of the European Convention of Human Rights will be discussed throughout 
this study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INDIVIDUAL ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL REMEDY SYSTEM 
1 Preliminary Remarks 
This chapter outlines the current functions and powers of the United Nations bodies in the 
field of human rights, including the availability of individual to access those bodies. It also 
analyses the existing international mechanisms or procedures available to individuals, 
including the limitations or weaknesses of these procedures and explains why there is a need 
for a new separate form of judicial review within the United Nations discussed later in this 
study. This is necessary to support the argument that a new mechanism is required that allows 
the individual in limited cases to be heard at the international level by a tribunal capable to 
give just satisfaction for violations of internationally accepted human rights norms.  
Various communications procedures have been developed within the framework of the 
United Nations in the field of human rights. The analysis in this chapter will be centred on the 
procedures concerning individual communications within both Charter and treaty-based 
bodies, that is, the Economic and Social Council with its subsidiary bodies and Committees 
(including the Human Rights Council which replaced the Human Rights Commission in 
2006), working in accordance with the UN Charter, resolutions and treaty provisions. 
2 Applicable Human Rights Measures. 
Before considering the current international human rights organisations and their role and 
remit, it is first necessary to narrow and highlight those international rights which the 
individual or entity may have had violated as a result of UNSC targeted resolutions. It will be 
necessary to formally identify what rights have been infringed and where those rights 
originate from in terms of international human rights protection.  
These rights can be found in two documents, The Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) both of which set 
out in clear terms the international standards of basic human rights protection that are 
applicable to this study, that is, those rights which apply to those who have had asset freezing 
and travel bans applied to them, specifically they are as follows: 
2.1 Rights Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
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Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals 
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 
Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him. 
Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
Article 13.(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of each state.(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and 
to return to his country. 
Article 17. 
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
 
2.2 Rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Art 14.1 All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of 
any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. 
 
Art 17.1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
 
Art 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground 
such as race, .colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
2.3 Status of these Rights 
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Although the rights outlined above were initially contained within the UDHR and the ICCPR 
treaty documents, they are now considered together with the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Right to form an International ‘bill of rights’ that has over time 
become considered customary law, that is, it applicable to all states whether signatory or not. 
As one of the principles of the UN charter is respect for and promotion of human rights, it 
seems a fair assumption that from the Charter itself, these rights would be applicable to the 
UN itself. 
3 Overview of the United Nations Human Rights System and Treaty Based Bodies 
3.1 Preliminary Remarks 
A number of mechanisms
303
 that grant individuals access to means of legal redress at the 
international level have been developed within the framework of the United Nations
304
. 
Anyone, be it a single individual or a group of people, may bring human rights problems to 
the attention of the United Nations; thousands of people around the world have done this in 
the past, and continue to do so. What kinds of communications on human rights can the 
United Nations receive? How are they dealt with and what are the procedures for handling 
them? How are the outcomes monitored? These are the issues that will be discussed in this 
chapter. To begin here is a pictorial representation of the UN’s different bodies currently 
involved in Human Rights. A more complex diagram is to be found at Appendix 1. 
                                               
303 Despite their long existence, it was not until the last decade that these mechanisms become popular amongst 
individuals in any countries; partly because of the information system within the UN itself, and largely because 
many countries were not willing to become parties to the treaties. For example, many Arabic countries have 
neither signed nor ratified the treaty and others such as China have signed but not ratified it. 
304 The term United Nations used here refers to the UN itself, as by definition, the UN also includes a far 
wider family of other specialised agencies, e.g. ILO, Unesco, WHO. 
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As can be seen within the United Nations Human Rights system, there are two distinct types 
of bodies that can deal with communications concerning human rights problems. The first are 
those known as the Charter-based bodies or organs, also referred to as Charter Bodies. The 
second known as the Treaty-Based Bodies, also referred to as treaty-monitoring bodies or 
simply treaty bodies. Charter bodies function in accordance with the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter, which applies to all Member States. Treaty bodies, on the other hand, 
function according to the provisions contained within the particular treaty that establishes 
  
  
UNITED NATIONS BODIES IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS   
Charter - Based Bodies   
Treaty Based Monitoring  
Bodies   
Human Rights Committee (HRC) for  
the ICCPR   
Committee on Economic, Social and  
Cultural Rights (CESCR) for the ICESCR   
Committee on the Elimination of Racial  
Discrimination (CERD) for the ICERD   
Committee Against Torture  (CAT) for  
the CAT Convention   
Committee on the Elimination of  
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)  
for the CEDAW Convention   
Committee on the Rights for the Child  
(CRC) for the Convention for the  
Rights of the Child   
Committee on Migrant Workers and  
their Families   
  
UN General Assembly   
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights   
Third Committee   
Commission on the Status of Women   
Sub -   Commission on the Prevention of  
Discrimination and Protection of  
Minorities   
 
 
  Human Rights Council   
Economic and Social  
Council   
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them. Generally speaking, in International Law these treaties only bind the States that are 
parties to the treaties
305
.  
Individuals  seeking  redress  for  alleged  abuse  of  their  rights  have  limited access  to  the 
international system under four UN treaties
306
: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) with its first Optional Protocol
307
, the International Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial  Discrimination (ICERD),
308
  the Convention Against 
Torture  and  Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or  Punishment (CAT)
309
, 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW)310 with its Optional Protocol
311
. 
 
Under these treaties (sometimes referred to as covenants), any individual can bring a petition, 
complaint or communication
312
 about alleged human rights violations to the respective 
Committees which function on the basis of the treaty provisions. These treaties are 
multilateral and under international law are legally binding on the signatory States
313
. 
According to the provisions of these treaties, any individual who is a subject of the State 
Party can challenge acts it allegedly commits in violation of the rights set forth in the treaties. 
This may be done by filing a petition with the respective Committee, however whilst the 
procedure may be clear there is a lack of any precedent on whether these treaties may be used 
against the UN itself as an international organisation. In other words none of the treaties 
provide a system of reviewing the actions of the United Nations Security Council as the UN 
is not as an entity a signatory to the treaty. 
                                               
305See, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998, 10-64 for a 
detailed discussion on the principles surrounding international law and in particular treaty provisions. 
306 There are currently six major treaty based bodies that provide for Committees to monitor the implementation 
of human rights at the international level, the other two are: International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Political Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Although under optional 
Protocol Three of the CRC which came into force in February 2012, a child can now make an individual 
complaint to the Commission for the rights of the child (CRC), this provision is unlikely to have much effect on 
those subject to targeted sanctions and will not be pursued in this thesis as amongst other issues it is still not 
clear just what effect it will have. The other treaties do not make any provisions in their procedures to allow 
complaints by individuals. 
307 GA Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights‘, 16 December 1966, UN Doc. 
A/6316 (1966), entered into force 23 March 1976. 
308 General Assembly Resolution 2106A (XX) (1965). 
309 General Assembly Resolution 39/46 (1984). 
310 General Assembly Resolution 34/180 (1979). 
311 General Assembly Resolution A/54/4 (1999). 
312 All of the four treaties use the term “communication” and this seems to be the ‘official’ phrase or term 
accepted throughout. However, in many writings the terms “petition” and “complaint” are also used, and it 
is rightly so considering the very nature of the communication, which is a petition or complaint. 
313 See I. Brownlie, (ibid n305) 234. 
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4 Functions and Powers of Charter-based Bodies 
By contrast Charter-based bodies do not receive or consider individual communications as 
viable and therefore will only be mentioned briefly.  
4.1 General Assembly and the Third Committee314 
As one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, the General Assembly is its main 
representative body. It contains representatives from all Member States. The General 
Assembly refers most human rights matters to its Third Committee, which deals with social, 
humanitarian and cultural matters.
315 
The role of the General Assembly, prescribed in Articles 
10 and 13 of the United Nations Charter, ranges from standard setting
316,
 implementation  and 
supervision of international standards
317
, to providing advisory services, and hosting or 
participating in philosophical debates on human rights. 
Amongst its functions those that are relevant to this study include
318
: 
• to discuss any question relating to international peace and security and except 
where a  dispute  or solution is being discussed by the Security Council, to 
make recommendations on it;  
• to discuss and, with the same exception as above, make recommendations on 
any question  within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and 
functions of any organ of the United Nations; 
• to  initiate  studies  and  make  recommendations  to  promote:  international 
political  co-operation, the development and codification of international law, 
the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all; 
                                               
314 More detail on this including the historical analysis of the General Assembly can be read in Antonio 
Cassese and John Quinn’s essays “The General Assembly: Historical Perspective 1945-1989” and “The General 
Assembly into 1990s” in Philip Alston (Ed.). The United Nations and Human Rights. Clarendon Paperbacks: 
Oxford, 1996, 23-106. 
315 S. Pritchard, N. Sharp, et al. Petitioning the CERD; individual complaints under the Racial Discrimination 
Convention (Human Rights Booklet No. 2). Australian Human Rights Centre, Faculty of Law, UNSW, Sydney, 
1998, 6. 
316 Mainly in adoption of resolutions but also in making recommendations, see John Quinn in Philip Alston 
(ed.), Ibid (n 314) 65. 
317In relation to treaty implementation the GA receives reports from the HRC, the CESCR, the CAT and the 
CEDAW, see OHCHR website, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/comments.htm, accessed 3 
November 2012  
318Full details of functions of UN GA can be found at the following UN website, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml, accessed 4 Jan 2013. 
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• to elect jointly with the Security Council the judges of the International Court 
of Justice, and on the recommendations of the Security Council, to appoint the 
Secretary-General.
319
 
4.2 Economic and Social Council 
The powers and functions of the Economic and Social Council (the ECOSOC) are detailed in 
Chapter X of the Charter. Like the General Assembly, the ECOSOC is a principal organ of 
the UN. As regards human rights in particular, according to the UN Charter, the ECOSOC 
may, amongst other things, “… make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms …” [Article 62 (2)]. In the 
field of human rights the ECOSOC has also initiated studies and prepared draft conventions 
for submission to the General Assembly.
320
 
The founders of the United Nations foresaw an important role for the Council and gave it 
considerable powers in the UN Charter, inter alia: 
 to furnish information to the Security Council and assist it upon request.321 
 Pursuant to Article 68 of the UN Charter, ECOSOC has established a number of 
functional commissions
322
including a Commission (now Council) on Human Rights. 
In practice, the ECOSOC assigns most of its work on questions of human rights to the 
Council.
323
 
However the Council itself does not hear or deal with individual complaints on human rights 
issues which it delegates to its Human Rights Council. 
5 Commission on Human Rights 1947-2006 
The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), is the primary human rights agency of the 
ESCOSC however it is necessary discuss briefly its predecessor the Commission on Human 
                                               
319Article 4 Statute of the International Court of justice: http://www.icj-cij.og/documents/?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0, 
accessed 9 November 2011. 
320 Pritchard, Sharp & Rodrigues, Petitioning the CERD, ibid (n315) 7. 
321 Declan O’Donovan (1996) “The Economic and Social Council” in Philip Alston (ed), ibid (n 314) 107. 
322 As at the time of writing, there are nine functional commissions: Statistical Commission, Commission on 
Population and Development, Commission on Human Rights, Commission on the Status of Women, 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Commission on Crime Prevention Criminal Justice, Commission for Social 
Development, Commission on Science and Technology for Development and Commission on 
Sustainable Development. See Economic and Social Council, un.org/documents/ ecosoc.htm, accessed 4 June 
2011. 
323
 Ibid (n 308). 
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Rights (CHR), to examine if they could assist the individual wishing to seek satisfaction 
against UNSC targeted sanctions. Many of the procedures adopted by the current Council are 
the policies and procedures of the previous Commission and are therefore relevant to discuss. 
When the Commission was created in 1947; it met annually for six weeks during February 
and March and consisted of 53 Member States. Brownlie suggests that it initially played a 
minimal role in the handling of human rights violations
324
, however from 1967 following 
ESOSOC resolution 1235 (XL11) it began to make a thorough study of and report on 
situations revealing a consistent pattern of human rights violations. It was later considered by 
some as the single most important United Nations body dealing with international human 
rights.
325
 
The commission assisted ECOSOC in coordinating human rights activities within the United 
Nations system. It undertook studies, made recommendations and prepared draft international 
instruments. It undertook tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly and ECOSOC, 
including the investigation of allegations concerning human rights violations. Since the 
1960s, with the powers vested in it, the commission developed procedures in dealing with 
communications regarding violations of human rights
326
. 
Through the appointment of special rapporteurs, special representatives and independent 
experts, and through the establishment of working groups, the commission established rules 
and procedures for dealing  with human rights situations in particular countries. It also dealt 
with specific types of human rights violations which affected a large number of people in a 
large number of countries.
327
 It used three types of procedure: country procedures, thematic 
procedures and “1503” procedures.328 Together, these procedures are known as the Charter-
based human rights procedures.  
The country procedures, also referred to as country mechanisms or mandates, were the 
mandates or procedures with which the Commission examined, monitored, and publicly 
reported on human rights situations in specific countries or territories. The thematic 
                                               
324 I. Brownlie, & G. Goodwin-Gill, (Eds), Brownlie’s Documents on Human Rights, 6th Ed: (Oxford ,2010)13. 
325 The CHR is the main subsidiary body of the ECOSOC in the field of human rights. Mary Robinson, the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, describes the CHR as having been “the central architect of the work of 
the United Nations in the field of human rights” http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chr.htm, accessed 6 June 
2011. 
326 Regarding this role and function See Philip Alston ibid (n 314) 120-125,   
327 For an analysis of how this procedure operated in See; Philip Alston ibid (n 314) 126 cf. Pritchard, Sharp & 
Rodrigues’ Petitioning the CERD, ibid (n 315) 7. 
328 Summary on the development of the procedures, see Philip Alston, ibid (n 314) 126 -210. 
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procedures were the procedures by which the commission examined, monitored, and publicly 
reported on major incidences of human rights violations worldwide.
329
 
Country and thematic mechanisms were extra-conventional, in that they differed from treaty-
based bodies as they had no formal complaints procedure. The activities of the country and 
thematic mechanisms are based on communications which have been received from various 
sources (the victims or their relatives, local information or NGOs, etc.) and which contain 
allegations of human rights violations. Such communications may be submitted in various 
forms (e.g. letters, faxes, cables, emails, etc.) and may concern individual cases as well as 
details of situations of widespread or systematic alleged violations of human rights. 
Collectively, these procedures or mechanisms were known as the Special Procedure of the 
Committee.
330
 
The replacement of the Commission into the Council came about as a result of increasing 
criticism of the capability of the Commission to perform its tasks both professionally and 
credibly. The then UN Security General Kofi Annan said, “States have sought membership of 
the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or 
to criticise others for political gain. As a result a credibility deficit has developed which casts 
a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole.
331
 
These comments along with increasing concerns on the part of member states helped pave the 
way in 2006 for the replacement of the Commission by a new mechanism, the Human Rights 
Council (UNHRC). 
5.1 United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
In Resolution 60/251332 which the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted on 15 
March 2006, it identified the new Council Human Rights Council mandate which replaced 
the former Commission as ‘promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal 
                                               
329 See, Commission on Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chr.htm, ibid (n 315) accessed 6 
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330 Also referred to as ‘communications’ under extra-conventional mechanisms, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/- 
menu2/8/ex_conv.htm, accessed 20 May 2010. 
331 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, reports of the Secretary-
General, A/59/2005/ (21 March 2005) para 182. 
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manner’333. It sets out a number of guiding principles such as universality, impartiality and 
non-selectivity
334.
 The Council should address the situation of violations of human rights, 
including gross and systematic violations and make recommendations about these.
335
Through 
a dialogue of co-operation the Council should contribute to the prevention of human rights 
violations and respond promptly to human rights emergencies.
336
The new Council is still an 
intergovernmental organisation which now consists of 47 States as opposed to the 
Commissions’53. It was hoped that the Council would take on the same status of the other 
councils to reflect the importance of its work and the high regard the UN allegedly placed on 
human rights, however to date this has not yet fully occurred but is still a possibility. The 
Council is required to meet more regularly than its predecessor for at least ten weeks over a 
year in at least three different sessions; the Council may also hold further sessions at the 
request of one third of its members
337
. Under the new system when election is sought, States 
are called upon to take into account the human rights record of a potential candidate and the 
voluntary pledge they make regarding improving human rights protection when considering 
their application.
338
 
However, consideration must be given as to whether this change of name is merely cosmetic 
or if will it bring real change and if so, why? One reason given for a more effective 
organisation is the inclusion of a new mechanism known as the ‘Universal Periodic Review’ 
(UPR). All Member States of the United Nations, including all elected Council members will 
now submit to a periodic review of their own human rights performance to be conducted by 
the council over a four year period.
339This UPR is designed to ‘complement not duplicate the 
work of the treaty bodies’ although it is difficult, as Brownlie suggested, to see how this will 
be possible. This may be difficult as the basis for the review encompasses the UN charter and 
the major UN human rights documents as well as the examination of the pledges of states 
who submit themselves as for membership of the Council.
340
This four year cycle is supposed 
to ensure that States cannot avoid attention but at the same time the methodology adopted is 
designed to be more co-operative than confrontational, although a member State found to 
responsible for a gross violation could be suspended from the General Assembly. 
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The Council is empowered to work with a variety of stakeholders including regional 
organisations, national human rights institutions and civil society.
341
The Council was given 
express powers to take over all the functions of the previous Commission, inter alia it is to 
‘review, assume and where necessary improve all mandates functions and responsibilities of 
the Commission’.342The processes of the Council still remain in large part confidential but the 
change of emphasis is to focus on situations rather than individual violations.
343
The former 
Sub-Committee on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has been replaced with an 
Advisory Committee, intended to work at the Council’s discretion and be its ‘think tank’. It 
comprises of 18 expert members elected by secret ballot based on geographical 
location.
344
Unlike its predecessor the Advisory Committee cannot adopt resolutions or 
decisions. 
5.2 Critical Appraisal on the UNHRC 
The Secretary General has characterised the UPR as a mechanism which has ‘great potential 
to promote and protect human rights in the darkest corners of the world.’345Country review 
began in 2008 and by the end of 2009, 80 States had been reviewed under the procedure, 
however there has been no examination of the UN’s own Security Council resolutions in 
respect to human rights compliance regardless of whether or not there could be mandate to do 
so. The Council continues to ‘review the mandates of the Commission’ so there may in the 
future be an opportunity for the examination of terrorism sanctions against the individual, but 
it is still far too early to say. The Council has reviewed it work in 2011 and reported to the 
General Assembly. In evaluating its report the General Assembly concluded that in its five 
year history the Council had developed considerably, but that it should avoid politicisation 
and continue to take the lead in addressing urgent human rights situations around the 
world.
346
It of course has the major flaw of not allowing individual petition or representation 
with no powers to offer an effective remedy to individual cases
347
. 
 
                                               
341 UN GA/Res/60/251, para 5(h) 
342 UN GA/Res/60/251, para 6 
343 UN GA/Res/60/251, para 85-109 
344 UN GA/Res/60/251, para 65-84 
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Freedman argues that the Commission failed to universally protect and promote human 
rights, particularly by either overlooking, or being prevented from addressing, many grave 
human rights situations. The Commissioner has, moreover, not overcome the Commission‘s 
selectivity and bias in addressing human rights. She cites as the leading example, Israel which 
occupies a vastly disproportionate amount of the Council‘s time and resources, as occurred at 
the Commission. Human rights violations by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are 
not disputed. However, the disproportionate focus on Israel within Council proceedings and 
mechanisms has been deliberately calculated to deflect the spotlight from similar, and often 
graver, human rights violations in other regions. Both the Secretary-General, notwithstanding 
his encouraging rhetoric and the High Commissioner for Human Rights were unable to 
convince Council members to avoid such selectivity thereby giving proportionate attention to 
other human rights situations
348
.  
The founding principles also include co-operation, inclusiveness and dialogue, which aim to 
overcome the Commission’s culture of naming, shaming and blaming. However, as has been 
demonstrated regarding the US, that culture is being repeated at the Council. Emphasis on co-
operation has undermined the body’s proceedings and mechanisms to the extent that states 
have refused to cooperate with the body or have used this principle to insist on weakened 
actions by the Council when seeking to protect or promote human rights. The Council has 
provided a forum for dialogue, but often that dialogue and information-sharing has been 
impeded by groups and blocs intent on naming, shaming and blaming rather than seeking 
constructive dialogue
349
. 
5.3  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, formerly known as the Centre 
for Human Rights, is part of the United Nations Secretariat. The Office plays an important 
part in implementing the human rights programmes developed by policy organs and in 
servicing Charter-based and Treaty-based human rights bodies.
350
 One of its main functions 
is to provide and disseminate information and documents relating to international human 
rights, and to channel communications to the appropriate bodies. The Office is based in 
Geneva and has a branch in the United Nations headquarters in New York. It has no power or 
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mandate in its function to hear individual claims of human rights abuse or offer any remedy. 
It serves more as an administrative academic type of organisation. 
6 Communications   Procedures   and   Individual   Access   through   International 
Human Rights Instruments 
It should be noted that the procedures that discussed above brought before the Charter bodies 
do not concern individual complaints or petitions as such, the bodies have no ability to hand 
down a judgement or act in any form of quasi-judicial manner, rather these procedures 
concern human rights situations that affect a large number of people in countries over a 
protracted period of time.
351
Individuals or, in most cases, groups of people who claim to be  
the victims of  alleged  human rights abuses
352
may, however, participate in the examination 
procedures as witnesses with a consultative status.  
As for individual complaint mechanisms under specific human rights treaties, there are 
currently four United Nations committees appointed to receive and consider individual 
communications concerning human rights: The Human Rights Committee (HRC) under the 
ICCPR, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee 
Against Torture (CAT) and the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). 
7 Treaty-based Communications Procedures 
Treaty-based communications procedures are procedures for dealing with human rights 
complaints which have been brought before the treaty-based bodies. These bodies will then 
consider and decide what action should be taken on the communications. There are two types 
of communications: inter-state communications and individual communications. Whilst this 
paper will only concern  itself with the systems available for the individual in the 
international plane it should perhaps be noted that despite three systems currently being 
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available for an interstate complaints procedure with regard to human rights violations no 
state had lodged a complaint as of 2007.
353
 
Treaty-based bodies,  also  referred  to  as  treaty  bodies,  are  established  to  defend  the 
provisions laid down in the treaty, and to monitor and supervise their implementation. This 
means that the rules and procedures of the treaty apply only to those States which are parties 
to the treaty and not to all UN member States. The treaty bodies concerned are the Human 
Rights Committee (the HRC) formed under the ICCPR, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (the CERD), the Committee Against Torture (the CAT) and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (the CEDAW). None of 
these systems offers any form of redress to the individual nor do they have the judicial 
expertise to offer such a solution. 
7.1 Procedure brought before The Human Rights Committee (HRC). 
The HRC works in accordance with the provisions set out in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its first Optional Protocol.
354
 The ICCPR and its first 
Optional Protocol were adopted by the General Assembly in its resolutions in 1966 and 
entered into force on 23 March 1976.
355
 
The ICCPR, along with its first Optional Protocol, is regarded as the most important 
international instrument for the protection of human rights.
356
 This is for two reasons. Firstly, 
it not only sets  down most, if not all, of the basic civil and political rights proclaimed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (part I, articles 6 to 27), but more importantly it puts 
those rights into a legally binding  form. It should be noted however that the States that are 
parties to the Covenant are not automatically parties to the Optional Protocol. An act of 
ratification or declaration from a State is required before it becomes a Party to the Protocol. 
Secondly, it was the Optional Protocol which, for the first time, opened the door for 
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individuals to access remedies at the international level. By 20 March 2013, although there 
were 114 parties to the Covenant only 35 were signatories to the Optional Protocol.
357
 
 
Pursuant to the Covenant, the Human Rights Committee was created in September 1976 in 
accordance with the provisions contained in part IV (Articles 28 to 45) of the ICCPR to 
monitor the implementation of the Covenant. This part of the ICCPR sets out the 
establishment, composition, status, function and procedure of the Committee. Its two main 
functions are to consider reports from, and complaints against, States parties. The former is 
obligatory while the latter is optional.
358
 
 
Although the HRC is not an organ of the United Nations it does utilise the services of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and submits its annual 
reports to the General Assembly. The HRC has five main functions: to receive and consider 
periodic reports from the States parties, to make general comments, to examine inter-state 
communications and to consider individual communications
359
. 
 
In accordance with the implications of the ICCPR, the HRC could be considered as a quasi-
court of law for the parties in cases of alleged violations of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant.
360
 
Thus, under this procedure, individuals are granted a locus standi, the right to be heard in 
court or other proceeding. Communications or complaints against States parties exist in two 
forms: inter-state communications and individual communications
361
. 
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The competence of the Committee to receive and consider individual communications is 
provided for in the first Optional Protocol to the Covenant (hereinafter referred to as the 
Protocol). The Protocol, which entered into force on the same date as the Covenant, sets out 
the conditions of admissibility of individual communications as well as their examination 
procedures. The second Protocol deals with the elimination or abolition of the death penalty 
within the States parties
362
. 
Article 1 of the Protocol stipulates that States parties must recognise the competence or 
ability of the HRC to receive and consider communications from individuals alleging that the 
State party violates the provisions of the ICCPR. Thus, the HRC cannot receive nor consider 
petitions or communications which originate from citizens of States that are not parties to the 
Protocol. This then would severely limit its general use or applicability to individuals 
involved in cases of targeted sanctions. 
7.2 Critical Appraisal and Limitations of the HRC Procedure 
It must be noted that whilst the HRC hands down judgements, it is not a true court; it is not 
made up of judges in the judicial sense and it cannot issue a judgments against a non-
signatory state, indeed those states not signatories to the additional protocols allowing 
individual petitions are not involved in the process at all. The views it does expresses on the 
merits of individual communications have no legal force and are not binding on the State 
party involved even if a signatory. This is the most significant limitation of this procedure. 
The State party concerned is not obliged to take any notice of the steps or measures contained 
in the views, and the Committee has no means of enforcing them. Despite recognition and 
vindication of the Committee’s efforts in dealing with communications, in the final analysis 
these have been futile, in effect, in many cases.
363
  
7.3 Summary 
Although the Committee plays an important role in hearing and reporting on alleged human 
rights violations under the ICCPR, the fact that only those states that have signed the optional 
protocol allows an individual to bring to the committee attention alleged individual abuse in 
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the first place, that coupled with the fact that the Committee hands down a judgment without 
the power to make an offending state or organisation change its practice makes it less 
effective for the purposes of this study. 
8 Other Treaty-based Communication Procedures 
Other treaties have entered into force that are legally binding on States parties providing they 
are signatories to them;  namely The International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) which came into force on 21 December 1965 and 
took effect on 4 January 1969, the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  
Cultural  Rights (ICESCR), which came into effect on 3 January 1976, The Convention  on  
the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Discrimination  against  Women (CEDAW) entered into 
force on 3 September 1981, The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT Convention) entered into force on 26 June 1987 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which came into force on 2 September 
1990. Whilst these international treaties deal with human rights issues, none are relevant in 
the present study of individual or target sanctions and are not discussed further. 
9 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the current procedures available to the individual under 
international law who wishes to bring a claim regarding a human rights issue are sadly 
lacking in any real enforcement mechanism with no ability to give effective just satisfaction 
that would provide a real legally binding remedy that could be pursued by an individual who 
wished to seek redress for inclusion on a sanctions list instigated by the UN.  
The treaty bodies were not designed with that remit in mind. They do not possess the 
necessary quality and expertise of a court and have little experience in handing down 
judgements. Their membership is not made up from the judiciary but from a mixture of 
academics and specialists in their respective areas of competence.  
Treaty bodies to date have no authority to examine the competence of the UN itself and in 
order to enable any such body to do so would require a new treaty signed by all members of 
the UN, even then should this be possible it would leave the treaty body likely to be in 
conflict with the UN through article 103 of the UN treaty discussed later. 
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The next chapter will begin to look at the proposal of an international judicial review or 
appeal mechanism capable of offering such a proposal within the bounds of international law. 
To begin with the concept of judicial review or appeal and human rights will be discussed 
and outlined as neither are by no means a universally accepted precept. 
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CHAPTER 6 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
1 Preliminary Remarks 
As this study focusses on the lack of an effective judicial remedy currently available at the 
international level for those subjected to targeted sanctions by the United Nations it is 
necessary to examine at the outset the elements required for a judicial review to occur, this 
will be achieved from examination of various jurisdictions and deciding what constitutes a 
judicial review or appeal for the purposes of this thesis. Likewise there must be the same 
discussion surrounding what constitutes ‘human rights’ as this is itself a much contested 
issue. The starting point for this thesis is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
has been accepted by most states and is the basis of most modern human rights documents. 
This last element will be considering some of the ideals and ideologies which underpin 
contemporary concepts of human rights throughout the world.  The discussion in this chapter 
will be concluded with a brief explanation of what constitutes a violation of human rights. 
The subject of international judicial review, as a possible solution for the current problem, 
will be examined in detail later; this chapter will continue to use a comparative view as 
discussed in the methodology section of this thesis in order to obtain a wider assessment of 
the purpose of judicial review. 
 
2 Judicial Review 
Clive Lewis QC a barrister practising English Law, writing in the context of English common 
law, defined judicial review as: 
 “…the process by which the courts exercise a supervisory jurisdiction [or control] 
 over the activities of public authorities in the field of public law”.364 
 
This control is exercised primarily through the application for judicial review of regulations 
and policies made by those public authorities by individuals and entities who feel that the 
public authority has acted ultra vires. Lewis further emphasizes that judicial review 
jurisdiction only operates in the field of public law; and: 
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 [The] procedure is generally regarded as public law remedy. More accurately, the 
 application for  judicial review is a specialized procedure by which an applicant can 
 seek one or more of the existing prerogative remedies which can now only be claimed  
 by  way  of  an  application  for   judicial  review  and,  in  appropriate circumstances, 
 declarations and injunctions and damages.
365
 
Supperstone and Goudie, also writing in the context of English law, assert that “judicial 
review is the process by which the High Court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction over the 
proceedings and decisions of inferior courts, tribunals and other bodies or persons who carry 
out quasi-judicial functions or who are charged with the performance of public acts and 
duties.”366 In this connection, it is important to distinguish between application for judicial 
review and appeal, bearing in mind the suggestion of Ian McLeod that “appeal is a means of 
challenging a [court] decision, while [judicial] review is a means of challenging the way in 
which the decision was made.”
367
 Whilst this may be the case in UK law, it is not the case in 
EU law. However, it is important to distinguish between judicial review and judicial appeal, 
here it is explained as: 
 
  One major practical consequence of the distinction is that in the case of an appeal 
 the appellate body is not only being asked to say whether the decision was right or 
 wrong, but can also generally substitute its own decision. Whereas in the context of 
 [judicial] review, the  supervisory body is not called upon to say whether it agrees  
 with  the  merits  of  the  decision,  and  therefore,  even  if  it  upholds  the challenge, 
 it cannot substitute its own decision, compel it to be re-made in a lawful fashion, and 
 make an order prohibiting future illegality.
368
 
 
In the case Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans, Lord Brightman expresses 
himself in similar vein: 
 Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a [court] decision, but a 
 review of the manner in which the decision was made. [It] is concerned, not with the 
 decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of 
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 the court is observed, the court will, in my view, under the guise of preventing the 
 abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power.
369
 
A United States-oriented definition of judicial review is put forward by Tate and Jackson in 
the book they edited, entitled “Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy”. This book 
states that: 
 … Judicial review refers to the ability of a court to determine the  acceptability of a 
 given law or other official action on grounds of compatibility with  constitutional 
 forms.
370
 
In relation to McLeod’s term “fashion”, the word “forms” refers to procedural matters and 
the substance or matter of the law. From this perspective, judicial review can be categorized 
into two major types, namely procedural and substantive judicial review. In the procedural 
review, the object of examination or review is the "fashion", the way or the procedure by 
which a decision or law was issued. Thus, it concerns itself with whether or not all the 
necessary formalities have been met. That is why this type of review is also called formal 
judicial review. The procedure by which the constitutionality and legality of the substance or 
the subject matter of the decision or law are tested is called substantive or material judicial 
review.
371
 
Neal Tate goes even further when he divides judicial review into five different types: 
a. Constitutional and Administrative Review  
b. Direct and Indirect Review 
c. A Priori / A Posteriori and Abstract / Concrete Review  
d. Coerciveness of Review.372 
 
In the aforementioned book, co-editor Neal Tate provides comprehensive explanations of 
these types of review, which can be summarised as follows: 
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a. Constitutional review occurs when the courts are assigned to examine and to declare 
whether state laws, legislation and actions of government (including legislative and 
judicial agencies) are constitutional or unconstitutional. Administrative review occurs 
when the courts are assigned to examine and to declare whether the actions of 
government agencies (other than the courts) are legally appropriate or not. 
 
b. Direct review is basically the same as constitutional review, while indirect review 
occurs where, in the process of interpretation of laws; a court considers whether or not 
the issuing body or legislature actually has the legislative power it claims. 
 
c. A priori / a posteriori review is an examination procedure exercised by the courts 
before (a priori) or after (a posteriori) laws or actions take effect. The former is 
identical to abstract, the latter to concrete. 
 
d. Coerciveness of review was introduced by William Kitchin in 1990. This has to do 
with the effectiveness of the procedure. At one extreme, the ability of courts to 
declare official laws void on grounds of unconstitutionality is very limited (like in 
Indonesia); at the other extreme, the power of courts is unlimited (coercive). It is 
therefore important to determine in which instance the power of courts exercising 
judicial review may be coercive and those in which it may be advisory
373
. 
 
For the purpose of the discussion in this thesis, which is mainly considering the actions of the 
UN Security Council, the assertion of Brewer-Carias’ that judicial review is “[the] power of 
court to decide upon the constitutionality of legislative acts; in other words, the judicial 
control of the constitutionality of [all] legislation”374is particularly helpful.  
 
Further detailed discussion of either procedural judicial review or the divisions mentioned 
above is outside the parameters of this study. This is because whilst most of the measures 
mentioned are primarily concerned with municipal law, this thesis will contend that they can 
be equally applied to both the State internally and externally and to international 
organisations in particular the United Nations but further discussion of the mechanics of 
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judicial review is academic. At present there is no legal concept of judicial review for actions 
of the Security Council! Consequently, the focus of this thesis is grounded in establishing that 
there should be a system in place to allow for such action. 
 
It should be noted for sake of completeness that not all decisions or laws that are disliked by 
citizens or groups of citizens, are reviewable. Three main factors are used to decide whether 
aggrieved persons can challenge decisions: firstly, whether or not the particular body or 
agency that made the decision is the appropriate body to be subject to a review procedure, 
secondly, assuming that the body is appropriate and subject to review, whether or not it is 
possible to review the particular decision or law that is subject to complaint and thirdly, 
whether or not the person who is submitting application for review has locus standi to do so. 
Moreover, the procedural relevance for the applicant of answers to the above questions must 
also be considered. Must the applicant proceed in a particular way depending on whether or 
not review is available? What consequences are there for the applicant’s case, if, in 
challenging the decision in question, he or she uses a procedure deemed to be inappropriate 
by the court? Due to limited space, and in order to maintain a focussed discussion, these 
issues will not be dealt with in this thesis except in relation to the United Nations Security 
Council.
375
 
 
In summary, judicial review is the procedure whereby the ‘court’ is able, in certain cases, 
with or without application, to review the legality (and constitutionality or in this case 
compliance with its own Charter) of legislation or decisions affecting an individual or entity 
made by a wide variety of bodies, ranging from internal, such as government or state 
institutions, ministers and officials exercising prerogative or statutory powers, and other 
powerful self-regulating bodies, to external, such as those rules now made by international 
organisations such as the United Nations. 
 
This thesis will not consider every act or role of the United Nations but only those acts made 
by the Security Council that have taken on a quasi-legal significance; such as naming 
individuals and entities for inclusion on ‘smart’ or targeted’ sanctions lists. The judicial 
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review aspect will consider whether the Security Council acted ultra vires of its own powers 
in taking on such a role and where pertinent, to mention within the context of this study, the 
compliance with human rights norms established under the UN Charter and the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
2.1 The Notion of Judicial Review 
From an historical viewpoint, the notion of judicial review emerged as a companion of the 
idea of the Rechstaat (Rule of Law), which dates back to the late nineteenth century in 
Europe.
376
 Since then, this concept has been developed and reached its evolutionary apex 
shortly after World War II.  From then on, despite differences in interpretation, the concept 
seemed to be suitable for every country in the world. 
 
A closer examination of history helps to trace the notion of judicial review back to its origin. 
It was the Magna Carta, decreed by King John of England in June, 1215, which was regarded 
as the birth of the Rule of Law.
377  
The Great Charter, as it is popularly referred to, guaranteed 
that citizens would be protected against arbitrary decisions and sentences - these were, up to 
that time, made at the Crown’s discretion and considered part of its prerogative. With this 
Charter, the King recognised the authority of the law over his own power to govern (although 
retaining some of his prerogatives), and placed himself  on  the  same  footing  as  his  
subjects  before  the  law.  The Magna Carta thus established the principles of supremacy of 
the law and equality before the law: two main “pillars of the Rule of Law”, as Dicey termed 
it
378
. Later on in history, the principle of the Rule of Law became an effective means of 
controlling the performance of governments, whose power was thus limited by the duty to 
guarantee the rights and freedoms of individuals and at the same time regulated by the 
functions and duties of the government.  
 
In the eighteenth century, the French commentator Montesquieu introduced the doctrine of 
the separation of powers (Trias Politica), which requires that the three main State functions 
(legislative, executive and judicial) should each be exercised by different agencies. Although 
                                               
376 See, for instance, R. Gneist, Der Rechsstaat und die Verwaltungsgerichte in Deutschland. 2nd ed., 
Darmstadt 1958: reprint and Informationen zur politischen Bildung, der Rechsstaat. published by 
Bundeszentralle fuer politischen Bildung Bonn (1991), particularly at 3-6 and 13-15. 
377 Rene Dassault, & Louis Borgeat, Administrative Law: A Treatise. Vol. 4, (2nd ed), Carswell, Student 
Edition, (Toronto 1990) 25-26. 
378 A.V. Dicey’s “Introduction to the Study of the Law of Constitution”, edited by E.C.S. Wade, 10th ed., as 
quoted by Dassault and Borgeat, Id. 
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the strict separation of powers has never actually occurred, the basic principles of this 
doctrine emphasize that every exercise of power must happen through the proper channels 
and must be in accordance with the law. 
 
Basically, the legislative bodies make the laws, the executive agencies implement and 
perform the duty and competence prescribed by those laws, and the judicial agencies (courts) 
supervise or monitor the implementation of those laws and, where necessary, force the other 
agencies to abide by the laws if there is a violation or inconsistency. 
 
Notwithstanding the values it upholds, the concept of the Rule of Law will remain a buried 
relic unless, as van Dijk asserts: 
 
 …procedures are made available by which it is possible to control the observance by 
 the government of the legal rules it has itself laid down. Such control of governmental 
 action  not  only  serves  to  protect  the  individual  against  the government; it  serves 
 the public interest in the maintenance of the legal order. Moreover, this control is in 
 the interest of the government itself. The awareness that the government too is bound 
 by the law and is subject to supervision under certain guarantees, in combination with 
 the fact that for most legal communities this supervision will show that the 
 government generally acts legally, strengthens confidence in the governmental 
 apparatus and thus enhances the efficiency of the administration. 
379
 
 
One of the above-mentioned procedures is unarguably the judicial review. In accordance with 
van Dijk’s assertion, the notion of Rule of Law is part of, or rather, derived from the principle 
that no one may exercise power unless that power has been granted to them by law. This 
premise can also be used in formulating the notion of judicial review of government acts; that 
is, no government can exercise power unless that power has been granted by law. 
Furthermore, the legality of that exercise of power must constantly be subject to a review 
procedure prescribed by the law. 
2.2 The Purpose of Judicial Review 
                                               
379 P Van Dijk, Judicial Review of Governmental Action and the Requirements of an Interest to Sue: 
Sijhthoff & Noordhoff, The Hague, 1980,  2. 
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In relation to their function as law enforcers, and in the context of English public law, Lewis 
summarises that the courts will review an exercise of power by the government and other 
public bodies in order to ensure that they: 
a. have not made an error of law; 
b. have  considered  all  relevant  factors,  and  not  taken  into  account  any 
irrelevant factors; 
c. have acted for a purpose expressly or implicitly authorised by statute; 
d. have not acted in a way that is so unreasonable that no reasonable public body 
would act in that way; 
e. have  observed  statutory  procedural  requirements  and  the  common  law 
principles of natural justice or procedural fairness.
380
 
 
Although these review criteria were only meant to be applicable in judicial practices based on 
the common law, they are, in fact, also suitable for most, if not all, national court systems and 
practices. The words “common law”, for example, can be replaced with “constitutional law” 
in the European-continental system to make the term more generic.  
 
While the aim of judicial review may vary somewhat in emphasis from country to country, 
nevertheless, the general purpose of all judicial proceedings in the courts is to ensure that the 
law is enforced and upheld as the law itself requires. Judicial review is no different; with the 
only exception being, within the confines of the definition, that the purpose of judicial review 
is to test, to question, or to challenge the lawfulness of acts, decisions or laws of the 
government and other public bodies. This right of the citizen to challenge the laws passed by 
their democratically elected representatives is of course a dichotomy within a democratic 
society but this acts as a check and balance not against the democratic process but by the 
excess of the Executive who may not always have a democratic legitimacy to pass legislation. 
 
In Japan, for example, the principal purpose of judicial review is the protection of individual 
rights,
381
 whereas in the United States and Canada, which represent the American-style of 
judicial review, the main purpose is to “measure legislation against the requirements of a 
                                               
380 Clive Lewis, (Ibid n364) 107. 
381 Jackson & Tate, (Ibid. n 370) 29. 
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written constitution”382. In the United Kingdom and other countries whose legal systems have 
common law  foundations, the purpose of judicial review is primarily, although not only, to 
“exercise a supervisory jurisdiction over public bodies to ensure that they observe the 
substantive principles of public law
.”383 
 
In this study it will be suggested that although there is no separation of powers at the level of 
the UN, it is the authors’ contention that the International Court of Justice as an organ of the 
UN itself should be empowered through a change of its statute to enable it take on such a role 
in ensuring that the acts of the organisation remain legal and compliant with human rights 
standards they themselves have set. 
3 Major Concepts of Human Rights 
3.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The term “major concepts” in relation to human rights means the more widely discussed 
concepts in the literature examined in this study, but does not in any way imply that the 
“major concepts” are more genuine or more valuable than the “minor” ones.384  It is not 
appropriate nor indeed feasible to discuss all human rights concepts in this study. It is also 
accepted that there are difficulties both in the definition and interpretation of international 
human rights instruments. Generally speaking however it has been argued by some that there 
are four major systems
385 
of human rights currently in operation throughout in the world: 
European, American, African and Asian
386
. All four will be dealt with briefly as concepts in 
the following sections. The discussion will commence with an overview of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which in this respect can be regarded as a fundamental 
doctrine and part of a ‘bill of international human rights’ which in turn will also be discussed 
by reference to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
387
 and the 
                                               
382 (Ibid  n 370)30. 
383Clive  Lewis, (Ibid. n 364) 3. 
384 Some authors suggest that there are several new emerging human rights concepts or systems in several 
regions  such  as  in  Arabian  region  (Cairo  Declaration  on  Human  Rights,  1990)  and  Asian  Region 
(Bangkok Declaration,1993). For these, see among others, Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston. 2000. 
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 780. 
385 Most authors use the term “concept”, but some others “system”. Steiner & Alston, (Supra  n384 ) 779-
786, uses the term “system”. In this work both terms are regarded as the same and used interchangeably. 
386 According to Steiner & Alston, one of the new emerging concepts is the Asian system; albeit still in the 
form of a proposal compared to that of the European, Inter-American and African systems. See, Steiner & 
Alston, (Supra n384 )780. 
387 For a historic background and discussion on the history and development ICCPR see: Christian Tomushat at 
the UN Audio visual library http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/iccpr/iccpr.html, Accessed 3 Jan 2012. 
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International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
388
. These together these are 
more often referred to as an international bill of rights they will be referred to in greater detail 
later within the thesis. 
It can be argued that the most important question relating to the universality of human rights 
is the following: whether they are universal or whether they ought to be universal. The 
answer to this question is far more than a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. It involves some relevant  
issues  such  as  moral  and  cultural  values,  tradition,  religion,  state  and  legal systems  as  
well  as  social,  political,  economic,  and  even  historical  backgrounds. Addressing this 
issue, Lindholt argues: 
 The importance of distinguishing between the two lies within the fact that we cannot 
 legitimately deduce from “is” to “ought”, since this represents a confusion of two 
 distinct scientific methodologies. This means that just because there seems to be some 
 degree of universal consensus as to basic human needs formulated as rights and 
 freedoms, we cannot extend this to serve as the only legitimation for claiming that 
 human rights, as they develop and express themselves at different times or under 
 different circumstances, must therefore conform to a narrowly defined universal code 
 of human rights. As to the contrary situation, deducing from the normative to the 
 empirical also carries some dubious consequences. An illustration hereof would be to 
 reject certain types or distinctions of rights because they  do  not  conform  to  a  
 normative  definition  of  a  universal  human  rights conception.
389
 
3.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
In less than half a century, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the UDHR) has come 
to be regarded as possibly the single most important document created in the twentieth 
century and as the accepted world standard for human rights
390.
 As the Second World War 
drew to an end, the representatives of the four major allied powers met in 1944 at Dumbarton 
Oaks in Georgetown, Washington DC, to discuss the future world order. Two world wars had 
been fought in less than 30 years and atrocities had been inflicted mainly on members of the 
Jewish race in Europe and on prisoners of war in detention in Asia and Europe. Within this 
                                               
388 For full details of ICESCR  http://www.un-documents.net/icescr.htm, Accessed 3 Jan 2012. 
389 Lone Lindholt, Questioning the Universality of Human Rights, The African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights. Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth,  1997, 23. 
390 Markus Schmidt. Eds D Moeckli, S Shah and S Sivakumaran, International Human Rights Law, Oxford 
Uuniversity Press: (Oxford, 2010) 391. 
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context, the leaders felt it was imperative that the nations and peoples of the world live 
together more peaceably resolve conflict ideally without recourse to armed conflict, and 
instigated plans for establishing what was to become the United Nations
391.
  
In late 1945, leaders of the world's nations met in San Francisco to form the United Nations. 
Inspired by the great South African pre-apartheid leader Field-Marshall Smuts, they included 
in the preamble to the Charter of the UN, an important reference to human rights.  
 We the peoples of the United Nations [are] determined -  
 .. to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
 person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.   
This reference to human rights was followed up by six references throughout the UN 
Charter's operative provisions to human rights and fundamental freedoms
392
. In addition, 
largely as a result of pressure brought to bear on the political leaders by some
42
 United States 
non-government organisations, Article 68 was included. It required the Economic and Social 
Council to set up commissions in the human rights and economic and social fields. The 
outcome was the establishment of a Commission on Human Rights. Thus the Commission is 
one of the very few bodies to draw its authority directly from the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
In April 1946, Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of President Franklin Roosevelt of the United 
States was appointed to chair an interim group of 9 members. By June, the interim body had 
suggested that the new Commission should make its first task the development, as soon as 
possible, of an international bill of human rights. Later in the year, the new Commission of 
Human Rights of 18 members, again chaired by Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, was appointed, and 
included China's P.C.Chang, Frenchmen Rene Cassin and Dr Charles Malik of Lebanon. The 
Commission met for the first time in January 1947 and considered several critical issues. Its 
decisions have greatly influenced the human rights development since then, including action 
at both the regional and national level. It concluded that it should work to develop first a 
declaration rather than a treaty. This was to allow the document to be produced with 
unanimous agreement or at least without dissention. The declaration was intended to have 
more moral and political gravitas than a recommendation, but less binding in international 
                                               
391 T. Weiss & S. Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2008) 
527. 
392 See UN Charter  http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/, Accessed  10 Feb 2010. 
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law than a treaty. Perhaps most important of all, it decided that the declaration should contain 
both civil and political and also economic and social rights
393
.  
 
The Commission's view was that the declaration should be a relatively short, inspirational 
and energising document accessible to ordinary people. It should be the foundation and 
central document for the remainder of an international bill of human rights. It thus avoided 
the more difficult problems that had to be addressed when the binding treaty came up for 
consideration just what role the state should have in enforcing the rights in its territory and 
whether the mode of enforcing civil and political rights should be different from that of 
economic and social rights
394
. All these topics whilst both interesting and noteworthy, will 
not be explored further in this study. 
 
It was fortunate that the Commission made the decision to separate the formally legally 
binding covenant from the initial declaration. Although the declaration was endorsed in 
December 1948, the two covenants (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) that emerged to 
define the obligations of each state were not ready for ratification (formal approval by the 
governments of the world) until 1966, some 18 years later
395
.  
 
The acceptance of the declaration was not without its difficulties. Many individuals and 
groups helped to drive the declaration through including Eleanor Roosevelt and her advisers 
who came mainly from the US Department of State. Those who provided drafts to the 
Committee for consideration which included the international lawyer Professor Hersch 
Lauterpacht of Cambridge University and British author H G Wells. There was also a draft 
based on preparatory work for an American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
Finally, the secretariat, led by Professor J P Humphrey executed the onerous task of collating 
all this material for the Commission to consider.  
 
When the Commission finally took its vote on 18 June 1948, twelve of its fifteen members 
voted in favour. The Soviet Union, Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Yugoslavia (the Soviet bloc 
technically had only two members) abstained. On the evening of 10 December 1948, the 
                                               
393 T Weiss & S. Daws, ibid n 391, 528. 
394 Ibid n 391, 529. 
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General Assembly endorsed the text of the UDHR without amendment, only two days before 
it rose until the next year. There were no dissenting votes, but the six communist countries, 
then members of the UN, and also Saudi Arabia and South Africa, abstained.  
3.3 Aspirational or Instrumental  
The Commission then turned to formulating the declaration. It decided to name it the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which was to set a standard of rights for all 
people everywhere regardless of race gender greed religion and political persuasion. In the 
words of the first preamble to the UDHR, it was to inculcate:  
 recognition of the inherent dignity and .. equal and inalienable rights of all members 
 of the human family [... and through that recognition provide] the foundation of 
 freedom, justice and peace in the world. 
Article 1 reflects the inspirational nature of the project. It was included only after much 
controversy about whether it was superfluous; merely stating the obvious, or whether it 
should be included in the preamble rather than the main text. It proclaims in ringing terms 
that:   
 All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
 with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
 brotherhood.  
The reason for including it in the main text is to state firmly the basis of all human rights, the 
rationality of human persons and their obligation to deal fairly with everyone else, regardless 
of race, sex, wealth and so on. Article 7 follows up this theme by saying that all are to be 
equal before the law and have a right to protection against any form of discrimination. 
Articles 3 and 27 are probably the core of the substantive provisions in the Declaration. They 
give every human being the rights to life, to liberty, to security of person (Art 3) and to an 
adequate standard of living (Art 27). The first three are core civil and political rights, the last 
an economic and social right. The right to an adequate standard of living is interesting in that 
it specifies as part of it the right to health and well-being not only of a person but of his or her 
family, and also the right to necessary food, clothing, housing and medical care, and the right 
to social security (also covered in Art 22).   
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Overarching all the particular rights are Articles 28 and 29. (There are 30 Articles in the 
Declaration, of which 17 could be regarded as relating to civil and political rights and 8 to 
economic and social rights). Articles 28 and 29 have not generated much discussion, and 
have not been given legally binding force in the two Covenants. But they have momentous 
significance. Article 28 emphasises the responsibility of the whole international community 
for seeking and putting into place arrangements of both a civil and political and an economic 
and social kind that allow for the full realisation of human rights. It would be easy to ask 
questions about current arrangements or plans that hardly seem to do this, such as those 
relating to trade and investment arrangements and perhaps some of those planning to 
eradicate international crimes such as genocide and war crimes. Article 30 is also of high 
importance, because it underlines the responsibility all people have to their community. 
Notice that the Article does not talk about the state.  
3.4 The changing status of the UDHR  
With the advent of the Cold War and the consequent deceleration of many constructive 
developments, the Universal Declaration has still managed to emerge successfully from the 
complex and politically hazardous processes of the United Nations to become its human 
rights flagship. The Declaration had not managed during this time to achieve full recognition 
from the communist and certain Middle Eastern countries, but at least they had not voted 
against it. It can be argued that as a human rights document it has achieved world recognition 
as the basis on which to build effective human rights protection. Whilst it does have many 
critics those who argue that many states still routinely violate basic human rights norms, it 
has led to changes and the introduction and recognition at the regional and national level of 
human rights protection that is enshrined binding legislation.    
 
UDHR has almost certainly now becomes a part of international customary law. The view is 
steadily growing among international lawyers that state practice is an important source of 
international law as it includes not only acts such as observing rules about navigation at sea 
but also acts such as voting for resolutions at the United Nations and other international 
gatherings. The very large and increasing number of ratifications of the two human rights 
Covenants, and the fact that the rights stated in the UDHR are commonly recognised as well 
founded in moral and good practice terms, means that there are now virtually unchallengeable 
grounds for asserting that the UDHR rights have become part of international customary 
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law
396
. That means that, unlike treaties, which only bind a country once it has accepted the 
treaty obligations, all countries in the world are bound, whatever their particular view may 
be. A country cannot repudiate international customary law, as it may do with a treaty 
obligation. This is the position that this author takes throughout this study when interpreting 
actions of the UNSC in its dealings over sanctions against the individual
397. 
 
Of equal importance, the UDHR has become almost an extension of the UN Charter
398
. 
Although, the Charter has only a few articles that refer to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, it is now usual to refer to the UDHR as setting out the content of those rights and 
freedoms. So it has become a part of the fabric of the UN itself, and is often referred to in 
resolutions of the UN General Assembly, and in its debates, for example in relation to the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960. At 
the human rights conference in Teheran in 1978, to mark the 30th anniversary of the UDHR, 
the representatives of 84 nations unanimously declared that the UDHR states a common 
understanding of the inalienable rights of all people and constitutes an obligation for the 
members of the international community.  
3.5 Concluding remarks on the UDHR 
More than sixty years on from what Eleanor Roosevelt described as a possible global Magna 
Carta, the UDHR has become the starting point and backbone for modern human rights 
protection. Whilst it will be difficult in this study to have a consensus on human rights 
interpretation, the UDHR can be likened to what Walzer describes as ‘Thick and Thin’. Here 
the idea is that although we may not all agree on every aspect of Human Rights protection 
and that they may have different interpretations it can be argued that even at the thinnest 
point there is a similar agreement that rights do exist
399
.   
 
                                               
396 F. Martin, S. Schnably, R. Wilson, J. Simon, M. Tushnet, International Human Rights and Humanitarian 
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hoc, detached, and general. Thick arguments play the larger role in determining our views about domestic 
justice and in shaping our criticism of local arrangements. Thin arguments shape our views about justice in 
foreign places and in international society 
  
124 
 
Notwithstanding the initial difficulties and resistance, the Declaration has probably achieved 
a stature in the world that even the most optimistic of its founders in 1948 would not have 
expected. First, it has become accepted (often rather reluctantly, it is true) as an influential 
statement of standards, even by countries that are doubtful about the human rights enterprise. 
When countries such as Burma, Argentina, China and the former Yugoslavia feel bound to 
defend their alleged breaches of the UDHR, then it can be said to have achieved an important 
political and moral status and has been suggested it is now reached the level of Jus Cogens
400. 
 
Nevertheless, even though we cannot come to an agreement as to whether all or even some 
human rights are universal or not, due to the complexities and the variety of perceptions 
pertaining to this matter, one thing is certain: the basic principles set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights (UDHR) have been agreed by the membership of the United 
Nations and is deemed as the fundamental corner stone in human rights protection. (Together 
with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESR).  
The opening statement of the Declaration distinctly and appropriately acknowledges that: 
 …[the] recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
 all  members  of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
 the world.
401 
Universal peace and the respect of human rights are urgent issues. Man can peacefully enjoy 
life only if the human rights of every individual are recognized and what is more, respected. 
Progress is only possible if peace prevails.  
3.6 European Concept of Human Rights 
The formation of a regional system of human rights operating across the European States was 
not unusual in its content and in fact preceded the formation of the Council of Europe in 
1949. This European concept of human rights culminated in the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was signed on 4 November 1950 and 
entered into force on 3 September 1953. What is remarkable about this system of human 
rights are the protection mechanisms that have evolved and the ability and rights of the 
                                               
400 F. Martin, S. Schnably, R. Wilson, J. Simon, M. Tushnet, (ibid n 396 )33. 
401 First sentence of the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
  
125 
 
individual to take their grievance and be heard before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) at Strasbourg, which has the power to provide just satisfaction. By 1995 all thirty 
states then party to the convention had accepted the right of the individual to petition and 
more importantly the jurisdiction of the Court
402
. It is this development that has led to the 
myriad of case law and academic comment of the Convention’s jurisprudence. There are 
currently 14 protocols which have been agreed upon as supplementary documents to the 
original text. The Convention is considered the most advanced and developed framework and 
structure for the international protection of human rights in the world. In relation to the 
promotion of respect for international human rights standards, the Convention is of particular 
importance for several reasons: 
• It was the first comprehensive treaty in the world in this field 
 
• It established the first international complaints procedure and the first international 
 court for the determination of human rights matters 
 
• It remains the most judicially developed of all human rights systems 
 
• It has generated a more extensive jurisprudence than any other part of the 
 international system.
403
 
Yet, despite the reputation that the Convention has gained for covering a wide range of 
human rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
protocols still only deal with certain rights within this spectrum. Alpha Connelly observes: 
 … the Preamble to the Convention explicitly states that the signatory governments 
 are  enforcing  only  certain  rights  proclaimed  by  the  United  Nations  General 
 Assembly  in  the  1948  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights.  The  rights 
 guaranteed by the Convention are mainly civil and political rights: rights such as the  
 right  to  life,  to  freedom  from  torture  and  from  inhuman  and  degrading 
 treatment or punishment, to personal liberty, to fair trial, to respect for private and 
 family life, to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and  
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 freedom of association. The right to vote, a right essential to representative 
 democracy, is guaranteed not in the original text but in [article 3 of the First 
 Protocol]. Economic and social rights, such as the right to work and the right to social 
 welfare, are the subject of separate treaty, the 1961 European Social Charter” [which 
 entered into force on January 26, 1965].
404
 
 
Van Dijk suggests that Human rights in the European perspective are considered as “rights of 
the individual and obligations to society.”405 In 1981, Gerard Wiarda, who was the then 
president of the European Human Rights Court, wrote an essay on the Ringeisen
406
 case in 
which the Court tried to give its own interpretation of the expression “determination of civil 
rights and obligations” in Article 6 (1) of the convention. He argued that: 
 
 … the Court must have given a much broader scope than what was intended when 
 the provision was drafted. Indeed, in reality, the terms “civil rights and obligations” is 
 an equivalent of “private or individual rights and obligations.407 
 
One might, of course, argue that there was no necessity for the Court to give an abstract 
definition of “civil rights and obligations”, but, in fact, the notion of the guarantee of 
individual rights has been a prevailing feature of the concept of human rights in Europe. 
 
The underlying importance of human rights in Europe within this study is the rights of an 
individual to challenge perceived breaches against public authorities and the state. Something 
that is not yet possible within the international stage against the UNSC.  
3.7 European Court of Justice 
It is perhaps judicious to remind ourselves of the discussion in Chapter three regarding the 
European Union Court of Justice (EUCJ), as part of the regional protection of human rights 
within the European Union. The role of this court has been discussed in particular in relation 
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to the case of Kadi in which the Court has become directly embroiled for nearly ten years in 
conflict with the United Nations Security Council regarding the imposition of sanctions
408
.  
 
The main function of the European Union Court of Justice which was established under the 
treaty of Rome
409
 is to interpret European Law (EU law) in order to make sure it is applied 
fairly throughout the EU. It also settles legal disputes regarding the interpretation of EU law 
between EU governments and EU institutions. The EU Court is empowered under treaty to 
issue advisory opinions to the national Courts of member States on the interpretation and 
application of EU law within those states. Individuals, companies or organisations may also 
in certain circumstances bring cases directly before the EU Court for breaches of their EU 
rights. As far as human rights are concerned, human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights are the values on which the European Union is 
supposedly founded. These principles have been embedded in the Treaties of the European 
Union, they have been reinforced by the Charter of Fundamental Rights
410
. Countries seeking 
to join the EU must respect human rights, and so must countries which have concluded trade 
and other agreements with it. The EU is not yet but is moving towards becoming a signatory 
of the ECHR which it is hoped will give rise to human rights harmonisation throughout 
Europe. 
  
3.8 Inter-American Concept of Human Rights 
The Inter-American Human Rights System is a gradual development from fundamental 
principles for a peaceful co-existence among the American states. The principles include 
regional solidarity, collective security, non-intervention, democracy and human rights. These 
primary and collectively accepted norms were given legal status at the ninth Inter-American 
Conference held in Bogota in May 1948, when the American states adopted a Charter 
establishing the Organization on American States (OAS). At the same time, the Bogota 
Conference also adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man.
411
 
                                               
408 See discussion on Kadi and others in Chapter 4. 
409 Full details of operation and composition of the Court: http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-
justice/index_en.htm,  Accessed  4 Jan 2012. 
410 For full details, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm, accessed 4 Jan 2013. 
411 About the debate on the legally binding quality of the Declaration’s provisions relating to human rights, see 
W. van Thomas and A. Thomas. 1963. The Organisation of American States. (Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press) 223. 
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Thus, the  Americans  already  had  a  commitment  to  human  rights  in  the  form  of  a 
declaration   seven   months  before  the  United  Nations  had  adopted  the  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and two and a half years before the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was adopted. 
 
Nevertheless, the establishment of a regional treaty whereby the principles set forth in the 
Declaration would have a legally binding power only came much later.
412
 That treaty is the 
American Convention on Human Rights, which was adopted in 1969 and entered into force 
in 1978. Prior to the adoption of the Convention, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights was established in 1959. The Commission became an organ of the OAS only after the 
amendment of the Charter by the Protocol of Buenos Aires 1967. The principal function of 
this Commission is “to promote the observance and protection of human rights, and to serve 
as a consultative organ of the OAS in this matter.”413 
 
On the basis of the rights which are protected and the freedoms which are guaranteed in the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Convention on Human 
Rights, one might hastily conclude that the Inter-American concept of human rights has an 
individualistic focus, just like the European one. Article 1 of the Convention, for example, 
requires the States “to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full 
exercise” of the rights and freedoms recognised therein414. 
 
The American Convention on Human Rights contains twenty-six rights and freedoms, 
twenty-one of which are included in the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. They are: the right to life, the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial, the 
right to free election, the right to an effective remedy if one’s rights are violated, the right to 
recognition as a person before the law, the right to compensation for miscarriage of justice, 
the right to a name, the right of the child, the right to a nationality, the right to equality before 
                                               
412 The reason for this is that in the face of massive and widespread human rights violations in many coup 
d’etat attempts in Latin American countries, the progress towards an established human rights system in 
the region proceeded slowly. J.S. Davidson observes the phenomenon in his books Inter-American Human 
Rights System, published by Dartmouth, 1997, particularly at pp. 1-99 and 259-260, and, more generally in 
Human Rights, published by Open University Press, 1993. 
413 Chapter XVI, Article 111 of the Charter. This broad mandate was further amplified by the Commission 
Statute and Rules of Procedure according to which, as the work progressed, the Commission became an 
organ of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
414 R. Smith, Texts and Materials on International Human Right, Routledge Cavendish: Oxford, 2007, 132. 
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the law, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, freedom  from slavery and servitude,  
freedom from retroactivity of  the criminal law, freedom  of conscience  and  religion,  
freedom  of  thought  and  expression,  freedom  of  assembly, freedom of association, 
freedom to marry and found a family, and freedom of movement. Meanwhile, there are five 
rights and freedoms included in the Convention which are not part  of  the  United  Nations  
Covenant:  the  right   to   property,  freedom  from  exile, prohibition of the collective 
expulsion of aliens, the right of reply, the right of asylum.
415
 
 
However, taking this view is not entirely true, especially in conjunction with the provision 
contained in Article XXXVIII of the Declaration, which provides that “the rights of man are 
limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general 
welfare and advancement of democracy.”  
 
It should be noted that although the United States of America has not accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court to hear complaints of alleged violations of human 
rights, the Commission does have jurisdiction to investigate and report on any such violations 
as the USA is a member of the organisation
416
. 
 
In conclusion, the American concept of human rights can be pictured as a freeway of rights 
where civic duties function as road signs that remind individuals of the speed limits while 
exercising their rights
417
. 
3.9 African Concept of Human Rights 
The African system could be describe as the newest, least developed and effective system of 
human rights protection.
418
 This is not surprising when one considers the problems faced by 
the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, which is the sole active organisation 
in the whole African human rights system. The African Commission is a relatively 
inexperienced organisation, with few powers, and for the most part it has been hesitant in 
                                               
415 For further comparison of the rights protected in the Inter-American system, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and in the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see N.R. Sharma., Human Rights in the 
World, Pointer Publishers: Jaipur,1999,especially at pp. 35-117. 
416 See for example, Mary and Carrie Dann v United States of America, report No: 75/02 (2002) in which the 
petitioners claimed that various rights under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man had 
been infringed.  
417 R. Smith (ibid n414 ) 133. 
418 Steiner & Alston, supra  n384, 920. 
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exercising or creatively interpreting its existing powers, or developing further powers. 
Moreover, the basic structure and tasks undertaken by the Commission have not shown 
innovation in terms of inter-governmental human rights institutions. 
Human rights in the African perspective are by and large a communal matter. Contrary to the 
European perspective, which distinguishes individuals, the African view on human rights 
emphasizes communality. Lone Lindholt articulates this African perspective as follows: 
 …the focus  is  the  group  and  on  obligations  rather  than  on  the  rights  of  the 
 individual,  contained in the statement ‘in African culture it is the community 
 (consisting of unitary, or extended, families) that has priority’. Indeed, we may not 
 even  find  many  examples  of  forms  of  traditional  governments  fulfilling  the 
 requirements of European democratic ideals, which  again rest on the equality, 
 autonomy and ability of representation of each member of the community.
419
 
Yet this does mean that in traditional Africa there has never been a universally recognised 
conception of rights. Some human rights recognised by most “civilised” societies have long 
been part of the African culture, such as: the right to membership, freedom of thought, 
speech, belief and association, and the right to enjoy property. In contrast to European human 
rights, which stemmed from a ‘Grundnorm’ or constitutional basis, these rights and freedoms 
were originally derived from natural law and the dignity of man. In Lindholt’s own terms, the 
legitimacy of these rights comes from: 
 … a set of social values ingrained as a set of basic principles espoused by at least a 
 substantial majority of a given society. ….Africa maintained a set of rights and duties 
 for its peoples which were substantially in tune with the concept of “natural law” and 
 the “dignity of man.420 
The Charter establishing the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) came into force in 1986. It 
imposed no explicit obligation on member states for the protection of human rights. The 
OAU founding Charter only required states parties to have due regard for human rights as set 
out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in their international relations. In spite of 
                                               
419Lone Lindholt, Questioning the Universality of Human Rights, The African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights. Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth,  1997, 18, More details on the cultural perspective of the African 
human rights conception, see f o r  e x a m p l e ; A h m e d  Abdullah,  F r a n c e s  An-Na’im & M. Deng 
(Eds.), Human Rights in Africa, Cross-Cultural Perspectives, The Brookings Institution: Washington, 1990, 12 
420 Ibid 19. 
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the absence of a clear human rights mandate, the OAU took bold steps to address a number of 
human rights issues such as decolonisation, racial discrimination, environmental protection, 
and refugee problems. The continental organisation however ignored the massive human 
rights abuses wantonly perpetrated by some despotic African leaders against their own 
citizens. This was due largely to the OAU’s preference for socio-economic development, 
territorial integrity and state sovereignty over human rights protection, as well as firm 
reliance on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. 
The African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights was established in 1987, one 
year following the entry into force of the African Charter. 
The role of the African Commission is defined as to ‘promote the protection of human rights 
through studies and research, cooperation with other human rights bodies and dissemination 
of information’. 
It interprets the Charter’s provisions, considers complaints for violation of the Chapter’s 
provisions and drafts state’s reports on the implementation of the Charter’s provisions. It 
adopts resolutions and guiding principles that are subsequently used in the interpretation of 
the Charter and the reasoning of its decisions. 
 
Complaints can be submitted by the victims of a human right violation as well as a third party 
(e.g. NGO). 
When a violation of a human right is found, the Commission’s communication may contain 
recommendations to the respondent state including an award of compensation (although it 
does not specify the amount). Under its own rules and provisions, the Commission is 
empowered to issue provisional measures. 
 
The African Commission has been and still remains the main human rights body of the 
African Continent. However, the individual complaint procedure is not used as frequently as 
one would expect, something that surely does not explain the delay in reaching a decision 
upon a given complain. Also, there is no follow up mechanism for its recommendations. The 
Commission’s work is assisted by Special Rapporteurs, such as the Special Rapporteur on the 
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, and the Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights Defenders. The Special Rapporteurs publish press releases, send letters to the 
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governments, receive information about violations of the Charter’s provisions, engage with 
NGOs, undertake on–site visits and produce their own reports that include recommendations. 
3.10 The African Court of Human Rights 
The Protocol on the African Court on Human Rights and People’s Rights, adopted in 1998, 
entered into force in 2004, however less than half the member states of the AU have ratified 
the Protocol. The African Court of Human Rights is due to be replaced by the African Court 
of Justice when the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice (adopted in 2008) 
enters into force. 
Under Article 5 of Protocol, the African Commission is entitled to submit cases to the Court. 
Only one case has so far been examined by Court and that was found inadmissible due to lack 
of jurisdiction. 
Under the provisions of the Protocol, the Court can: 
1. make an appropriate order to remedy the human rights violation (including 
payment),
421
 deliver advisory opinions,
422
 
2. adopt provisional measures in circumstances of extreme gravity and urgency when 
irreparable harm to persons would otherwise ensue.
423
 
3. The Council of Ministers (now the Executive Council of the African Union) shall 
monitor the execution of the Court’s judgments.424 
3.11 Asian Concept of Human Rights 
The modern concept of human rights is relatively new to Asia. It has been introduced and 
developed over less than four decades,
425 
but the Asian concept of human rights has yet to be 
fully formulated. James Tang observed that a region-wide system of human rights protection 
does not exist in the Asian region
426.
 Steiner and Alston note that “although Chapter VIII of 
                                               
421 Art 27(1)  
422 Article 4(1)  
423 Article 27(2)  
424 Article 29(2)  
425 T.S. Batra,  Human Rights, A Critique. (New Delhi: B.V. Gupta, 1979) 41. 
426 James Tang, (Ed.), Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific. (London, New York: 
Pimter 1995)  3. The Asian Charter of Human Rights is not considered as the ‘official’ concept of human  
rights; it is mainly the position or view taken by a large number of human  rights NGOs, community 
organisations, concerned persons and groups. As a matter of fact, there are several documents relating to basic 
principles of human rights adopted within several Asian countries, e.g. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Human 
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the United Nations Charter makes provision for regional arrangements in relation to peace 
and security, it is silent as to human rights cooperation at that level.”427 
 
More recently, regional concepts and systems of human rights have begun to emerge as a 
reaction to the active encouragement of the United Nations through a resolution adopted by 
General Assembly
428
. 
 
Dating back to the ancient world, mainly in East Asian region, one strong influence upon the  
concept  of  human  rights  is  seen  by  some  commentators  as  closely  related  to 
Confucianism. W. Theodore de Barry makes the following comments about the core values 
of Confucianism: 
 
From this [public and private tension] it may seem again that the Confucian ideal was a 
balance of public and private, not an assertion of one over the other. In fact, from the 
Confucian point of view the state’s responsibility for the public interest was to encourage 
legitimate private initiative. How to define what was legitimate remained an issue, and the 
state, historically, was not slow to assert its own authority in this respect (any more than it is 
today), but Confucians were just as ready to challenge any such claim on the part of the state 
bureaucracy (guan), asserting instead that the public interest (gong) consists in serving the 
legitimate desires and material needs of the people. A balance of public and private (gongsi 
yiti), not the person or individual subordinated to the collectivity or state, remained the 
Confucian ideal.
429
 
 
A human right in Confucianism is therefore none other than a balance of public interest on 
one side and individual desire for freedom on the other. A true human right can only be 
appreciated in the light of the continuing tension that results from efforts to achieve a balance 
between the two. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Rights, Larrakia Declaration, Bangalore Declaration, Declaration of ASEAN Accord. All these documents can 
be accessed in a collection compiled by F. de Varennes in Asia-Pacific Human Rights Documents and 
Resources, Vol. 1, published by Martinus Nijhoff, 1998. 
427 Steiner, Alston, supra n 384, 210 
428 An appeal was made by the United Nations through General Assembly Resolution 32/127 to States in 
areas where regional arrangements in the field of human rights do not yet exist “to consider agreements with a 
view to the establishment within their respective regions of suitable machinery for the promotion of human 
rights.” 
429Theodore de Barry, Asian Values and Human Rights. Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1998, p29; cf., 
James C. Hsiung (Ed.), Human Rights in East Asia, a Cultural Perspective. Paragon House Publisher:(New 
York, 1985) 1-30. 
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Using another style of speech, but with essentially the same meaning, Michael Freeman 
observes that “there was no explicit concept of human rights in East Asian culture before the 
reception of Western political ideas at the end of the nineteenth century”, and asserts that: 
Confucianism laid the foundations of ethics in certain social relations and the mutual 
obligations that were inherent in them.
430
 
 
With  regard  to  the  infiltration  of  Western  ideas  into  Asian  values,  Freeman  further 
suggests that: 
 
 …the embrace of Western ideas and of rights into Asian values was mainly caused 
 by  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  indigenous  with  the  old  order  and  the  fact  that 
 Western ideas of rights and democracy have helped Asian protesters to articulate their 
 goals and principles. 
431
 
 
Yet, as time has passed and changes have occurred, such an embrace has not been without 
objections. Objections to the application of Western ideas of human rights are based on the 
argument that such ideas and values are alien to Asian traditions. These objections gained 
considerable currency in the East when governments of Asian countries were so “unfairly” 
stamped as human rights violators by the West, while at the same time Western countries 
practiced imperialism and colonialism. 
 
The Asian response to this criticism was straightforward. The Asians argued that despite its 
social and technological achievements, there was no justification for the West to preach 
morality to Asia, let alone push Asia into implementing ‘westernized’ human rights. The 
difference here lies within the basic concept of human rights held by East and West 
respectively: the West sees them as the equal civil and  political rights of every individual,  
whereas  Asia  views  them  more  in  the  context  of  economic  and  social development for 
the nation as a collective entity. 
 
                                               
430 Michael Freeman, Human Rights: Asia and the West in James Tang (Ed.), Human Rights and the 
International Relations in the Asia Pacific, ,Pinter, London 1995, 25-38 
431 Ibid, n 430, 28 
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This polarisation of perception also leads to the other common Asian argument against 
criticism from  the West:
432 
 that stability, and therefore authoritarianism and respect for 
traditional  cultural  values,  are  necessary  to  facilitate  development,  including  that  of 
economic and social rights. 
 
For example, summarizing the debate with respect to Western and Asian human rights 
perspectives, Yash Gai asserts: 
 
 … it is generally assumed that there is one Asian view or concept of human rights, 
 and that it is opposed to the tradition of individual human rights that first developed  
 in the West.… The gist of this position is that human rights as propounded in the 
 West are based on individualism and therefore have no relevance to Asia in societies 
 which are based on the primacy of the community.
433
 
 
Onuma Yasuaki, commenting on the “universal” versus “relative” perceptions of human 
rights, argues that such controversy goes beyond the realm of human rights and behind it one 
can see fundamental problems, namely: 
 
a) contradictions between the globalisation of economic and information activities and 
the national state system; 
b) contradictions between the emergence of non-Western powers in Asia and the 
persistence of West-centric power structures of information and culture in 
international society, and 
c) contradictions between a sincere quest for a more humane and less violent world and 
a deep resentment against the colonial past and  present inequality among nations and 
international society.
434
 
 
However, there is clear evidence that there is no link between economic growth and the 
negation of human rights. Some authoritarian governments may have succeeded in their 
                                               
432 Ibid, n 430, 16. 
433 Gai, Yash, “Human Rights and the Governance: The Asia Debate”, in Asia-Pacific Journal on Human 
Rights and the Law, Vol. 1,issue 1, 2000. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 16-17. For additional 
readings, see also John Girling (Ed.), Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region Canberra: Dept. of International  
Relations,  Research  schools  of  Pacific  Studies,  Australian  National University, 1991 
434 Yasuaki, Onuma,  In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights: “Universal vs. Relative”, in Asia-Pacific 
Journal on Human Rights and the Law 1: 53-88, 2000,  53 
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economic  development,  but  many  such  regimes  have  failed  to  achieve  stability  or 
economic growth. 
 
In 1993, a common understanding of human rights was reached when Asian governments 
came together in Thailand’s capital, Bangkok, for the preparation of the United Nations 
sponsored  World  Conference  on  Human  Rights,  to  be  held  in  Vienna.  The Asian 
governments that were present in Bangkok adopted a declaration at the conference in Vienna. 
The document, then known as the Bangkok Declaration, recognises the universality of human 
rights with a special note that those rights have to be interpreted in the context of religious, 
historical, cultural and regional particularities. 
 
The argument that human rights are “none of Asia’s business” is no longer valid, since the 
adopted common position expressed in the Bangkok Declaration partly, if not largely, reflects 
the universally  recognised principles of human rights. This, to some degree,  opens  the  
avenue  for  the  establishment  of  an  international  mechanism  for promotion and 
protection of human rights in national government  policies, in partial conformity with the 
United Nations’ encouragement and appeal to all States. As one human rights activist says, 
“Human rights do not belong to the West, they are ours too”435. 
4 Human Rights Violations 
Every person wishes to live in peace and harmony with their neighbours
436
. This idea extends 
from home to society, state and the whole world. However such an ethical venture must be 
protected. Any violation in a particular instance may be a threat for all human rights. Hence, 
it is the responsibility of the individual, family, society and the world to protect and preserve 
harmony by ensuring that human rights are not violated. In order to guarantee this, a State 
must make the effort to produce legislation that necessarily contains legal assurances for the 
preservation of human rights. A violation of such a right will only lead to a hostile society. 
 
When does a violation of human rights take place? Any action against the enjoyment of 
human rights becomes a breach of human rights, regardless of the origin of this action, be it 
                                               
435 Quoted from the opening note made by Dr. F. de Varennes in the Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and 
the Law, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2000. 
436 This view is reflected in virtually all major religious writing from the Bible to the Koran. 
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from an individual, a family, a society, a state or government, or the international community 
and its organisations. 
 
From what Lalit Parmar has catalogued about situations in which human rights may be 
considered violated, any of the following actions or conditions are considered violations of 
human rights: 
 
 Fear of exercising human rights; the fear to defend one's own human rights and those 
of others; 
 Obstruction to human rights; any acts that prevent someone from enjoying his/her 
human rights; 
 Breach of human rights; denying someone’s rights to benefit from his/her rights; 
 Molestation  of  those  who  attempt  to  exercise  their  human  rights;  any molesting 
or annoying acts that intimidate people so that they are deprived of enjoying their 
rights; 
 Attack on human rights; some people do not wish to allow other people to enjoy their 
rights.  
 Any clear, direct or indirect, attack on the rights of others437. 
 
Violations of human rights constitute the slippery slope that can lead to the situation that 
occurred in Nazi Germany. Examination of more recent atrocities such as in the Baltic and 
Africa have shown that large scale genocide and crimes against humanity often start with 
minor breaches of an individual’s human rights. 
5 Summary 
The term Rule of Law (Rechtsstaat,) shares the fate of many other political and legal 
definitions. That is it is a term widely used in the political and legal discourse, although it is 
understood in various ways. It is, however, fortunate that many debates will cease when the 
existence of the Rule of Law is in danger; namely, when there is a threat or potential 
hindrance, be it coming from socio-political, economic, legal or any other forces. Walzers’ 
suggests that moral reasoning is at its best when done at the ``thick'' level, in which the many 
components of individual and communal decision-making, history, and particularity can be 
                                               
437 Parmar, Lalit, Human Rights. (1st ed)., Anmol Publications Pty: (New Delhi,Ltd 1998) 76-80. 
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dissected, analysed, and accounted for. But it is the ``thin'' level of moral discourse (where 
generally recognizable slogans and terms predominate) that most often is the meeting point 
for intra-cultural and cross-cultural discussion and debate. So for example according to him,  
the thin good of ending communism or providing aid to the needy is something that large 
numbers of people can agree on, but the thick good of making decisions about how to achieve 
such goals is more difficult. 
 
In a Rechtsstaat, the government and by implication those institutions on the international 
plane are also bound by the law, and all its acts are ideally subject to review for their 
lawfulness and conformity with human rights standards. Such review procedures are 
necessary in the interests of both the individual citizen and the government itself. Realising 
that everyone is acting according to the law creates a climate of confidence, and so progress 
is possible in the struggle for social welfare.  
 
Judicial review is a court procedure whereby the legality and constitutionality of a 
government act can be challenged, and if they are found unlawful, the court has the 
competence to repeal the act or decision and, where possible, impose another that is lawful 
and in accordance with the law. 
 
In order to assess whether a government or an international organisation has breached a 
human right standard, a common understanding as to what human rights really are has to be 
achieved. It may be argued that the basic principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights should be the international standards suitable for every civilised society, since 
there is no direct disagreement only abstention from those fundamental values of human 
dignity and rights as set out in its pages. It is accepted that interpretation of these rights is 
another matter, however for the purposes of this thesis it is the line drawn in the sand. 
 
Any act that breaches, denies, attacks or ignores human rights is seen as a violation of human 
rights. Recognition and respect of these rights are the preconditions for peace and the social, 
economic and political welfare among all members of the human family. Any interference 
with the exercise and enjoyment of these rights has a significant effect on the dignity and 
lives of all human beings no matter what level they are derived from. The UN as the 
instigator of modern human rights through its conventions and founding principles should not 
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be exempt from criticism and review of decisions it makes within the Security Council when 
they affect an individual’s rights. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN 
REALATION TO OTHER POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 
 
1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, the international bodies and procedures currently available for dealing with the 
individual human rights issues have been examined and explained in detail. They have shown 
that there is no body presently available with a judicial capability and understanding that 
could easily fulfil the role of dealing with those subjected to UNSC targeted sanctions. Most 
of the current bodies have the role of investigative and reporting with little or no formal 
judicial experience makeup or jurisprudence. They are not court and none hand down 
judgements that are in anyway similar to a judicial review/appeal. These bodies have been 
developed to deal in specific areas of human rights and with a State’s failure to comply with 
those international human rights norms at State level. 
This then leads us to the next organisation to consider in dealing specifically with providing a 
judicial review/appeal body and international procedure for those subject to UNSC targeted 
sanctions.  
The International Court of Justice, like the Security Council and General Assembly, is a 
principal organ of the United Nations
438
 and it is indeed referred to as ‘the principal judicial 
organ’ of the UN439. What has emerged from the jurisprudence of the Court since its 
inception is that there is an absence of hierarchy between the Security Council and the 
Court
440
 and neither organ is in any way subordinate to the other. The Court has therefore 
                                               
438 Art.4 of the UN Charter. 
439 It is interesting that the ICJ should have been referred to in the Charter as the “principal judicial organ” 
because it is in fact the only judicial organ created by the Charter. This expression has. however, taken on a real 
meaning since 1945 because other judicial organs have now been created within the UN system. The General 
Assembly has set up an Administrative Tribunal to handle staff matters and “appeals” from that Tribunal used to 
go to the ICJ. Also, the Security Council has more recently set up two other judicial bodies within the UN 
system: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda. See SC Res.808 and 827 for the former and 955 for the latter. 
440 See Franck. “The ‘Powers of Appreciation’: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?” (1992) 86 
A.J.I.L. 519; Reisman. “The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations” (1993) 87 A.J.I.L. 83: R. St J. 
Macdonald. “Changing Relations between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council of the 
United Nations” (1993) 31 Can. Y.I.L. 3; Watson. “Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court” 
(1993) 34 Harv.I.L.J. 1; Gowlland-Debbas, “The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the 
Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case ” (1994) 88 A.J.I.L. 643; Bedjaoui, The New World Order 
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held that it is not debarred from exercising its functions by the fact that the matter before it is 
at the same time being considered by the Security Council
441
. In the Nicaragua case the Court 
noted that
442
 while in Article 12 of the Charter there is provision for a clear demarcation of 
functions between General Assembly and the Security Council… there is no similar provision 
anywhere in the Charter with respect to the Security Council and the Court. The Council has 
functions of a political nature assigned to it, whereas the Court exercises purely judicial 
functions. Both organs can perform their separate but complementary functions with respect 
to the same events. 
Until the Lockerbie case,
443
 however, all the cases involving the parallel functioning of the 
Court and the Security Council have been cases where it was the same party that presented 
                                                                                                                                                  
and the Security Council--Testing the Legality of its Acts (1994): Brownlie, “The Decisions of Political Organs 
of the United Nations and the Rule of Law”, in Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (1994), p.91: Gill. “Legal and 
Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under 
Chapter VII of the Charter” (1995) 26 N.Y.I.L. 33; Alvarez, “Judging the Security Council” (1996) 90 A.J.I.L. 
1. 
441 See United Stales Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran I.C.J. Rep. 1980.3.21-22: also Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Jurisdiction) I.C J. Rep. 1984, 392, 435. 
442 Nicaragua, ibid. 
443 The first case was Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising 
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. US: Libya v. UK ). Provisional Measures. I.C.J. Rep. 1992, 3, 
114. That case arose out of US and UK demands that Libya surrender for trial two Libyan nationals accused (by 
the US and UK) of carrying out the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. In Jan. 1992 the Security Council adopted 
Res.731 urging Libya “to provide a full and effective response” to the requests of the UK and US. In Mar. 1992 
Libya filed applications in the ICJ. against the UK and US. Libya asked for a judgment declaring that the UK 
and US were in breach of their obligations under the Montreal Convention and that it was complying with its 
obligations under that Convention. Libya also filed an application, under Art.41 of the ICJ Statute, requesting 
the indication of provisional measures which would prevent the US and UK from taking any measures that 
would coerce Libya to surrender the two men to any jurisdiction outside Libya or that would otherwise prejudice 
the rights claimed by Libya. After the close of oral arguments in the ICJ but before judgment was delivered, the 
Security Council adopted, under Chap.VII of the Charter. Res.748 which imposed mandatory sanctions on 
Libya in the event that Libya failed to comply, by a certain date, with the demand to surrender the two men. 
Libya's requests for provisional measures were dismissed by the ICJ. It considered that, by Art.25 of the 
Charter. UN members are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council: that obligation 
prima facie extended to Res.748 and by Art.103 of the Charter prevailed over any obligation under the Montreal 
Convention. The rights claimed by Libya were therefore inappropriate for protection at the provisional measures 
phase.The second case is Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) ). Requests for Provisional Measures 
I.C.J. Rep. 1993, 3 and 325. In its second request for provisional measures. Bosnia asked the ICJ to declare that 
SC Res.713 imposing an arms embargo upon the whole of the territory of the former Yugoslavia must not be 
construed as imposing an arms embargo on the Bosnian government as this would be contrary to the right of 
self-defence enshrined in Art.51 of the Charter and would also stop the Bosnian government from preventing the 
commission of genocide as required by Art.1 of the Genocide Convention. The ICJ held that this request was 
outside the scope of Art.41 of the Statute as it was not aimed at a declaration by the ICJ indicating steps that the 
respondent ought to take for the preservation of the applicant's rights but. rather, at “a declaration of what those 
rights are which would clarify the legal situation for the entire international community in particular the 
members of the United Nations Security Council” (p.345). This aspect of Bosnia's case (the part seeking a 
lifting of the arms embargo) has become moot as a result of the signing of the General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords) and as a result of SC Res.1021(1995) which lifts the 
arms embargo. The point was therefore not pursued at the jurisdictional phase of the case in Apr. 1996. See the 
ICJ's judgment on jurisdiction and admissibility delivered on 11 July 1996. 
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the matter to the two organs and both organs were being used to achieve more or less the 
same ends. The potential for conflict between the organs was therefore low.
444
 In these cases 
it was therefore easy for the Court to state that both organs could perform their “separate but 
complementary functions”. In more recent cases, however, the States instituting action in 
each organ have not intended the functions of the Court and the Council to be 
complementary. In these cases opposing sides have sought to use the two organs for 
contradictory or conflicting purposes and one side has sought to have one organ negate the 
actions of the other. The situation was well articulated by Judge Bedjaoui in Lockerbie when 
he said
445
: 
if the concomitant exercise of the concurrent but not exclusive powers has thus far not 
given rise to serious problems, the present case, by contrast, presents the Court not 
only with the grave question of the possible influence of the decisions of a principal 
organ on the consideration of the same question by another principal organ, but also, 
more fundamentally, with the question of the possible inconsistency between the 
decisions of the two organs and how to deal with so delicate a situation. 
The question that has now arisen, particularly in Lockerbie, is whether one principal organ 
the Court may nullify the decision of another, the Security Council. It relates to the role the 
Court may play when there is a decision by the Council that is stated to have been taken to 
maintain or restore international peace and security
446
. 
                                               
444 In Diplomatic and Consular Staff, supra n.12. it was the US that brought the matter before both the Council 
and the ICJ and both organs reached similar decisions, viz. requesting Iran to release the hostages. See also SC 
Res.457 of 4 Dec. and 461 of 31 Dec. 1979. Again, in the Nicaragua case it was Nicaragua that brought the 
matter both before the ICJ and to the attention of the Council and though the ICJ upheld its claims against the 
US. Nicaragua failed to secure a specific condemnation of the US by the Council. Again this was not a case of 
conflicting decisions: there was a decision by the ICJ to the effect that the US was responsible for the illegal use 
of force against Nicaragua and no decision by the Council as to whether or not the US bore such responsibility. 
See 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 and 76 I.L.R. 349. See also SC Res.530 and 562 of 19 May 1983 and 10 May 1985 
respectively both of which reaffirmed the right of Nicaragua to be free of outside interference and expressed 
support for the Contadora peace process. Res.562 in particular called upon all States “to refrain from carrying 
out. supporting or promoting political, economic or military actions of any kind against any State in the region 
which might impede the peace objectives of the Contadora Group”. Neither Res. particularly implicated the US 
or any other State. Two draft resolutions tabled by Nicaragua in 1986 and calling for full compliance with the 
ICJ's decision failed to be adopted because of negative votes (vetoes) by the US. 
445 I.C.J. Rep. 1992.3, 33. 
446 The question of the limitations of the powers of the Security Council and of the possibility of judicial review 
(though not by the ICJ) also arose in the first case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. In the Du%24sko Tadić case (Case No.IT-94-1-I-T). the defendant contested the validity of the 
Security Council action in setting up the Tribunal. He asserted that the resolutions of the Council were invalid 
and that in consequence the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to try him. One of the Tribunal's Trial Chambers, in a 
Decision of 10 Aug. 1995. rejected this motion of the defence and held that it contained non-justiciable issues. 
Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber expressed its view on the appropriateness of the Security Council action in 
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2 The Substantive Limits to the Powers of the Security Council Contained in the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter 
The UN Charter and its negotiating history support the contention that the powers of the 
Security Council are not unlimited. That this is so was well understood at the 1945 
Conference on International Organisation which drew up the Charter. At this conference 
many delegations expressed concern at the wide powers of the Council and proposed 
amendments which would limit the freedom of the Council and make clear how far the 
Council could go in the exercise of its powers.
447
 None of these amendments was adopted, 
however, because it was accepted that the text of the Charter (as proposed by the sponsoring 
powers at Dumbarton Oaks) already encompassed the limitations sought to be included. As 
the report of the Rapporteur of Committee III/3 (Enforcement Arrangements) of the 
Conference put it:
448
 
A number of amendments … were directed at limiting the great freedom which in the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposal, is left to the Council in determining what action if any to 
take. 
Some of these amendments were designed to make more precise the Council's obligations to 
act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organisation and the provisions of 
the Charter. The Committee considered that, since such specifications were already stated in 
Chapter VI defining the powers of the Council, it was unnecessary to make special mention 
of them in the present Chapter. 
The main limitation on the powers of the Security Council was therefore understood to be the 
duty to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. This obligation is 
expressly contained in Article 24(2) of the Charter and the purposes and principles are those 
stated in Articles 1 and 2. That this is a substantive limitation of the powers of the Security 
Council has been recognised in a number of individual opinions of judges of the International 
                                                                                                                                                  
setting up the Tribunal and took the view that that action was appropriate. However, on appeal, the Appeals 
Chamber of the Tribunal decided (by 4 votes to 1) that the Tribunal was competent to pronounce on the plea 
challenging the establishment of the Tribunal. The Appeals Chamber came to this conclusion on the basis that a 
challenge to the validity of the establishment of the Tribunal was a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
It then held that in accordance with the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz it had the competence to decide on 
its own jurisdiction (and thus on the legality of the establishment of the Tribunal). After examining the matter, 
the Appeals Chamber held that the Security Council had acted within its powers in setting up the Tribunal (see 
Case No.IT-94-1-AR72, decision of 2 Oct. 1995) (1996) 35 I.L.M. 32. 
447 See e.g. the amendments proposed individually by Australia, the Netherlands. Chile and Mexico, 12 
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 603 and also those of Norway. 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 378. Greece, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 531 and 
Iran. 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs., 554. 
448 Doc.881 III/3 146.12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs., 504-5 (10 June 1945). 
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Court. Judge Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion in Lockerbie, after posing the question 
whether there are norms or principles circumscribing the boundary within which the 
responsibilities of the Security Council are to be discharged, remarked:
449
 
Article 24 itself offers us an immediate signpost to such a circumscribing boundary 
when it provides in Article 24(2) that the Security Council in discharging its duties 
under Article 24(1), “shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations”. The duty is imperative and the limits are categorically stated. 
Also, Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in his separate opinion in the Bosnia Genocide Convention 
case expressed the same thought when he remarked: “Nor should one overlook the 
significance of the provision in Article 24(2) of the Charter that, in discharging its duties to 
maintain international peace and security, the Security Council shall act in accordance with 
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”450 
This limitation on the powers of the Council has on occasion been deployed by States in 
Security Council meetings. For example, when the Security Council, in 1951, was dealing 
with the question concerning the passage of ships through the Suez Canal, the representative 
of Egypt made the following remarks:
451
 
Although we do not want to pretend that the functions and powers of the Security 
Council are limited to those specific powers mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 24 of 
the Charter, yet we affirm that those powers and duties are limited and should be 
strictly regulated and governed by the fundamental principles and purposes laid down 
in Chapter 1 of the Charter. Paragraph 2 of Article 24, on the “functions and powers” 
of the Security Council reminds us that “In discharging these duties the Security 
Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations”. Those Purposes and Principles of the United Nations are laid down in 
Chapter I of the Charter; Article 1, paragraph 1, demands that the adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes should be “in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law”. 
                                               
449 I.C.J. Rep. 1992, 3, 61:94 I.L.R. 478, 544. 
450 I.C.J. Rep. 1993, 325, 440, para.101; 95 I.L.R. 1, 158. See also Judge Bedjaoui, writing in a non-judicial 
capacity, op. cit. supra n.2. particularly at pp.14 and 31. 
451 SC Official Records (1951), 553rd meeting, pp.22-25. Quoted by Mr Stavropoulos, representative of the UN 
Secretary General, at the oral hearings of the Namibia Advisory Opinion before the ICJ. See Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents--The Namibia Advisory Opinion, Vol.2, p.48. Also reproduced by Bedjaoui. idem, 
pp.285-286. 
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However, the purposes of the United Nations are very broad goals which the organisation is 
set up to achieve and the principles to be observed in achieving those goals are for the most 
part directed at the conduct of member States and not the organisation. Nevertheless, there 
are specific limitations in the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter which 
circumscribe the powers of the Organisation generally and thus of the Security Council. It is 
to these specific limitations which are now considered. 
2.1 General Principles of International Law 
The first possible limit on the powers of the Council under these provisions is a duty on the 
part of the Council not to violate general international law unless the Charter specifically 
allows it to do so. As the Egyptian representative quoted above pointed out, Article 1(1) of 
the Charter provides, as one of the purposes of the United Nations is that international 
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace are to be settled or adjusted 
“in conformity with the principles of justice and international law”. The contention, then, is 
that in exercising its responsibilities the Security Council is bound to act in accordance with 
international law and may not disregard or derogate from it unless the Charter specifically 
allows it to do so.
452
 As Judge Bedjaoui has pointed out:
453
 
It appears less acceptable than ever that sovereign States should have created an international 
organisation equipped with broad powers of control and sanction vis-a-vis themselves but 
itself exempted from the duty to respect both the Charter which gave birth to it and 
international law. 
The view that the Security Council is bound to respect general international law has been 
stated by a number of judges of the Court in separate and dissenting opinions. In Lockerbie 
Judge Weeramantry stated: “The history of the United Nations Charter thus corroborates the 
view that a clear limitation on the plenitude of the Security Council's powers is that those 
powers must be exercised in accordance with the well-established principles of international 
                                               
452 See the statement made by the Representative of Ecuador. Mr Ayala Lasso, in the Security Council prior to 
the adoption of Res.687(1991) which provides, inter alia, for the demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait border. He 
said: “While Chapter VII of the Charter authorizes the use of all necessary means to implement the resolutions 
of the Council, it cannot confer on the Council more powers than those set forth in the Charter itself. A position 
of the Council in this matter, which is an extremely sensitive one. must fall unequivocally within the bounds of 
international law and of the United Nations Charter if it is not to become a fresh source of conflict”: SC meeting 
of 3 Apr. 1991. UN Doc.S/PV.2981. Reproduced by Bedjaoui, idem, p.347. 
453 See Bedjaoui. idem, p.7. 
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law.”454 In the same case Judge Bedjaoui asked: “is not the essential point of concern to us 
here the fact that the Council is bound to respect ‘the principles of international law’, an 
expression that holds more precise meaning for international lawyers?”455 
According to Dapo
456
, it is not correct to contend that the Security Council is not at all 
restrained by principles of international law when it is taking collective measures to enforce 
the peace or to suppress aggression and by inference against individual’s organisations or 
entities. First of all it is not clear that the delegates to the San Francisco Conference sought to 
limit the application of principles of international law only to peaceful adjustment of disputes 
by the Security Council. In the Committee on the Structure and Procedure of the Security 
Council, Norway proposed an amendment which would have required that “no solution 
should be imposed upon a State of a nature to impair its confidence in its future security or 
welfare”.457 The UK delegate argued that this was unnecessary in view of the reference to 
justice and international law in the principles of the Charter which bind the Security Council. 
The Norwegian delegate replied that there was no problem connected with pacific settlement 
of disputes but only with coercive action in applying sanctions. This shows that he also took 
the view that the phrase “justice and international law” in the principles of the Charter 
referred only to pacific settlement of disputes as this was all that was covered by the Chinese 
proposal which led to its inclusion in the Charter. It seems that he therefore wanted to insert 
limits to the enforcement powers of the Council. The US delegate then took the floor to 
support the opinion that the Norwegian amendment was unnecessary. He referred to the 
purposes and principles of the Charter, specifically mentioning the phrases “regard for 
principles of justice and international law”, “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination” and “promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without respect to race, language, religion, or sex”. In his 
opinion these “constituted the highest rules of conduct. Furthermore, the Charter had to be 
considered in its entirety and if the Security Council violated its principles and purposes it 
would be acting ultra vires. ”  
To the extent that the United Nations is a subject of international law it follows that its organs 
                                               
454 I.C.J. Rep. 1992, 3, 65; 94 I.L.R. 478, 548. 
455 Idem, p.46: 94 I.L.R. 478, 529. See also Judge Fitzmaurice in the Namibia Advisory Opinion I.C.J. Rep. 
1971, 6, 294. 
456 Akande Dapo.The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: is there room for judicial control 
of decisions of the political organs of the United Nations? I.C.L.Q. 1997, 46(2), 309-343 
457 Doc.555. III/1/27. 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs., 378 (24 May 1945). 
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are thereby subjected to international law. Where the Charter gives the Council a right to 
derogate from international law it is clear that that right exists. Where no express permission 
is given the right does not exist. For example, the Security Council is empowered to use force 
in the maintenance of international peace but this does not relieve it of its duty in using such 
force to respect international humanitarian law in armed conflict (the jus in bello). As one 
writer has pointed out, in transferring the power to wage war or conduct military operations 
the member States “could not attribute to the Organization a power which they themselves 
did not and do not possess”. The reason for this is because the United Nations and its member 
States are equally subject to international law and therefore have obligations under it. 
2.2 Human Rights Obligations 
Dapo also suggests that there is a limitation on the powers of the Security Council in respect 
to international human rights norms and that there is a duty on its part to observe generally 
accepted standards of human rights behaviour when it is acting in its role of quasi-
judicial/legislative law maker interpreter. Since the end of the Second World War there has 
been an increasing awareness of the need to protect the rights of the individual and this was 
one of the reasons for setting up the United Nations. One of the purposes of the United 
Nations, which as we have seen limit the powers of the Security Council, is that expressed in 
Article 1(4) of the Charter, which provides for international co-operation “in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights”. Likewise, Article 55 of the Charter declares that “the 
United Nations shall promote … universal respect for, and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms …” The ICJ has on two occasions declared that conduct by a State 
which violated the fundamental rights of individuals is contrary to the principles of the 
Charter and it has thus confirmed that this is a substantive obligation flowing from the 
Charter.
458
 Indeed it would be anachronistic if the Security Council, an organ of the United 
Nations, was itself empowered to violate human rights when the whole tenor of the Charter is 
to promote the protection of human rights by and in States. Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in the 
Bosnia case recognised that human rights obligations do constitute a limitation on the power 
                                               
458 See Diplomatic and Consular Staff, supra n.15. at p.42 where the ICJ said: “Wrongfully to deprive human 
beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraints in conditions of hardship is in itself 
manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the 
fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Also in Namibia Advisory 
Opinion I.C.J. Rep. 1971.6.57 the ICJ stated that “denial [by South Africa] of fundamental human rights is a 
flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter”. 
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of the Security Council.
459
 
There is, of course, the question as to which fundamental human rights the Council is bound 
to respect. Gill has suggested that “the Council will at a minimum be bound by the rules of 
human rights contained in the International Bill of Rights from which no derogation is 
permitted in time of emergency or armed conflict.”460 One may also suggest that human 
rights norms which have entered into the corpus of general international law are binding on 
the Security Council and also that by Articles 1(4) and 55(c) of the Charter, human rights 
obligations (such as the various human rights treaties) adopted within the United Nations 
system are binding on the Organisation even if they are not yet accepted by all member 
States. 
In the exercise of its powers to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions under Article 41 
both the Security Council itself and its members have often shown a reluctance to act in such 
a way that the basic human rights of the peoples of the territories concerned will be 
violated.
461
 For example, it is recognised that the Council cannot pursue a policy of 
starvation.
462
 Also, in the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
                                               
459 I.C.J. Rep. 1993.325.440 at paras.101 and 102. See also 95 I.L.R. at 158. 
460 Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sets out provisions in respect of which 
no derogation may be made even “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.” 
461 See Gowlland-Debbas, “Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility” (1994) 43 
I.C.L.Q. 55, 91. See also Gowlland-Debbas. Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in International Law. United 
Nations Action in the Question of Southern Rhodesia (1990). pp.437-441 and 459-460. See also the decision of 
the European Court of Justice (particularly the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs) in Bosphorus Hava Yollari 
Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, Ireland (C-84/95), [1996] 3 
C.M.L.R. 257 holding that a European Community Regulation (Council Reg.990/93) implementing S.C.Res. 
820 did not violate the plaintiffs fundamental rights.Note that medical supplies and foodstuffs required for 
humanitarian purposes are always excluded from UN sanctions regimes. See in respect of Rhodesia. 
Res.253(1968) paras.3(d) & 4; Iraq--Res.661(1990) paras.3(c) & 4. Res.666(1990) & Res.687(1991) para.20; 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) and the parts of Bosnia and Croatia under the 
control of Serb forces--Res.757(1992) paras.4(c) & 5, Res.820(1993) para.12; Haiti--Res.917(1994) 
para.7(a).Nevertheless, certain parts of Res.820(1993) & 992(1995) raise the question as to whether the Council 
may have authorised the violation of the right to a fair hearing provided for in Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Paragraphs 16 and 4 of those resolutions (respectively) provide that no 
vessels suspected of having violated or being in violation of the relevant Security Councils imposing sanctions 
on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) or on the Serbian controlled parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina is to be allowed passage through installations, including river locks or canals within the territory of 
Member States (in particular through the locks of Iron Gates I system on the left hand bank of the Danube in 
Romanian territory--Res.992). If this is intended to deny access to vessels suspected of having been involved in 
previous violations of the sanctions regime, as opposed to those suspected to be presently attempting to violate 
the relevant resolutions (and this is a reasonable interpretation of those resolutions as other provisions of those 
resolutions deal with the right of States to take measures to avoid infringement of the resolutions), it is arguable 
that those concerned have a right to have their rights and obligations judicially determined and cannot simply be 
denied all rights of access on the basis of suspicion. 
462 See Provost. “Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications of the UN Food Blockade Against Iraq and 
Kuwait” (1992) 30 Col.J.Trans.L. 577 who argues that starvation is prohibited by rules of international 
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Yugoslavia, the Security Council was careful to ensure that the basic rights of accused 
persons are respected. The Secretary General regarded the point as so basic that in his report 
to the Security Council prior to the establishment of the Tribunal he said:
463
 
It is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally 
recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its 
proceedings. In the view of the Secretary General such internationally recognized 
standards are, in particular, contained in Article 14 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
The Statute setting up the Tribunal ensures respect for human rights norms in a number of 
ways. In the first place, Article 21(1) and (4) ensure that there is absolute respect for the 
principle of “equality of arms”, i.e. the prosecution and the defence are put on the same 
footing and given equal opportunities. Second, the accused is entitled to be present at his trial 
as provided for in Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).
464
 Third, the Statute follows the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and it 
denies the Tribunal the power to impose the death penalty. Fourth, Article 25 of the Statute of 
the Tribunal guarantees to the accused a right of appeal, as stipulated in Article 14(5) of the 
ICCPR.
465
 It would indeed be surprising if the Council has the power to set up a criminal 
tribunal (as it asserts that it has, and an assertion that the Tribunal has upheld it does have)
466
 
but has no obligation to set up one that guarantees the rights of persons brought before it.
467
 
It would therefore seem there is a body of evidence to support the notion that the UN Security 
Council should act in accordance with internationally recognised human right norms as 
contained within the international  ‘Bill of Rights’. 
                                                                                                                                                  
humanitarian law, in particular by Arts.54 and 70 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. According to him 
these provisions have attained the status of customary international law. 
463 See the Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993). 
UN Doc.S/25704, para.106, p.27. Repr. (1993) 32 I.L.M. 1159. 
464 See Art.21 (4)d of the Statute of the Tribunal. 
465 See paras.22-26 of the First Annual Report of the Tribunal to the General Assembly and the Security Council 
(29 Aug. 1994), UN Docs.A/49/432 and S/1994/1007. Also reproduced in (1994) Hag.Y.I.L. 187, 197. 
466 See the decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal in Tadić (IT-94-1-AR72) (1996) 35 I.L.M. 32. 
467 One of the arguments put forward by the defendant in Tadić before the Tribunal, ibid, was that the 
establishment of the Tribunal was contrary to the general principle that a person is entitled to be tried by a 
tribunal or court “established by law”--See Art.14(1) of the ICCPR. The Appeals Chamber held that the 
interpretation of that principle that requires a tribunal to be established by a legislature has no application in an 
international law setting. However, the Appeals Chamber held that other possible interpretations of the principle 
are that a tribunal must be established by a body with power to take binding decisions or that the tribunal must 
be established in accordance with the rule of law. The Chamber held that the establishment of the Tribunal 
satisfied these last two interpretations and therefore held that the Tribunal had been “established by law”. See 
idem, paras.41-48; (1996) 35 I.L.M. 32.46. 
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3 Responsibility of the United Nations for an Internationally Wrongful Act 
In July 2011, the International Law Commission (ILC) recommended that the Articles for 
Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO) for be adopted by the General 
Assembly of the UN
468
 regarding the responsibility of international organisations for their for 
wrongful acts
469
. It outlines the principle that for every internationally wrongful act of an 
international organization there entails international responsibility for that organization. This 
act or omission must be attributable to the organisation and must constitute a breach of that 
organisations obligation under international law. As the articles refers to international law 
this is relevant in the present study as it would presumably include a breach of international 
human rights norms, as outlined in the international bill of rights. (These are further discussed 
in detail chapter 6). 
In particular article 7 makes it clear that if a state or any of its organs, place their function at 
the disposal of an international organisation, then it is the international organisation that must 
take responsibility for that function. This infers for example that where states give 
information to the UN through its security services, or government agencies that leads to 
inclusion of an individual or entity on a UN sanctions lists such as that maintained under 
resolution 1267, then the responsibility for who appears on these lists and their culpability for 
the subsequent sanctions imposed by the UN through their resolutions still lies firmly with 
the UNSC
470
. 
3.1 Implications for UN under ARIO 
                                               
468 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10), paras. 87 
and 88. 
469 Article 2 of ARIO gives an explanation for the use of terms, which it states for the purposes of the present 
draft articles means, (a) “international organization” means an organization established by a treaty or other 
instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality. International 
organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other entities; (b) “rules of the organization” 
means, in particular, the constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions and other acts of the international 
organization adopted in accordance with those instruments, and established practice of the organization; (c) 
“organ of an international organization” means any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the 
rules of the organization; (d) “agent of an international organization” means an official or other person or entity, 
other than an organ, who is charged by the organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its 
functions, and thus through whom the organization acts.  
470 ARIO, Article 7, deals with the ‘Conduct of organs of a State or organs or agents of an international 
organization placed at the disposal of another international organization’. It states that where the conduct of an 
organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that is placed at the disposal of another 
international organization shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organization if the 
organization exercises effective control over that conduct.  
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Whilst ARIO is primarily intended to deal with the relationship between states and 
international organisations, such as the UN, it may have some implications for individuals 
and entities who wish to appeal the decision to place them on sanctions lists, particularly 
under the 1373 resolutions where it is a state nomination. Under ARIO the responsibility 
would still lie with where the UNSC for example under resolution 1373 have provided the 
names of individuals and entities themselves then under article 7 or ARIO there is a 
responsibility there is little an individual could do to instigate their state to take counter 
measure such as noncompliance in order to comply with international law.  
Where a state lists an individual under UN resolutions such as 1373, then the UN could be 
held responsible under ARIO and therefore subject to counter measures from the individual’s 
state. This could decide not to comply with resolution as it would not be binding (therefore 
bypassing article 103 of the UN charter (see discussion in chapter 7)…as it would be in 
breach of that states international obligations under the international bill of rights. 
Given that under ARIO the UN is responsible for its own actions and that states acting on 
behalf of their citizens could hold the UNSC accountable for breaches of human rights then it 
seems to make eminent sense to have an organisation available under the auspices of the ICJ 
to examine and determine such matters in compliance with international law. As "the legal 
framework governing the responsibility of international organisations is sufficiently clear 
[…], inadequacies in the legal enforcement and compliance with human rights produce both a 
‘liberty deficit’ and an ‘accountability deficit’471.  
3.2 Concluding Remarks 
Throughout this study other international organisations or bodies that deal with the individual 
and human rights issues have been examined and found wanting for a number of fundamental 
reason of lacking the necessary international law credentials or the authority and competence 
under international law to deal effectively with the Security Council.  
 
It has been shown previously that the Security Council are consistently failing to follow the 
rule of law it is required to do under its own charter. Given such a failing to face its 
obligations under international law, it is clear that some further action is required sufficient to 
                                               
471 Guglielmo Verdirame.The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? 2013, Cambridge Studies in 
Comparative Law CUP, p2  
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make them accountable and assessable to the individual seeking redress for violations of their 
rights. With no other organisation currently readily available with the necessary expertise, 
jurisprudence and credibility at the international level to provide the necessary just 
satisfaction for those affected then this author contends this should logically fall to the ICJ to 
fulfil this role. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN RELATION TO BREACHES OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
1 Preliminary Remarks 
From the previous discussion, it appears that those individuals alleging human rights abuses 
on the basis of internationally recognised and accepted standards who live and reside in 
States which would normally offer adequate legal remedies for defending their human rights, 
have little chance to obtain fair redress under the existing international channels for any 
violation of their rights when subjected to sanctions imposed by the UNSC. This is the case 
whether the violation is caused by the UNSC directly or indirectly through the 
implementation into national laws in order to comply with UN Security Council 
Resolutions
472
. As has previously been discussed States are unwilling to ignore these 
resolutions regardless of any human rights implications as under Articles 41 and 103 of the 
UN Charter the UNSC resolutions are clearly stated lacking ambiguity and directing member 
states to act in a specific way against those listed such as travel bans and asset freezing 
binding on member states regardless of any other international or national commitment
473
.  
 
It should be conceded, that various international procedures currently available for dealing 
with human rights communications has only achieved limited success in providing 
individuals with some form of recourse and a chance to defend their human rights. However, 
as previously discussed these procedures carry with them significant constraints and 
limitations. Accordingly, these conditions greatly limit the chances for the individual to 
obtain the just satisfaction in the form of redress or compensation that they desperately need. 
 
An international judicial review and appeal system that would therefore allow those subjected 
to the relevant UN sanctions and subsequent acts of State/Government to truly benefit. This 
should be employed at an international level because the circumstances under which the UN 
is placed, particularly with article 103 of the charter (discussed in Chapter 3) make any such 
                                               
472 B.G. Ramcharan, The Concept and Present Status of the International Protection of Human Rights: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht Boston, 1989 267. 
473 Behrami v France ; Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (2007) 45 EHRR SE 85 , para 149 
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procedure operating under the domestic legal system virtually useless if a state is to comply 
with its international law obligations.  
It is the author’s contention and basis of this study that only one organisation is both legally 
qualified has the necessary jurisprudence gravitas and establishment to be capable of carrying 
out this function, the International Court of Justice
474
. This thesis is primarily aimed at 
finding a judicial solution for human rights violations of those subjected to UN sanctions and 
whilst it could be argued that this process could in fact be applied in a wider context, it will 
not form part of this study, however it is possible that any such procedure could eventually 
work equally well for those individuals who find themselves unable to obtain just satisfaction 
at the national and regional level for a violation of the human rights under international treaty 
provisions, but as stated this is beyond the ambit of this discussion which will concentrate 
only on this issues involving acts of the Security Council to impose restrictions on individuals 
and entities through implementation of their targeted sanctions regime which at this time has 
no system to allow for a sufficient judicial review or appeal. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold. Firstly, it argues that another mechanism is 
needed at the international level as a complement to procedures which have been in place for 
a long time but have proved ineffective as instruments offering individual protection from the 
United Nations. Secondly, it analyses the advantages of the proposed procedure in 
comparison to the others that have already been implemented internationally. As part of the 
discussion, it is therefore necessary to examine the powers and competence of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) under the Rome Statute as well as various other 
international practices (e.g. good offices, etc.) to examine any analogous procedures or 
systems that might be better suited. 
2 Why is International Judicial Review Needed? 
Some form of judicial review/appeal procedure is considered necessary in a modern world as 
the systems currently in place within the international legal system are insufficient to deal 
with the present problem regarding targeted or smart sanctions as a result of UNSC 
Resolutions. The reason for this is that because all the existing international procedures, 
                                               
474 For full information on the Courts, including its membership, operation, statute and procedures see: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/,  accessed 3 Jan 2011. For a discussion on the functioning of the Court see for 
example S. Rosenne., Intervention in the International Court of Justice: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Netherlands 1993; The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-1996: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1997 
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particularly those aimed at defending the human rights of individuals, are designed to give a 
voice against the abuses of States and generally, have not considered having authority to 
challenge the new phenomenon of human rights abuses by (or as a direct result of legislation 
enacted by the States to give effect to UN Resolutions) the UN. This legislation cannot fulfil 
the expectations of individual victims. In the first instance, the problem lies within the 
procedure itself. 
Under Charter-based procedures, for instance, individual complaints are not generally 
considered. These procedures were designed to deal specifically with a given country’s 
human rights situation as a whole but as a consequence do not allow an individual the right to 
petition the UN itself as an international organisation. Under treaty-based procedures, 
although dealing with individual petitions, the views or conclusions usually do not bring 
about the desired result. It could even be argued that the quality of the decisions which 
currently result from the procedures that are available makes the entire mechanism futile as 
no state or regional organisation has been able to overall the decision of the Security 
Council
475
.  
Strengthening the position of the Committees to assist in permitting recommendations which 
are legally binding on the Security Council is one possibility. However, given the reluctance 
in the current situation of the Security Council to devolve power to an effective ombudsmen 
(see discussion in chapter 3 and 4) this may be worth considering but is highly doubtful to be 
effective. Historically even the  moderate  powers the Committees do possess,  has  taken  a  
long  time  for  the Committees to  obtain recognition from States. How much longer would it 
take for the States to recognise the authority bestowed on the Committees without the 
constant need for further Security Council resolutions to uphold and bind their decisions upon 
the member states. 
Moreover, even if an amendment to the treaty provisions endowed the treaty-based bodies 
with the same authority as a court, in most cases they still currently require additional official 
recognition, because the provisions are optional. The waiting time can be very long or even 
indefinite. From the victim’s perspective, this is intolerable. Again, in this respect, the 
political will of the States plays a decisive role. Such political will can well be uncertain and 
unpredictable.  With international judicial review, the door is at least partially opened: as a 
Member of the United Nations, a State is ipso facto a party to the Statute of the International 
                                               
475 See for example the discussion regarding cases of  Kadi/Nada in Chapter 4. 
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Court of Justice, even though as it currently stands, not all member States recognise the 
competence of the ICJ to hear a case and issue judgments on matters involving that State.
476
 
 
There would additionally be a risk of inconsistency if some other international body was 
considered in order to deal with issues regarding the implementation and execution of 
Security Council Resolutions in respect of targeted sanctions. For example, Judge Gilbert 
Guillaume, the International Court of Justice’s former President, has recommended caution 
about the risk of inconsistency and conflicting judgments because of overlapping jurisdiction 
due to what he calls the “proliferation of international judicial bodies”.  In  his  address  to  
the  members  of  the  General  Assembly’s  Sixth  (Legal) Committee, he asserted that the 
proliferation of judicial bodies was a response to the need to subject expanding inter-State 
relations and cross-frontier transactions to the rule of law.
477
 
He went on to caution: 
Among the unfortunate consequences from that proliferation though, were the risk of 
overlapping jurisdictions, which could lead to ‘forum shopping’, the rendering of 
conflicting judgments and inconsistency in case law. While international law certainly 
has to adapt itself, it must nonetheless preserve the unity and provide the players on 
the international stage with a secure framework.
478
 
This would suggest that it would be better to attempt to any strengthen judicial review/appeal 
not by creating a whole new mechanism, which might conflict or contradict others in place, 
but instead expand the mandate of an established institution already in situ, with the 
necessary credentials such as possessed by the International Court of Justice. 
All these aforementioned procedures tend to have as part of their main objective to provide a 
broad platform from which individuals may exercise their right to defend themselves against 
violations of human rights but of course, only after their rights have been violated.  
 
Speaking specifically regarding human rights violations, Professor Martin Scheinin, former 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and previous Director of the Finland-based Abo 
                                               
476 Article 93(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
477UN General Assembly Press Release, GA/L/3157, available at: http://srch1.un.org:80/plweb-cgi/, Judge 
Guillaume’s remark was actually made to comment on the establishment of the ICC, but its implication may 
well go beyond that’, accessed 1 November 2010. 
478 Ibid n 477, at p 2 
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Akademi University Institute for Human Rights suggests that some form of international 
tribunal is certainly a prospect. In relation to the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), seen by him as a parallel for the possible establishment of an international 
human rights court, Scheinin argues: 
 
The entry into force of the Rome Statute in July 2002 and the subsequent period when 
the ICC will become operative will provide momentum for international discussion on 
the need of a World Human Rights Court. If individuals are made, on the level of 
international law, subject to penal procedures and penal sanctions for violations of 
certain human rights, through the International Criminal Court with final and binding 
jurisdiction, why should the primary subject of international law, namely states, not 
be made subject to the jurisdiction of a human rights court with the power to issue 
binding decisions?
479
 
 
The pivotal reason for Professor Scheinin suggesting this conclusion is that in recent years, 
much attention has been given to the problems and potentials of the system of international 
supervision of human rights law; although this has primarily taken place only in academic 
and non-academic analysis on how to improve the functioning of the so- called treaty bodies 
established under six major human rights treaties elaborated within the United Nations 
framework
480
.  
 
Pointing out a recent development that occurred within the ICC, Scheinin sees that this could;  
Serve as strong support for the parallel processes of giving individuals also rights 
directly on the international level and of making states accountable for their acts or 
omissions that lead to the violations of human rights.
481
 
He argues that a future “World Human Rights Court” would have to be endowed with all 
necessary  power  to  fully  exercise  its  jurisdiction  as  another  world  court  (alongside the 
International Court of Justice), such as the power of judicial review of the UN itself, state 
parties’ acts covering legislative and administrative products as well as judicial decisions. A 
                                               
479Martin Scheinin., Towards a World Human Rights Court: Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi 
University: Finland, 2003, p 3 
480 Ibid  4 
481 Ibid  6 
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tentative blueprint of this world human rights court could be based on the following 
characteristics: 
 1)  No new substantive human rights norms need to be elaborated. The substantive  
 norms of human rights are to be found in the 1948 Universal Declaration  of  Human  
 Rights and subsequent  human  rights  treaties  and  the evolving institutionalized 
 practices of interpretation based on those treaties; 
 2)  In order to ratify the Statute of the World Human Rights Court, States need not 
 renounce the human rights treaties they have already ratified. However, States will be 
 free to withdraw from existing optional complaint procedures if they recognize the 
 binding jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the same set of substantive human 
 rights norms; 
 3)  The process of amending existing multilateral human rights treaties need not be 
 resorted to; 
 4)  The World Human Rights court will be optional in nature. Any State may subject  
 itself  to  the  binding  jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  in  relation  to  the substantive 
 norms provided by one or more of existing human rights treaties. This will result in 
 somewhat cumbersome variable geometry in the work of the Court, as the applicable 
 law will differ from case to case. By converting the principle of independence and 
 indivisibility of all human rights into a legal one, the resulting hardship can be kept 
 within tolerable borders; 
 5)  Entities other than States, including the UN itself or multinational corporations or 
 organisations, may by unilateral declaration recognize the binding jurisdiction of the 
 Court. Such declaration must specify a) a set of human rights norms contained in  the 
 existing human rights treaties to which the entity considers itself bound, and b) what 
 internal remedies of the entity, or generally available external remedies, need to be 
 exhausted before a complaint may be submitted to the Court; 
 6)  The same approach might be feasible even in respect of States themselves: that 
 they would have the right to specify what regional or international procedures 
 constitute such remedies that must be exhausted before engaging the Court. The 
 admissibility question related to “the same matter” could be resolved in a similar  
 fashion,  by  allowing  the  State  in  question  to  determine  whether previous   
 consideration by a regional human rights body  precludes a subsequent complaint to 
 the new Court; 
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 7) The Court will have the competence to issue binding decisions on interim 
 measures of protection and binding decisions on effective remedies in cases of human   
 rights violations. The Court will have an effective follow-up mechanism to 
 ensure the implementation of its judgments; 
 8)  So far, no blueprint exists to address the question of whether the jurisdiction of the 
 Court will be limited to complaints by individual victims of human rights violations, 
 or whether a case can be initiated by other actors (States, non-governmental 
 organisations, etc.), and whether this will require that the Court will deal not only 
 with (individual) human rights violations but also with “unsatisfactory application”, 
 e.g. to take positive measures.
482
 
One interesting point in Scheinin’s idea is the possibility of giving such a court a more 
extensive jurisdiction not only to deal with individual complaints but also with an 
“unsatisfactory application”, such as to take positive measures. The competence of such a 
court to deal with an unsatisfactory application in taking a positive measure may well be 
regarded as involving the review of a State’s acts or legislation and their conformity with 
human rights standards or even that of the United Nations itself which currently lacks any 
real judicial oversight into its own abuses of human rights.  
 
It would  therefore  be  useful  if  there  existed  at  international  level  a  judicial  review and 
appeals procedure which scrutinised the consistency and the actions of the UNSC resolutions 
in regard to international human rights compliance and  which  took  the  necessary  measures  
if inconsistencies were found. In this context, the availability of an international judicial 
review of UN Security Council actions specifically in relation to its targeted sanctions 
resolutions that result in breaches of human rights may, in this context, prevent the violation 
of wider human rights abuses from taking place and provide individuals with an avenue 
through which they can secure the exercise of their rights before any violation occurs. The 
procedure may thus function as an early-warning system for the protection of human rights. 
 
Nonetheless, even if a violation has taken place because a particular State has adhered to its 
national system of judicial review
483,
 international judicial review can still be used to bring 
                                               
482 Ibid  8 
483 In countries such as Switzerland, a regulation will be reviewed through a referendum before it comes 
into effect. But in countries like Indonesia, a regulation enters into force first and if considered inconsistent, a 
petition may be filed with the court. On various systems of judicial review, see, among others, Brewer-
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about an amendment in the legislation of this State. The proposed mechanism may thus have 
a dual function: prevention and reparation. This could also serve as a way to balance the 
power States have attached to article 103 of the UN Charter meaning that it could not be 
invoked it breached international human rights standards. 
 
Judicial review at this level may also serve to advise States and governments that they have 
exceeded the expectations of the UNSC in their implementation of legislation in response to 
UNSC sanctions and that in doing do have exercised its own power over and above what the 
resolution required. This may act as deterrence to future violations under Security Council 
Resolutions. There is of course always a possibility that a government will misuse its power 
while conducting its administrative and legislative affairs either allegedly in response to the 
command of a UNSC resolution in this situations, the court should be able to examine the 
lawfulness and fairness of their actions which is made in response to the relevant UNSC 
resolution and advise accordingly. 
 
In relation to the violation of principles for the promotion and protection of international 
human rights, a range of treaties have been adopted and ratified. But mere adoption and 
ratification of treaties do not themselves decrease the incidence of violations of rights, for it is 
up to the State parties to work out how they are going to implement these treaties. Many of 
the treaties are not implemented in practice. With the UNSC taking over a quasi-
judicial/
484
executive role of implementing targeted sanctions of individuals at the 
international level the UN charter itself has become an obstacle to human rights compliance. 
A major impediment to satisfactory implementation of these standards does undoubtedly lie 
within national laws themselves. So, in order to secure the  conformity of these national  laws  
with  international  standards  of  human  rights,  an  international  judicial review procedure 
must be available in the first instance to set the example and lead the way as well as showing 
that no one is above the rule of law. 
 
To what standard should the UNSC be held accountable in this context? It is suggested that it 
is both logical and equitable to expect the United Nations supreme decision making body to 
uphold to its own standards of human rights in what is generally referred to as the 
‘International Bill of Rights’, which purposes of this study consists of the Universal 
                                                                                                                                                  
Carais, Judicial Review in Comparative Law, Chapter 5. 
484 See discussion in chapter two regarding changing role of the UNSC in relation to individual sanction lists. 
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Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
together with its two Optional Protocols, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. 
The two covenants are already legally binding on States parties. The principles contained in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are not an international treaty or part of the UN 
Charter however they are now considered almost universally as part of customary 
international law
485
. Its provisions either constitute a general principle of international human 
rights law or express basic humanitarian views
486
. More important is its status as an 
authoritative guide, produced by the General Assembly, for the interpretation of the United 
Nations Charter. In this capacity, the Declaration has considerable indirect legal effect and is 
regarded by the General Assembly and by some prominent jurists as a part of the “law of the 
United Nations”.487Moreover, in the Proclamation, it is stated that the Declaration is; 
a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that 
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration in mind, shall 
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and 
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and 
                                               
485 For a full discussion on the  sources, types and hierarchy of international law and how state behaviour can 
lead to the adoption of certain practices as ‘customary international law’ see Ian Brownlie, and G, Goodwin-
Gill.,(Eds)., Brownlie’s Documents on Human Rights, (6th Ed): Oxford University Press, Oxford ,2010, Cha 1-2, 
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998, Chap 1-3 
486 See Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
487 Ian Brownlie (Ed.)., Basic Documents in International Law. ( 4 t h  E d):  Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005,  
255 and on jus cogens, see, Juergen Broehmer. State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights:  Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1997, particularly at pp 145-147, excerpt of which: “… [t]he concept of jus cogens is 
based on the notion that the international legal order contains norms which cannot be subject to contracting out, 
respectively which cannot be derogated by any subsequent nor unless that norm is also attributed jus cogens 
character. In effect this postulates a set of norms higher in hierarchy  than  general  norms  of  international  law  
and  insofar  similar  to  public  policy  norms  of municipal legal orders … In the broader context of human 
rights the law of genocide, the principles of racial non-discrimination, the rules prohibiting slavery and 
piracy and the rules concerning crimes against humanity are the least controversial jus cogens norms. 
However, the jus cogens catalogue of norms also includes “the murder or causing the disappearance of 
individuals”, “torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. That follows from the 
definition of jus cogens norms as rules which cannot be derogated from and which must be recognized “by the 
international community of States as a whole” (art. 53 Vienna Convention on Law of the Treaty). “The 
international community as a whole” cannot be understood in the sense of each and every state: jus cogens 
norms do not rely on state’s consent for it to be bound … it is at least not evident that there is any 
significant opposition within the international community against the very existence of these fundamental 
rules.” 
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effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States 
themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
488
 
Most of the human rights principles and standards laid down in the Declaration are then 
elaborated in the Covenants, which even go so far as to propose mechanisms for defending 
human rights. Unfortunately, as explained above, these mechanisms may only be invoked by 
individuals who are placed under the jurisdiction of the States which are parties to both 
treaties. What is needed now is a mechanism that applies to the United Nations to give 
individuals a right of representation and protection at the very highest level. 
Several other  references  to  the  principles  underlying  these  developments  and  to  the 
practical  modalities of their international implementation can be found in the United Nations 
Charter, particularly in Articles 1(3), 55(c), 56, 62(2), 68 and 76(c). 
 
There is all the more reason to do away with any hesitations about the use of international 
standards of human rights as a basis for judicial review because these standards also involve 
other aspects of social interaction, such as culture and ethics with human rights touching 
both. Whilst interpretation of these rights is often vexatious for any court of tribunal tasked 
with their interpretation, it is matter of degree. For example whilst there is strong debate on 
the right to life, which includes discussion on abortion and capital punishment, there is no 
denying from either an ethical or cultural context that there is a right to life argument, it is 
only the extent of that right which is debated.  In other words no cultural or  moral  value  
judgment  would  deny  at least the  basic principles  and  standards  set  forth  in  the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights? Since human rights are the natural birth rights of 
every human being, universally.
489
 The respective relationships of culture and ethics with 
human rights might be likened to lex generalis for the former and to lex specialis for the 
latter. It has generally fallen to the role of a court to interpret and apply the law and in this 
instance that is exactly what is proposed. 
 
Thus, the promotion, observance, protection and defence of human rights is an international 
concern and not simply the business of certain states, regions or groups of people unless the 
                                               
488 GA Doc. A/811, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the UN 
on 10 December 1948. 
489 Diana Ayton-Shenker, United Nations Background Note “The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural 
Diversity”, Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information DPI/1627/HR--March 1995, 
available at:< http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm,> accessed 4 Jan 2013. 
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international peace and security that all are striving for is a mere facade. That is why a 
specific procedure needs to be established whereby the possible violation of any right as a 
result of wrongdoing or abusive legislation on the part of the United Nations may be 
prevented.  
 
What about any other international machinery, such as the International Criminal Court? 
Besides, what are the contributions of other international practices similar to judicial review 
such as mediation and good offices, conciliation, arbitration, etc.? How far can these 
mechanisms go in providing redress for human rights violations at an international level? A 
systematic examination of these is provided in the following two sections. 
3 The Power and Competence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Two years before entering the new millennium, the international community under the 
auspices of the United Nations
490
  successfully drafted and adopted the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.
491
 The idea was supported without question by the General 
Assembly, who emphasised even further “… the need to make necessary arrangements for 
the commencement of the International Criminal Court in order to ensure its effective 
operation.”492 
The Statute contains 12 parts and 128 articles. According to Article 126, the Rome Statute 
will come into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the 
deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. To date, of 
the 140 countries that have signed the Statute, more than 60 have already ratified the Statute 
rendering its provisions in force
493
. 
 
                                               
490 That is, the Preparatory Commission for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court which 
was established by Resolution F of the Final Act (A/CONF. 183/10) of the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court. On the work of the 
Preparatory Commission, see, among others, UN Press Release L/2968 of 8 December 2000; on the reading 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of Crimes, see, summary of proceedings 
PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev.1, Add. 1 and Add. 2. 
491 On 27 July 1998 the UN Diplomatic Conference adopted the draft Statute (A/CONF. 183/9). Complete text 
of the Statute is taken from: http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm, accessed 21 March 2011.  
492 A/Res/55/155. 
493 David Howell “Yes to the World Criminal Court, but with America on Board” in International Herald 
Tribune, 6 March 2001.  For the number of states that have ratified the Statute, see,  <http://www.un.org/icc> 
accessed 24 February 2012. 
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The International  Criminal  Court  (the  ICC)  is  to  be  an  independent  and  permanent 
judicial body with jurisdiction over “most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole” if  they were committed by individuals. Nevertheless, in the 
Preamble of the Statute it is emphasised that the ICC “shall [only] be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdiction.”494 
 
The Court was seen as the offspring of two ad hoc tribunals which prosecuted war crimes in 
former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, as well as of hybrid national/international courts which 
were being established in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and East Timor.
495
 But the very beginning 
of the ICC can be traced back to the second decade of the 1900s.  
 
The first proposals leading to the creation of a permanent and independent international 
criminal court were introduced just after the First World War, when the Permanent Court for 
International Justice was established. In the interval between the First and the Second World 
War, interest in the creation of this kind of court somehow subsided. The idea was revived  
after  the  Second  World  War,  when  the  Nuremberg  and  Tokyo  international military 
tribunals were created.
496
 
 
The ICC functions as an organ of the United Nations. The relationship of the ICC with the 
United Nations shall be determined by an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of 
States parties to this Statute and thereafter concluded by the President of the ICC on its behalf 
(Article 2) and the seat of the Court shall be at The Hague in the Netherlands (Article 3). 
 
According to Article 4, the ICC shall have international legal personality and other legal 
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its 
purposes (par. 1). The ICC may exercise its functions and powers on the territory of any State 
party and, by special agreement, on the territory of another State too (par. 2). 
                                               
494 See, sentence “Emphasizing…etc.” of the Preamble and Article 1 of the Rome Statute. 
495 Michelle Sief “World Needs a Crimes Court” in Christian Science Monitor,15 March 2001 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/wldcourt/icc/2001/0315us.htm>accessed 16/04/2011. 
496 Bernhard Graefrath, “Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and an International Criminal Court” in European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1 <  http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol1/No1/art4-01.html> accessed 10 
April 2011. For more details on the history of the proposals, see M.C. Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal 
Code and Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 2n d  revised and updated edition, Dordrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff: Boston, 1987, 1 ff., International Criminal Law, 2nd  edition, Vols. 1-3, Ardsley, 
Transnational Publishers: New York, also B.B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Court - A Step toward World 
Peace: a document, history and analysis. Oceana Publications: Dobbs Ferry,New York, 1980.  
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Part 2 of the Statute concerns the jurisdiction of the Court, the admissibility of a case and 
other relevant legal principles. Article 5(1) stipulates the types of crimes covered by the 
Court’s jurisdiction. It specifies that these crimes must be of concern to the international 
community as a whole, such as: (a) the crime of genocide, (b) crimes against humanity, (c) 
war crimes and (d) the crime of aggression. 
 
Genocide occurs when any of the following acts is committed with intent to destroy in whole 
or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group
497
: 
• killing members of the group; 
• causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
• deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
• imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
• forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.498 
A crime against humanity takes place when any of the following acts is committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population: 
• murder; 
• extermination; 
• enslavement; 
• deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
• imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
• torture; 
• rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, or 
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
• persecution  against  any  identifiable  group  or  collectivity  on  political,  racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally 
                                               
497 See The Impact of the ICC on victims and affected communities, Uganda Victims Foundation, Feb. 15-17, 
2010, which is based on a UVF/REDRESS workshop held in Lira, Uganda, See also The Impact of the Rome 
Statute System on Victims and Affected Communities, REDRESS/Victims’ Rights Working Group, March 22, 
2010. 
498 Article 6 of the Rome Statute. 
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recognised as  impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
• enforced disappearance of persons; 
• the crime of apartheid; and 
• other inhuman acts of similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body, physical and mental health.
499
 
War crimes occur when an act or acts of violence are committed as part of a plan or policy or 
as part of a large-scale order for such crimes to be perpetrated (Article 8 par. 1). According to 
paragraph 2, war crimes include any of the following acts: 
a) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the 
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the 
Conventions
500
: Wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military action and carried out 
                                               
499 Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Paragraph 2 of the article further defines the meanings of “attack directed 
against any civilian population” as a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
against any civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy to 
commit such attack; “extermination” includes the intentional infliction of condition of life, inter alia the 
deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population; “enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, without grounds 
permitted under international law; “deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced 
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are 
lawfully present without grounds permitted under international law; “torture” means the intentional infliction 
of severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused 
(pain or suffering due to lawful sanction is excluded); “forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a 
woman forcibly made pregnant with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or 
carrying out other grave violations of international law (this does not affect national laws on pregnancy); 
“persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law 
by reason of the identity of the groups or collectivity; “crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts committed in 
the context of an institutionalised regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any 
other racial group or groups with intent of maintaining the regime; “enforced disappearance of persons” means 
the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State 
or political organisation, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give 
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the 
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. 
500 Altogether there are four Conventions and two Additional Protocols: Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick Members of Armed Forces in the Field, Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol 1), and Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol 2). All four Conventions entered into force on 21 October 
1950, while the Additional Protocol 1 entered into force on 7 December 1979 and Additional Protocol 2 on 7 
December 1978. 
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unlawfully or wantonly, compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in 
forces of hostile power, wilfully depriving a prisoner of  war or other protected person of the 
rights of fair and regular trial, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement and 
taking of hostages; 
b)  other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict 
within  the established framework of international law, such as attacks against civilians, non-
military targets including those belonging to humanitarian or peacekeeping missions, the use 
of biological and chemical weapons, etc.; 
c)  intentionally wounding retired soldiers who are hors de combat.
501
 
As concerns the crime of aggression in particular, the Statute prescribes that the Court shall 
extend its jurisdiction to this type of crime once a provision has been adopted in accordance 
with Articles 121 and 123 which define the crime and set out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.
502
 
3.1 Exercise of Jurisdiction 
Article 13 rules that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to any sort of crime 
covered by the Statute if (a) a situation arises in which one or more of the alleged crimes is 
referred to the Prosecutor by a State party, (b) a situation arises in which one or more of the 
alleged crimes is referred to the Prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council pursuant 
to Chapter VII of the Charter, or (c) the  Prosecutor has initiated an investigation proprio 
motu based on reliable information that one or more  such crimes have indeed taken place. 
 
To assist the Court in determining whether one or more such crimes have indeed taken place, 
a set of rules on the Elements of Crimes shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the 
Assembly of States Parties (Article 9 par. 1). In exercising its powers, the Court is also to 
uphold the general principles of criminal law, such as ratione temporis (Article 11), nebis in 
idem (Article 20), nullum crimen sine lege (Article 22), nulla poena sine lege (Article 23), 
non-retroactivity or ratione personae (Article 24), etc.  
                                               
501 Article 8 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
502 Paragraph 2, Article 5 of the Rome Statute. The article further requires that the provision concerning the 
crime of aggression shall not contravene the provisions or principles of the United Nations Charter. 
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The jurisdiction of the Court excludes any person who was under the age of 18 (Article 26) 
when the alleged crime occurred, but no exception is made with respect to the official rank of 
a person, even if he/she enjoys legal immunity under international as well as national laws 
(Article 27). As in a normal criminal trial, the Court must exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility if the person is mentally ill, incapable, or acting in self- defence, etc. A 
person’s right to presumption of innocence is also to be respected and the burden of proof is 
laid upon the Prosecutor (Article 66).
503
 
3.2 Analysis and Comparison 
As noted above, the creation of the ICC is the next and perhaps the final outcome of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals, two ad hoc international tribunals for 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the current fledgling tribunals for Sierra Leone, 
Cambodia and East Timor for the effective enforcement of international humanitarian law.
504
 
The establishment of those tribunals was meant to provide a more effective means of 
enforcing international humanitarian law after the previous mechanisms seemed to fail. 
 
The first means available for legally enforcing international humanitarianism was the 
traditional and rather controversial method of reprisals, whereby a soldier used an illegal 
means of warfare in response to violations of the laws of war by his enemy. The aim of this 
tactic is to make the enemy stop behaving illegally and to ‘punish’ him in order to deter him 
from committing further breaches. The second means was generally known as Protecting 
Power, a mechanism agreed upon by the parties to a conflict, to secure the supervision and 
implementation by the armed forces of their international humanitarian obligations. The third 
means was the existence of the Fact Finding Commission. The Commission was set up by the 
Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council in accordance with Resolution 780 
(1992) to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia.  
Based on the subsequent findings of this Commission, the Security Council decided to 
establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
505
 
                                               
503 Rules on the trial process and the enforcement of the rulings are summed up in part 6 Articles 62 – 85 
and part 10 Articles 103 - 111 of the Statute. 
504 Bernhard Graefrath, “Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and an International Criminal Court” in European 
Journal of International Law, 1990,Vol. 1, No. 1, http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/1/1/1146.pdf, accessed 6 Feb 2013 
505Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, European 
Journal of International Law: 5 EJIL( 1994) 360-380 <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/5/1/1248.pdf> accessed 9 Jan 
2013. 
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While the  three  previous  methods  concentrated  on  the  States’  duty  to  uphold  their 
obligations under international humanitarian law, the ICC focuses its jurisdiction on 
individual responsibility. It should be acknowledged that, in one way, the creation of the ICC 
does represent a step forward in the effort to promote the observance of humanitarian law 
internationally. Yet, on the other hand, the mechanism is flawed as far as the effective 
enforcement of international humanitarian law is concerned, because the implementation of 
the prosecution and punishment of individuals ultimately hinges on, and depends on, the 
goodwill of States.
506
 
Unlike the procedures which deal with individual communications under various treaties in 
which the Committees do not make legally binding decisions, the ICC does hand down 
judgments and has legal binding force on the parties concerned. This is as expected because 
the ICC is a judicial institution operating as a criminal court on the basis of general criminal 
law principles at international level. Thus, it does not work in the area of international human 
rights.  
Petitions or complaints alleging violations of individual human rights are dealt with by the 
Committees established for that specific purpose, but they are not vested with the same 
degree of powers or competence as the ICC. In other words, some privileges enjoyed by the 
ICC, such as the power to hand down judgments, are not granted to the Committees. This 
makes the work of the Committees ineffective and in many cases futile for law enforcement 
purposes. 
 
Indeed, the effective implementation of the decisions made by the ICC ultimately depends on 
the goodwill of States
507
. Still, from this point onward, it is no longer a question of the court’s 
judicial competence, but rather a question of sanction and of moral values held by individual 
                                               
506 Ibid at 372 
507 For a discussion on the of the ICC effectiveness see for example; David Tolbert Stocktaking: Peace and 
Justice, (The Rome Statute Review Conference) Jun 2010 < http://ictj.org/publication/stocktaking-peace-and-
justice-rome-statute-review-conference> accessed 16 Jan 2013. Neha Jain, A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: 
The Clash between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court The European Journal of 
International Law Vol. 16 no.2 EJIL 2005; EU Guiding Principles Concerning Agreements Between a State 
Party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the United States Regarding the Conditions to 
Surrender of Persons to the Court < www.europa.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/gac.htm>J. 
Crawford, P. Sands, and R. Wilde, Joint Opinion in the Matter of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
and in the Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United States under Article 98(2) of the Statute (2003), 
at 22–23. I. Bantekas and S. Nash, International Criminal Law 4th ed  Hart Publishing: London, 2010; M. Boot, 
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (2002), at 554; R. Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics, and Diplomacy (2004) 80–81. 
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States. The issue here is in which skilful way could an effective sanction be formulated so 
that a State would have no other choice but to implement it within its national jurisdiction, 
because it felt that this sanction served its own interests as well as those of the international 
community at large, even though it might have to observe it under constraint.
508
 For no State 
would ‘feel’ happy to bow to international pressure and besides, there could be some 
financial or political consequences occurring. As the United Nations Secretary-General’s 
seminal Rule of Law report says, “Peace and justice, if properly pursued, promote and sustain 
one another. The question can never be whether to pursue justice, but rather when and 
how
509.” 
4 International Practices Similar to Judicial Review 
Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter states that all Member States;  
 shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
 international peace and security and justice are not endangered.  
This article means that there is no general rule requiring states to settle their grievances, but 
that if they decide to do so, this must be done in a peaceful manner. The absence of a general 
obligation to settle disputes is reflected by the fact that the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) is not compulsory. Thus, a state cannot be compelled to submit a 
dispute with another state to a third party such as the ICJ for settlement unless it has agreed 
upon it.
510
 
 
Under international law, many procedures to settle disputes have been implemented; 
although, from a legal point of view, these are relatively obsolete. As a matter of fact, such  
procedures  for  the  supervision  and  pacific  settlement  of  disputes  have  been developed 
through old-fashioned processes in which the acts and omissions of the States could be 
reviewed for their conformity with international  legal norms. Most of these procedures have 
                                               
508 More on the theory of sanction and punishment, see, Igor Primoratz (1989). Justifying Legal Punishment, 
New Jersey, London: Humanities International Press, particularly pp. 1-31. On the effectiveness of the United 
Nations sanctions, see, Willem J.M. van Genugten and Gerard A. de Groot (eds.) (1999), United Nations 
Sanctions, Effectiveness and Effects especially in the Field of Human Rights - A Multi- disciplinary Approach, 
Antwerpen: Intersentia. 
509UN Doc. S/2004/616, para.21,The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict 
Societies, Report of the Secretary-General, Aug. 24, 2004,  
510 The only exception to this rule is the obligation of states under Art. 33 of the Charter, which requires a 
state to submit disputes which are likely to endanger international peace and security to third party for a 
peaceful settlement. 
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a non-judicial character.
511
  Nevertheless, it is perhaps valuable to consider some of these 
procedures before possibly coming to the conclusion that an international judicial review is 
needed. 
 
The said procedures vary greatly among themselves and can be any of the following: 
 
• consultation between States parties; 
• settlement of disputes through mediation and good offices; 
• inquiry and conciliation (under the direction of one or more other States, a 
commission or an organ of an international organisation); 
• specific settlement of disputes of non-judicial supervision; 
• pacific settlement of disputes within the framework of international organisations or 
regional machinery.  
In general, most of these procedures concern the settlement of disputes of a specific nature; 
such as in diplomacy, problems relating to the international economy and trade cooperation, 
and other related matters such as disputes about territorial borders.
512
 
4.1 Negotiation 
As in the national legal system, the most common method of settling a dispute is through 
negotiation which appears to be the best option because it is simple and it does not involve a 
third party.
513
 However, the procedure can only operate if the disputants have agreed to adopt 
this method of settlement, which would then in turn affect the binding power of the 
settlement. If the parties concerned so decide jointly, the outcome of the procedure can 
become legally binding and then it may be set in the form of a treaty. Otherwise, the outcome 
can be recorded in an exchange of notes or diplomatic memoranda, which have no legal 
effect.
514
 The agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the United Kingdom 
over the future of Hong Kong is an example of how this second option can work.  
4.2 Good Offices and Mediation 
                                               
511 P van Dijk, Judicial Review of Governmental Action, Ibid (n405 )363. 
512 See, for instance, M. Dixon, Textbook on International Law (Blackstone Press Limited: London 1989) 222-
245: Malcolm Shaw International  Law (4th Ed, Cambridge University Press, London, 1997)717-774 and Ian 
Brownlie, Principles of Public  International  Law (5th Ed, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998) 703-706. 
513 Malcolm M. Shaw, International Law, Ibid n512, 546. 
514 M. Dixon, ibid (n 512) 223 
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Unlike negotiation, the use of the procedures of good offices and mediation involves the 
service of a third party. This third party may be an individual or individuals, a State or a 
group of States, or else one or more international organisations.
515
The main role of this third 
party is to persuade and encourage the contending parties to sit at the negotiating table to 
settle their differences. The person offering good offices must be  a  neutral and trustworthy 
party who is external to the negotiation, such as when the late American General, Alexander 
Haig acted as such a negotiator in the Falkland Islands war  between the United Kingdom and 
Argentina.
516
 
The procedure of mediation is simply an extension of good offices. A mediator is a person 
approved by the opposing parties whose task is to suggest the terms and conditions of a 
settlement, so that he or she is actively involved in the negotiation. United Nations envoys, 
for example, have been active in this type of process with regard to the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia. Mediation and good offices are thus a preliminary procedure of negotiation.
517
  
A number of rules governing these two procedures are laid down in The Hague Conventions 
for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1899 and 1907.  
4.3 Inquiry 
Generally speaking, a commission of inquiry can be set up in which reputable observers 
investigate the evidence in detail when differences of opinion on factual matters underlie a 
dispute between parties. The parties to a dispute will agree to refer the matter to this impartial 
body who will engage in an unbiased fact-finding task.
518
 It is up to the parties to negotiate a 
settlement based on its findings and just like the other procedures noted above, the settlement 
has no legal binding force. Although established as a fact-finding body, the commission of 
inquiry works according to the judicial pattern in the sense that its reports contain legal 
conclusions. This is not surprising since the majority of the members of the commission are 
usually lawyers.
519
  
                                               
515 M. Shaw, ibid (n 512) 723. 
516 Although just how neutral Haig was is now a matter of debate, see for example comments by John 
O’Sullivan, How the US Almost Betrayed Britain, Wall Street journal, 2 April 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577313852502105454.html.  
Accessed 2 April 2012 in relation to US official papers released 30 years after the conflict. 
517 More on the procedures, see International Court of Justice Report 1969, in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, 3, 47, also, ICJ Reports 1974 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction, 3, 32. 
518 M. Dixon, ibid (n 512) 224. 
519 The Red Crusader Case which concerned a British trawler and a Danish fisheries protection vessel which 
subsequently involved a British warship (a frigate) in 1962. The commission of inquiry came to the conclusion 
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4.4 Conciliation 
Conciliation can be regarded either as a non-judicial or as a semi-judicial procedure for the 
settlement of international disputes. The procedure of conciliation implies the reference of a 
dispute to a third party, usually a commission or committee, whose task it is to propose 
recommendations for settlement. Conciliation commissions are different from commissions  
of  inquiry  because  the  latter  do  not   produce  concrete  proposals  for settlement. The 
‘semi-judicial’ aspect of the work of a conciliation commission derives from its competence 
to elucidate facts, hear the parties and formulate decisions in the form of proposals.
520
 
 
The rules which define conciliation were drawn up in the General Act on the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes of 1928, revised in 1949. Under this procedure, a 
settlement is generally proposed by a neutral third party and has no legally binding effect. 
One example of a conciliation procedure is the Jan Meyen Conciliation Commission (Iceland 
v Norway) in 1981
521
. In practice, the settlements proposed by conciliation commissions form 
the basis for the arbitration of further settlement procedures. 
4.5 Arbitration 
The procedure of arbitration was held to be the most effective and equitable manner of 
settling international disputes where diplomacy had failed. The procedure grew to some 
extent out of the processes of diplomatic settlement and represented an advance towards a 
more developed international legal system.
522
Like all methods of pacific settlement in 
international law, arbitration is voluntary and may take place on an ad hoc basis or according 
to any other specific arrangement that the parties involved might have agreed upon.  Prior  to  
this  process,  the  States  concerned  must  consent  to  the  exercise  of jurisdiction by the 
arbitrators.
523
 
The most notable arbitration procedure that was ever carried out and is still regarded as the 
model of modern arbitration was the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the U.S.A. and Great 
                                                                                                                                                  
that the British frigate had ‘exceeded the legitimate use of armed force’. See Malcolm Shaw, 
International Law, ibid (n 38) 726. 
520 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, ibid (n 512) 704. 
521 Full details see: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXVII/1-34.pdf, accessed 16 Jan 2013 
522 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, ibid (n 38) 737-738. 
523 M. Dixon, International Law, ibid (n 38) 228.  
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Britain. The procedure was successfully used again in the Alabama Claims arbitration
524
 of 
1872 between the two countries, and resulted in the compensation payment by Great Britain 
to the U.S.A. for breaches of contractual obligations on the building of warships. 
Subsequently, in accordance with the Conventions signed in The Hague in 1899 and 1907 
(particularly Articles XV and XVIII), a permanent Court of Arbitration was established. 
Actually, it is not really a court as such since it does not consist of a fixed number of judges. 
Rather, it  consists of a panel of persons nominated by the contracting States (with a 
maximum  of  four  national   representatives),  and  comprises  individuals  of  ‘known 
competency in questions of international law,  of  high moral reputation and disposed to 
accept the duties of an arbitrator’.525  Arbitration tribunals may thus consist of a single 
arbitrator or of a collegiate body of judges. 
 
In 1958, the General Assembly adopted the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure proposed by 
the International Law Commission.
526
 These rules were, however, merely optional. In 1992, 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration itself adopted the Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes 
between Two States
527
. Generally, the law to be applied in arbitration is international law, but 
the parties may agree upon certain principles to be taken into account by the tribunal and 
specify this in the compromis
528
. This principle was applied in the British Guiana and 
Venezuela Boundary
529
 dispute and in the Trail Smelter Case
530
. 
 
It is an important characteristic of arbitration that the tribunal has the competency to 
determine its own jurisdiction and therefore to interpret the relevant legal instruments 
determining that jurisdiction. Once an arbitral award (that is, the decision) has been made, it 
is final and binding on the parties concerned, but in certain circumstances the award itself 
                                               
524 J. B. Moore, International Arbitrations, New York, 1898, vol. 1, p.653. 
525 Article XLIV of the Hague Convention as revised in 1907. 
526 General Assembly Resolution 1262 (XI) (1958). 
527 These  were  based  on  the  UNCITRAL  (United  Nations  Commission  on  International  Trade  Law) 
Arbitration Rules adopted by the UN General Assembly on 15 December 1976 in its resolution 31/98. 
See, for example, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, ibid (n 38) 706. 
528 A compromis is a kind of arbitrational decision based on the parties’ consent and agreement. It is final 
and binding. 
529 British Guiana v Venezuela, 89 BFSP, 1896 57 
530 USA v Canada; 9 AD 315: Full details of case <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_iii/1905-1982.pdf,> 
accessed 17 Jan 2013. 
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may be regarded as null.  Nullity of award occurs when the tribunal exceeds the powers that it 
was given by mutual consent in the compromis.
531
 
5  A Brief Analysis of These Types of Dispute Resolution 
It is  clear  that  these  procedures  for  settlement  of  disputes  by  peaceful  means  deal 
specifically with grievances between states. They do not relate to individual complaints. 
Besides, the grievances dealt with under these procedures do not concern human rights 
violations by any means. As mentioned above, complaints about human rights violations are 
dealt with by special bodies under special procedures according to special laws and 
provisions. 
 
Of all the international legal resources mentioned above, none can be invoked by individuals 
claiming that their rights have been violated as a result of State abuses or poor national 
legislation. This takes us to the next step in the search for a better protection of individuals in 
the field of human rights. 
6 International Judicial Review as a Complementary Procedure 
The following sections deal with two crucial issues on which the possibility of making 
international judicial review available is hinged: who shall possess the power of judicial 
review and by what legal principles is it underpinned? Prior to discussing these questions, I 
will enumerate some of the advantages of international judicial review as a complement to 
other existing mechanisms. 
6.1 The Complementary Functions of International Judicial Review 
In  the  previous  discussions,  it  has  been  noted  quite  extensively  that  the  existing 
international legal tools for the promotion and protection of individual human rights only 
provided individual victims  with limited redress. The disadvantages of the procedures came  
by  and  large  from  the  defending  bodies’  inability  to  produce  legally  binding decisions  
on  the  parties  involved  in  human  rights  violations  and  from  the  fact  that 
communications before these international bodies were generally only acceptable on the 
condition  that  all  available  and  effective  domestic  avenues  had  been  exhausted 
beforehand. 
                                               
531 Malcolm M. Shaw, International Law, supra (n 512) 740. 
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It is precisely in connection with these frustrating limitations that the proposed international 
judicial review might constitute a breakthrough. As in national law, the outcome of 
international judicial review proceedings could have legally binding force on the parties 
involved. Besides, in order to ensure the acceptance and implementation of its decisions, it 
could consider some form of enforcement such as international sanctions; other available 
measures could be authorized such as reparation or censure. The power to exercise this 
judicial review of the UNSC might be given to the International Court of Justice as a court; it 
would certainly deliver final and binding judgment upon all parties.
532
 
 
Another major advantage of the procedure would be the bypassing of the need for the 
“exhaustion of domestic legal avenues” requirement found in the procedures before the treaty 
bodies. As mentioned above, it can take individuals a very long time to meet this requirement 
even if there are some exceptions possible where the existing domestic remedies are 
unavailable, ineffective or even non-existent. It is also fraught with uncertainty, not to 
mention the heavy financial and possibly, psychological burden, that individuals may have to 
bear in the process. In short, it is just “as good as impossible” for individuals to fulfil their 
obligation in this particular area in relation to legislation enacted as a result of UNSC 
resolutions. 
 
Under the proposed international judicial review, which attempts to target this issue, this 
prerequisite could be scrapped. As in domestic law, the individual could be permitted to file a 
lawsuit requesting a court review of the lawfulness of a particular act or legislation, without 
having to exhaust other “preliminary” procedures first533. This way, if an individual claimed 
that, by international standards, his or her human rights had been, or might be, violated as a 
direct result of the imposition of legislation or government acts in response to UNSC 
resolutions then he or she would be allowed to file a lawsuit directly to the International 
Court of Justice instituting judicial review (or appeal). 
 
Although it seems possible at this point to conclude that international judicial review is 
necessary to complement other international procedures currently in force under various 
forms, it is not a simple matter of need. It is also a matter of finding legitimate and reasonable 
answers to some fundamental questions such as who shall possess that power, should there be 
                                               
532 Articles 59 and 60 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
533 See and compare discussion on judicial review in chapter 6 
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judicial review power for the ICJ, what is the source of the power and what is the scope of 
this type of judicial review. 
7 Who Shall Possess the Power of Judicial Review? 
For cases of human rights violations based on legislation and considering Scheinin’s 
argument and idea
534
, the ideal judicial institution to possess the power of international 
judicial review would be some sort of ‘world human rights’ court. It is the authors’ 
contention that although a specific world court might be tempting to suggest as an ideal, the 
most pragmatic way to establish a comparable world court capable of reviewing human rights 
violations on the international plane would be to utilise the expertise and established system 
already employed by the ICJ. 
Constitutional law theory and practical national law models suggest that the competence of 
judicial review is one of a court’s functions. Judicial review is a procedure whereby an 
individual challenges an allegedly unfair or unlawful decision or action by an international 
organisation of a State. In the course of the examination process, the court shall declare 
whether or not the action or decision is legal. If it is found to be illegal such as being ultra 
vires or unconstitutional, or as contrary to the charter provisions, then the decision must be 
declared invalid and may be revoked or revised in accordance with the rule of law
535
. 
 
At the  international  level,  despite  all  the  limitations  due  to  Charter  regulations,  the 
International  Court of Justice (ICJ) has been the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. As a World Court,
536 
 the ICJ has proved to be capable and impartial in settling 
                                               
534 See Scheinin on the “tentative characters of a World Human Rights Court”., at , note 479 at p 6 
535 See, among others, Stanley de Smith, H.K. Woolf., A.P. le Seur, & J.L. Lowell, judicial Review of 
administrative Action, (5th Ed): Sweet & Maxwell, London,1995; Grahame Aldous, & John Alder, Application 
for Judicial Review: law practice of the Crown office, (2nd ed)., Buttersworth; London, 1993; Sue Arrowsmith 
Government Procurement and Judicial Review, Carswell; Toronto, 1988, cf. 
536 First sentence of the Foreword of the booklet on the International Court of Justice, Jennings, the former 
president of the Court used this term occasionally to refer to the ICJ, which probably goes back to Judge 
Manley O. Mason. The term is current in legal literature in English and not in Spanish, French or Arabic. It is 
thus familiar mainly to common-law jurists. The expression ultimately suggests that it is a court of, and for, the 
whole world. Moreover, it is also a judicial organ of the international legal order, a higher court on a world 
level and as an instrument of world governance. See, Georges Abi-Saab The International Court as a World 
Court, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, Vaughan Lowe, and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, (Eds)., Fifty 
Years of the International Court of Justice, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996,  3-16. For an 
extensive essay on the ICJ as the World Court, see, Shabtai Rosenne, The World Court, what it is and how it 
works, (5th ed)., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1995. 
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international disputes. In the light of these facts, the International Court of Justice should be 
entrusted with the power of judicial review.
537
 
7.1 Should there be a Power of Judicial Review for the ICJ? 
While discussion on the possible establishment of a world human rights court has merit, 
overall use of the International Court of Justice is a better option. A multi-level approach to 
this issue will be used by emphasizing two of its aspects: the inherent competence of the 
International Court of Justice and the ever- increasing demand for a new world order. 
7.2 The Inherent Competence of the International Court of Justice 
As a court for the settlement of international disputes and as the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations, the International Court of Justice should possess the power of judicial 
review. It is a role the Court already plays in a limited way as it gives advisory opinions and 
delivers decisions on matters such as the interpretation and implementation of treaties and 
resolutions.
538
 
Article 92 of the Charter states that the ‘Statute of the International Court of Justice is an 
integral part of the Charter’. This statement points to at least two possible interpretations of 
what ‘integral part’ means. The first is that the Statute is essentially dependent on the Charter.  
The  second  and  more  generally   accepted  view  is  that  any  problem  of interpretation is 
to be solved in line with the general direction and functions of the United Nations. This 
                                               
537 For personal view of the former President of the Court, see, Nagendra Singh, The Role and Record of the 
International Court of Justice: 1946 – 1988, in celebration of the 40th anniversary: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht,1989, 76-82 (more general in chapter five) also, compare with Renata Szafarz, The 
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrect, 1993 in 
particular at 1-14.  
538 Since  it  began  work  in  1946,  to  1996  the  ICJ  has  given  23  advisory  opinions  and  delivered  61 
judgments. The General Assembly has requested 14 advisory opinions of the Court 13 cases, for example, The 
Conditions of Admission of a State in the united Nations (Article 4 of the Charter); the Security Council has 
requested advisory opinion of the Court concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding security Council Resolution 276 
(1970); the ECOSOC has requested advisory opinions of the Court in two cases, one of them is the 
Applicability of the Article VI section 22 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations; the Executive Board of the UNESCO has requested advisory opinion of the Court in the case 
concerning Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints Made Against UNESCO; 
WHO has requested advisory opinions of the Court in two cases, one of them is the Interpretation of the 
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt. A complete list of advisory opinions can be found 
at <http://www.icj- cij.org/icjwww/ibasictext/advisoryopinions.htm> accessed 23 Oct 2001. Some of the Court’s 
decisions: the Provisional Measures in the Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention (Lockerbie Case - Libya Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) of 14 April 1992, Judgment of 30 
June 1995 on the Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application (The East Timor Case).A 
complete list of Court’s orders and judgments at: http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/casesbycountry.htm, 
accessed 17 Jan 2011. 
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outlook implies in its turn that the Statute would certainly be able to support a power of 
judicial review even if it was not mentioned in the Charter
.539
 
Article 24(2) of the Charter, for instance, states that the Security Council must exercise its 
power  “…in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. Elsewhere, 
the Charter requires that these purposes and principles be carried out “… by peaceful means 
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.” On the basis of these 
requests, the Court should possess the power of judicial review to examine legally, but not 
politically, whether the United Nations' recommendations have been duly implemented. 
 
As a Member of the United Nations, a State has the obligation to introduce international 
human rights principles and standards into its national law (articles 1, 55, 56 of the Charter). 
In accordance with this principle, it is not such a huge step to go one step further and also 
adopt measures so that the Court is able to examine whether or not the Security Council or a 
member State has fulfilled its obligation to the Charter in the field of human rights. 
 
The Statute emphasises that the Court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations 
(Article1). The Court’s competence is outlined in Chapter II and its jurisdiction specifically 
addressed in Article 36. Although no mention is made of any power of judicial review, it 
would certainly be acceptable for the Court to be entrusted with such a power as the principal 
judicial body at international level. As Sir Robert Jennings, a former president of the Court 
once maintained, it is only a matter of “… when and to what extent the Court might or should 
have powers of judicial review of administrative action and of political decision. These are 
not simple but rather complex questions of basic importance for the legal character of the 
United Nations; and it is a gratifying sign of the maturity of the system that they should be 
dealt with by the ICJ, one way or another.”540 
7.3 A New World Order541 
The call for the International Court of Justice to assume a more prominent role in settling 
international disputes as part of a new world order has never been so intense as it is to date. 
The role and function of the Court as ‘the principal judicial organ of the United Nations’ is 
                                               
539 Ken Roberts, “Second-Guessing the Security Council: The International Court of Justice and Its Powers of 
Judicial Review” in Pace International Law Review, spring 1995, 
http://www.igc.org/globalpolicy/wldcourt/roberts.htm, accessed 16 April 2012  
540 “The Role and Functioning of the Court” in ICJ Yearbook, 1992 – 93, 251. 
541 Generally, this refers to the post-Cold War era of the 1990s. 
  
180 
 
manifold: it is at once a court for the whole world, a judicial organ of the international legal 
order, a higher court on a world level and an instrument of world governance, which in turn 
has implications that go beyond the Court’s position within the international legal order.542 
 
Through its special contribution to the settlement of international disputes, the Court partakes 
in world governance by taking a preventive approach to the pursuit of the purposes of the 
United Nations, namely the maintenance of peace and security, which according to the UN 
charter should be done with ‘conformity with the principles of justice and international law’ 
whilst promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all, without distinction
543
. In playing this role, the Court attracts an ever-increasing volume of 
work and this testifies to its growing involvement in the establishment of a new world order 
and the development and evolution (novum) of international law.
544
 
 
In the cases Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark
545
) and Certain Phosphate 
Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia
546
) for instance, the perception that recourse to the Court 
might usefully have been employed at an earlier stage of the dispute has been more widely 
accepted. In those two cases the parties have settled their disputes out of court after pleading 
them before the ICJ. This kind of intervention of the Court can be said to partake of 
‘preventive diplomacy’ lato sensu by opening the way to a direct settlement of the dispute.547 
If it were entitled to practise judicial review, the Court may well be able to play that kind of 
role in preventing human rights violations caused UNSC Resolutions that failed to comply 
with human right standards.  In  the  words  of  Sir  Robert  Jennings:  “Whenever  the  Court  
or  its procedure can help in this way, the Court is, in an important sense, still productively at 
work.”548 
 
                                               
542 Cf,  ibid  note 539 
543 Article 1 UN Charter 
544 This is the era where the Court is beginning to be seen as ‘a resort to be employed in close relationship 
with normal diplomatic negotiations rather than as a last resort’ where all else has failed (Sir Robert 
Jennings’ address to the General Assembly as the president of the ICJ [UN Doc. A/48/PV.31] of 8 
November 1993). On the contributions made by the Court for the development of international law, see, 
Nagendra Singh, The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrect Boston, 1989, 137-164  
545 ICJ Reports, Yearbook 1992, 348. 
546 ICJ Reports, Yearbook 1993, 322. 
547 Georges Abi-Saab, “International Court as a World Court”, Ibid (n 536) 213 
548Ibid. (n)545, ICJ Yearbook 1992 – 93 
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8 The Source of Judicial Review 
In this particular part of the discussion, it will be suggested that the International Court of 
Justice may already possess powers of judicial review. In support of this argument, four 
possible sources of power will be examined: the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, historical facts or travaux preparatoires of the Charter and 
certain developments of case law.  
8.1 The U.N. Charter 
Chapter XIV of the Charter deals specifically with powers attributed to the International 
Court of Justice. Article 92 states that the Court shall be the principal judicial organ of the 
U.N. and shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute of the ICJ. By virtue of this 
article, especially the phrase "principal judicial organ", it may actually be implied that the 
Court possesses judicial review power if the States parties agree that there should be a 
judicial body with the authority to examine the validity of acts issued by other organs of State 
governments. However, it is obvious that no judicial review power can be based solely and 
directly on this provision of the Chapter
549
. Furthermore to review judicial decisions of the 
Security Council or any other organ of the UN it will require a change to the present statute, 
which is discussed in the following chapter. 
8.2 The Statute of the ICJ 
The next possible source of judicial review power for the Court is the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Article 1 of the Statute confirms the specific existence of the 
ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. The ‘complete’ competence of the 
Court is outlined in Chapter II while its jurisdiction is set down in Article 36. The connection 
between the Statute and the Charter is formalised by Article 92 of the Charter, which states 
that the Statute is an integral part of the Charter.  On the strength of this argument, the Statute 
would certainly be able to support the Court’s power of judicial review even if it did not exist 
in the Charter
550
. However, there is not a single paragraph or line in the Statute which 
mentions any power of judicial review in so many words. Once again, it can only be 
implicitly deduced from the phrase that the Court is the ‘principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations’. At best therefore, it is a potential role which the Court could play, but would 
                                               
549 Ken Roberts, Ibid, note 539.  
550 Ken Roberts, Ibid, note 539. 
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probably require some type of modification to the Statute in order to enshrine such a role 
from a legal perspective. 
8.3 Historical Facts 
The history of the U.N. Charter shows that there was originally a strong desire to grant the 
Court a power of judicial review, although the travaux preparatoires of the Charter in the San 
Francisco Conference on International Organisation was sternly against the idea. Belgium 
was the leading country proposing that a judicial review power should be given to the Court. 
The idea was based on the assumption that the Security Council might make decisions which 
would breach the rights of Member States, which it is submitted has come to pass with the 
inclusion of targeted sanctions lists at the UN level and forms the crux of this thesis. It was 
suggested that the proposed amendment would be added into the Charter's Chapter VI on the 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes. But this did not come to pass because it was feared that the 
Belgian Amendment would weaken the Security Council too much and that sufficient checks 
and balances were already in place within the charter itself to make this unnecessary.
551
 
 
Later on, still in the same Conference, Belgium once again raised the issue of empowering 
the Court with judicial review competence, but this time before the Committee on legal 
problems. The proposal was to establish a proper interpretative organ for certain parts of the 
Charter with the Court being the obvious possibility. The proposal was once again rejected on 
the ground that the General Assembly, the Court or ad hoc committees could perform the role 
themselves
552
. The French amendment, which strongly supported the idea of giving judicial 
power to the court, was also rejected
553
.  It was clear that although the majority of the 
participants were not in favour of giving full judicial review power to the Court but they were 
certainly not against the procedure per se. The Charter itself recognises judicial review-like 
practices in case Member States disagree with each other about the interpretation of the 
Charter. The Court will then be asked for its advisory opinion on the matter. Therefore, it can 
                                               
551 Proposal  at  the  San  Francisco  Conference  in  International  Organisation,  UN  Doc.  433/III/2/15  or 
Conference (UNCIO) Documents Nos. 47 and 48 (1945). 
552 UN Doc. 664, IV/2/33, UNCIO Doc. 633 (1945). 
553 That was a concept made by the French delegation to the Conference, suggesting points similar to that of 
Belgium’s. 
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be argued that the final Charter itself gave rise to the idea of the establishment of permanent 
judicial review procedure, despite the views of the conference at the time.
554
 
8.4 The Development of Judicial Review in Case Law 
Examples of the Court’s power of judicial review can also be found in the decisions of the 
Court in certain cases. 
a. Certain Expenses Case 
In this case, the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the Court on whether 
Member States had to pay expenses related to the United Nations operations in Congo in 
1960-61 and in the Middle East in 1950. The requested opinion was about Article 17(2) of 
the Charter which stated that the “expenses of the Organisation [should] be borne by Member 
States as apportioned by the General Assembly”. The question was whether or not this rule 
included expenses incurred by such operations. The opinion of the Court was basically in 
support of the view that each organ must determine its own jurisdiction.
555
 It called for the 
Court to decide first whether the expenditures authorised by the General Assembly were in 
conformity with the Charter. Despite the fact that the request was not granted, the Court 
reserved for itself, if it so wished, the right to examine whether the act of the General 
Assembly was in line with the Charter provisions. 
 
The Court’s statement was that as long as the act fulfilled one of the stated purposes, "the 
presumption [was] that such action [was] not ultra vires." It would appear that the Court 
reserved for itself the power to review the validity of actions taken by the organs of the 
United Nations. Since then the ‘presumption of validity’ has served as the Court’s standard of 
review.
556
 
b. The Namibia Case 
In this case, the Court was asked for advisory opinion on the Security Council Resolution No. 
270 demanding South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia because, due to its apartheid 
                                               
554 Ken Roberts, ibid (n 539) 6. 
555 Certain Expenses Case, (ICJ Report, 1962) 168. 
556 Ken Roberts, ibid  (n 539) 7. 
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practices, it had violated the Mandate that it had been given.
557
 The resolution thus put an end 
to the Mandate. The Court’s opinion on this case was that the Council had not violated the 
‘presumption of validity’ principle in its resolution despite claims by France and South Africa 
that the Council's decisions were ultra vires.
558
 
 
This opinion reflects the view that the Court, when asked to do so, may not avoid putting to 
the test the legality or validity of any resolution made by any organ of the United Nations. 
 
c.  Lockerbie Case (Provisional Measures) 
 
In this case the Court was asked once again to give its advisory opinion based on the suits 
filed by Libya against the U.S. and the U.K. alleging that both states had violated the 
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation (Sabotage) of 1971 by continuing to attempt to gain custody of two Libyan nationals 
implicated in the case. In its application, Libya argued that the Security Council resolutions
559
  
regarding the bombing incident, upon which the U.S. and the U.K. based their demands, were 
ultra vires because they violated Article 7 of the said Montreal Convention.  It  further  asked  
the  Court  to  order  provisional  measures  regarding  the imposition of sanctions.
560
 
 
Article 7 of the Montreal Convention, recognising the aut dedere aut judicare principle, 
establishes that the country of origin of the suspects of air sabotage may choose either to 
surrender its nationals to foreign jurisdiction for trial or to have its own court procedure. On 
14 April 1992 the Court, in relation to the refusal to comply with Resolution 731, ruled that:  
 
the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention…were not appropriate for 
protection by the indication of provisional measures; an indication  of the measures 
requested by Libya would be likely to impair the rights which appear prima facie to 
                                               
557 Mandate of the League of Nations authorising South Africa to administer the so-called Mandate for 
Namibia in the territory then known as South-West Africa following World War I. 
558 Namibia Case, ICJ Reports 1971, 53.  
559Security Council Resolution 731 on 21 January 1992 requested that Libya surrender its two nationals 
involved in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland [UN Doc. S/Res. 731 (1992)] and 
Resolution 748 adopted on 31 March 1992, imposing universal and mandatory diplomatic and economic 
sanctions on Libya [UN Doc. S/Res./748 (1992)]. 
560 Letter from Ibrahim M. Bishari, the Secretary of State of Libya, to the ICJ dated 3 March 1992. 
  
185 
 
be enjoyed by the two respondent States (the U.S. and the U.K.) by virtue of Security 
Council Resolution 748.
561
 
 
In conjunction with Resolution 748 particularly, the Libyan application essentially left the 
Court with three jurisprudential options. Firstly, it could have maintained that the sanctions 
ordered by Resolution 748 should be suspended until such time as the merits of the claim 
might be ascertained, after which, the claim could have been declared groundless. Secondly, 
it could have decided that since no sufficient case of mala fides or ultra vires had been 
established by Libya at this preliminary stage, there were no grounds upon which the Court 
could order such interim relief. Or thirdly, the Court could have declared that no relief would 
be forthcoming at any stage of the proceedings if granting that relief would require the Court 
to find out whether the Security Council had exceeded its Charter-mandated power (Chapter 
VII). It is obvious that the first two choices imply the right of judicial review whereas the 
third implies judicial restraint or abdication.
562
 
 
So what did the Court choose in the end? It appears that the Court chose a soft version of the 
second option. The majority (11-5 votes) of the Court found that “both Libya and the United 
States, as Members of the United Nations, [were] obliged to accept and carry out the  
obligations  imposed  by  Security  Council  in  accordance  with  Article  25  of  the 
Charter”, including obligations contained in Resolution 748. It further concluded that “the 
obligations of the Parties in that respect [prevailed] over their obligations under any other 
international agreement, including the Montreal Convention.”563  
 
Before handing down judgment, the Court was once again minded to decide the matter  in  
the  judicial  review-like  manner  in  which  it  examined  the  lawfulness  and conformity  of  
the Council  resolutions with the Charter and the 1971 Montreal Convention. 
 
d. Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
 
                                               
561 Lockerbie Case (Libya v. U.K.), (ICJ Reports 1992) 29. 
562 Thomas  M.  Franck,  The  Powers  of  Appreciation: who  is  the  ultimate  guardian  of  UN 
legality? American Journal of International Law, July 1992, 14-28, http://www.globalpolicy.org/ 
wldcourt/franck.htm. Accessed 28 March 2011. 
563 Thomas  M.  Franck, Ibid, 23. 
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In  March  1993  Bosnia-Herzegovina  submitted  an  application  to  the  Court  seeking 
provisional measures in order to stop Yugoslavian acts of genocide. In response to this 
request, the Court ordered Yugoslavia to stop any genocidal actions and also indicated further 
measures that needed to be taken.
564
 However, this order could not stop the violence and so 
another request was filed with the Court by Bosnia-Herzegovina on 27 July 1993 asking that 
the Security Council’s Weapon Embargo Resolution 713 in 1991 be declared invalid. 
 
The  resolution  was  adopted  when  Bosnia-Herzegovina  was  still  part  of  federated 
Yugoslavia, but  by 1993 it had split into two different states. Bosnia-Herzegovina based its 
argument on the fact that due to the weapon embargo imposed through the resolution, it could 
not defend itself against Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was clearly taking advantage of the 
provisions in the resolution. However, these provisions were in breach of Bosnia-
Herzegovina's inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter in particular and 
customary law in general. 
 
This request led to a second order of the Court on 13 September 1993. In this decision, one of 
the  central issues considered by the Court was whether the weapon embargo provisions set 
forth in the Security Council Resolution 713 were valid or not. This time again, the Court 
could not avoid reviewing the validity of the Resolution, using as basis, not only the Charter, 
but also the principles of customary international law e.g.  jus cogens
565
. This proves that 
there have been cases dealt with by the Court in the manner of judicial review. Thus, without 
explicit power entrusted to it, the Court has been using judicial review procedure in its 
journey of work to settle international disputes. 
 
In addition, there are also statements or opinions from experts and judges in favour of the 
judicial review power of the Court.
566
 Judge Bedjaoui, for example, favouring the judicial 
power of the Court as opposed to the dominating power of the Security Council, asserted that 
a degree of balance should be achieved and that "the Court should not be displaced from 
                                               
564 Court Order on the case, 8 April 1993, see, Bosnia-Herzegovina v Yugoslavia ICJ Reports 1993, 332. 
565Ad hoc Judge Lauterpacht, for example, asserted that the prohibition against genocide has long been 
established as a principle of jus cogens. See, ICJ Reports 1993, at  440. 
566 Brief quotations of these opinions can be read, for example, in Ken Roberts’ Second-Guessing the 
Security Council: the International Court of Justice and its Powers of Judicial Review supra note 539, at 10 –
15. 
  
187 
 
exercising its primary judicial function." He felt that its primary judicial function should 
include judicial review power on legislative acts and actions
567
. 
 
In light of the cases mentioned above, it appears that from now on, there is increasing 
inevitability for the Court to be granted powers of judicial review.  
9  Summary 
Whilst traditionally it was State acts and actions have become the main cause of gross 
violations of human rights, there is now added to this the threat of the UN Security Council 
itself acting in a quasi-judicial/legislative role without any form of insight or review. Abusive 
acts and actions often assume the form of alleged legitimate action, i.e. the fight against 
terrorism, through resolution or legislative enactments. By issuing edicts or laws that abuse 
human rights, it appears that UN and member States are attempting to legitimise their 
misconduct which violates the rights of individuals. 
Despite the availability of a number of international procedures for the protection of human  
rights  against  abusive  acts  or  regulations,  these  provisions  may  still  be regarded as 
insufficient due to the limitations of these measures and the unwillingness of those involved 
at the decision making level to comply with international human rights standards. The 
decisions by the UN made under such procedures are legally binding on the States parties. 
The present UN Committees, should they disagree with these concluding remarks, are not 
courts in the true sense. They do not hand down judgments, they merely give their opinions 
or views in which recommendations and suggestions are formulated. Neither do they have 
authority to review the actions of the UN itself. The implementation of these 
recommendations heavily depends on the willingness of the State party, despite the fact that 
their contents can be very specific (e.g. amendment of legislation). 
 
Other major weaknesses in the implementation of this system are time and tangible as well as 
intangible costs, e.g. feelings of frustration. This is mainly caused by the individual’s 
endeavour to meet the requirement of ‘exhaustion of all domestic legal avenues’. Having to 
first trail through years of domestic legal procedures can cause an individual more suffering 
than the initial human rights abuse. This aberration can be found even amongst countries 
                                               
567 Ibid, at 16. 
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where legal systems provide for adequate procedures for individuals claiming that their 
rights, according to internationally recognised standards, have been violated
568.
  
 
Therefore, it is time to make another procedure available to individuals, in addition to the 
already existing instruments, so that the UNSC itself may be made accountable for its actions 
in relation to alleged violations of its own internationally accepted human rights 
obligations
569.
 Hopefully, this measure will be able to better protect individuals against the 
excesses of the Security Council in exercising its legislative and executive functions. The 
proposed procedure is for the international judicial review of the United Nations Security 
Council in respect of Resolutions passed that targeted an individual or other entity and that 
breach their human rights. 
 
Any decision coming from this procedure will be legally binding and have legal force on all 
Member States of the United Nations because it will be issued by the International Court of 
Justice. By becoming part of the United Nations, every Member State recognises the judicial 
competence of the ICJ to hand down judgment as the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. 
 
It is of course true that at this stage, there is no explicit legal basis for the Court to hold a 
power of judicial review of the types of cases discussed. However as the principal judicial 
organ of the UN and on the strength of its own jurisprudence over nearly 70 years, it is no 
longer inconceivable the ICJ could not be given such a power. When one considers all of the 
recent developments in international law concerning the rights of the individual, then such as 
power to review or appeal these specific cases is needed. 
                                               
568 See case comment on HM Treasury v A (and others) [2010] UKSC 2 with regard to the hardships found by 
those subjected to asset freezing in the UK 
569 For a discussion on the role of the ICJ in relation to UN sanctions see, Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects 
of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, The European 
Journal of International Law Vol. 16 no. EJIL 2006, for discussion on the role of the ICJ generally see, A.  
Zimmermann, C.  Tomuschat,  and K. Oellers-Frahm, (eds). The Statute of the International Court of Justice, A 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006; Shabtai Rosenne, The Law And Practice of The 
International Court, 1920-2005, Martinus Nijhoff, 4th Revised edition, 2006. Matheson, Michael J. Matherson, 
‘Judicial Review in International Organizations: ICJ Review of Security Council Decisions’ 36 George 
Washington ILR, (2004) 615–622. 
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CHAPTER 9 
A PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
1 Preliminary Remarks 
The previous chapters have outlined the case for the need of an international judicial review 
and appeal procedure in relation to Security Council targeted or smart sanctions. This is 
necessary in order to complement the other existing international procedures for dealing with 
individual complaints of human rights violations as none of the existing procedures allow for 
an individual or entity to challenge any acts of the United Nations Security Council, even 
when the Security Council appears to have taken on a hybrid quasi-judicial role. This is 
because at present the Security Council both makes the accusations against those named on 
the sanctions lists whom have alleged terrorist connections (analogous to the role of the 
executive branch) and imposes asset seizures and travel bans on those so named (a judicial 
function). This requires the individual to have both an effective judicial review mechanism to 
examine the evidence against them and an appeal procedure to contest the result of those 
findings. This is necessary in order for the UNSC to comply with the principles of justice and 
international law encompassed within the UN charter (article 1) and with internationally 
accepted human rights standards, (that can be implied from article 3). Whilst there is much 
debate over the legality of the UNSC to act in this manner, in the first place, with several 
commentators suggesting the Security Council has acted in an ultra vires manner in relation 
to its own Charter powers this is not the focus herein. This author takes the view that legality 
issues aside, the focus must be on developing a lawful, pragmatic solution to the situation 
which complies with international law. 
1.1 Dealing with Article 103 UN Charter 
As previously mentioned Article 103 states the following; 
 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail 
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Article 103 has been the source of much comment
570
 regarding human rights violations in 
respect of UNSC resolutions by academics and the judiciary (see chapter 4). Whether under 
the Articles of Responsibility of International Organisations discussed in chapter 7 it could 
still be used to circumvent breaches of international law is still has to be seen given that the 
draft articles were only introduced in late 2011. Article 103 would not be of concern to the 
reformed ICJ even if it has been such a hindrance to national and regional courts in the past 
when they have considered cases involving the United Nations Security Council for the 
following reasons; 
 
1. Article 103 only applies to a State’s obligations with its compliance under the UN 
charter, such as following UNSC resolutions with any other international treaty it is 
part to, such as the European Convention on Human rights. It therefore would not 
apply to the ICJ which is formed as an organ of the United Nations and therefore not 
in conflict with any other treaty obligations as it like the UNSC is not a signatory to 
any such treaty. 
 
2. The article only applies to other ‘international treaties’ the court would in any event 
be exercising human rights as define by the rights outlined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which are now widely considered customary international law in conjunction 
with the principles of the UN to respect and promote human rights norms. 
 
3. Article 103 would not be applicable where the Security Council resolution in question 
is made outside its own powers (ultra vires) for example by not pursuing the purposes 
of the UN charter, which include respect for and promotion of human rights norms, a 
it only applies where there is a conflict to the legitimate aims of the UN. 
  
The Courts main function in its role of judicial review/appeal in these limited cases would be 
to balance the UN’s objectives of maintaining peace and security, with promoting human 
rights. These are not mutually exclusive and when considering any application brought under 
the revised procedure, the Court would act in similar manner to that of a domestic court in the 
balancing of rights as they consider any complaint.  The ICJ would do this as a comparative 
                                               
570 See n115 
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organ of the UN, which is of equal standing of the Security Council, established under the 
same charter. The ICJ would simply be given the additional function of judicial review in 
these limited circumstances as outlined in the previous chapter. 
1.2 Proposal for ICJ to Provide Judicial Review/Appeal function 
It is suggested that in cases involving those subjected to UNSC smart or targeted sanctions 
the powers of judicial review and appeal should be entrusted to the International Court of 
Justice as a body most qualified and capable of executing this task. It has already been 
demonstrated that this role has to a greater extent already been used by the ICJ in various 
judgements handed down by the Court. This appears to be a logical, if contentious, extension 
of the court’s role. Logically, the next question is: “How would this procedure operate and 
which potential procedural rules are required?” 
These questions are narrowly connected to certain issues such as who may bring an action 
before the Court, the conditions relating to the admissibility of an application and 
identifying the different procedural stages.  However, of utmost importance, is identifying 
the parties to the procedure. This issue is related to the inherent problem that this study 
needs to address, namely, can an individual person or a group of people, other than a State, 
be party to a case before the International Court of Justice? Further, can a person or a 
group of people eligible to submit a petition to the Court? This question needs to be 
answered satisfactorily before other queries are discussed. 
 
Although this chapter will be dealing with these issues, it should be noted that the rules 
and stages of procedure proposed in this section are not conclusive. At this stage, they exist 
as a hypothesis only but one formulated with regard to the standard procedures generally 
adopted for the petitions which are brought before the International Court of Justice and its 
existing Committees. The author is keenly aware that this would also require the considerable 
political will of the membership, particularly amongst members of the Security Council.  
2 Who Can Bring a Case to the Court? 
2.1 Preliminary Remarks 
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Article 34(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
571
 confirms that only States 
are eligible to initiate proceedings before the Court. International organisations, other 
collectives and private persons are not entitled to bring a case to the Court. All Member 
States of the United Nations are entitled to be heard before the court.
572
 
 
Under no circumstances is an individual, a private person or a group of people allowed to 
bring a petition i.e. fo r  t hem to  have any locus standi before the Court. The only 
possible way of permitting individuals or groups to submit an application b e f o r e  the 
Court is via amendment to the Statute. It can be amended only in the same way as the 
Charter, i.e. by a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly and ratification by 
two-thirds of member States, including the permanent members of the Security Council.
573  
Should the ICJ consider it desirable for its Statute to be amended, it must submit a 
proposal to this effect to the General  Assembly  by  means  of  written  communication  
addressed  to  the  Secretary- General
574
. 
2.2 How the ICJ Statute Could be Amended 
The amendment  proposal  should,  in  the  first  instance,  apply  to  Article  34(1)  which 
declares that “only states may be parties in cases before the Court”. It should also be added 
to this particular paragraph of the article that individuals shou ld also be entitled to 
submit their cases to the Court, but only if they have a complaint in relation to their human 
rights following inclusion on a sanctions list proposed by the United Nation as a result of 
UNSC resolutions. (This issue will be discussed in the conclusion to this study to consider 
whether this could be expanded to include a wider ambit of other human rights violations). 
The complaint maybe either, that the association to terrorism is wrong, or that the sanctions 
imposed have exceeded that which the Security Council intended, such as banning travel for 
family and friends, or seizing assets not owned directly. 
2.3 Further Required Adaption of the ICJ Statute 
                                               
571 For full details of the Courts Statute see the International Court of justice home page at; http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0, assessed 19 June 2010. 
572 See “Who can bring a case”, ICJ homepage at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/iba…sictext/ibasic_who 
bringcases.html, accessed: 21/03/2011. 
573 Article 108 of Charter of the United Nations in conjunction with Article 69 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
574 Article 70 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
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However, this formulation still needs to be extended further since, in this context, individual 
persons would be severely limited to bringing only those cases before the Court involving 
petitions specifically related to violation of international human rights relating to Security 
Council Resolutions. This necessarily leads to the next step of the amendment proposal; 
namely the addition of another paragraph to Article 34 stipulating the specific type of 
instances in which a private person, or a group of people, may submit a petition to the Court 
to institute a judicial review procedure. 
 
The additional paragraph would then read “The Court, subject to and in conformity with 
its Rules and other applicable international provisions of human rights, may hear and 
decide communications brought to it by individuals, or a group, or groups of people, 
seeking judicial review of, or appeal against, decisions made by the Security Council, to 
which they are subject, alleging that this act and/or resolut ion is in contravention of 
international human rights provisions”. 
3 Proposed Changes to the ICJ Statute 
In full, the proposed amendments to Chapter II encompassing Articles 34 to 38 (proposed 
amendments shown in bold type) would read as follows: 
 
Chapter II Competence of the Court 
 
Article 34 
 
1. States and in specific circumstances, in relation to acts of the Security Council,  
individuals, or a group, or groups of people may be parties in cases before the Court. 
 
2.  The Court, subject to, and in conformity with its Rules, and other applicable 
international provisions of human rights norms, may hear and decide 
communications brought to it by individuals, or a group, or groups of people 
seeking judicial review, or appeal against decisions made by the Security 
Council, to which they are subject, alleging that this act and/or resolution is in 
contravention of international human rights provisions. 
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3.  Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present Statute remain, but now become paragraphs 3 and 4. 
Article 35 --- unchanged ---  
 
One cannot dismiss, however, the issue of whether such an amendment is in any way 
realistic or likely. In response, it could be argued that it certainly is, because the Statute is 
not sacrosanct and can, and in fact has, been amended. Within the Court itself, amendments 
are by no means “taboo”, firstly by virtue of Articles 69 and 70 of the Statute and secondly, 
because it has already happened to the Rules of Court twice.
575
 One might wryly comment on 
the universality of change, and the need for change, in accordance with the prosaic reality of 
panta rhei, or note, more simply, that ‘Everything changes.’ 
3.1 Is Such a Change Legally Possible? 
A more apposite question perhaps, may be the likelihood of such a change taking place in the 
near future. This is, of course, entirely dependent on whether there is sufficiently strong 
political support from the international community for such a paradigm shift, but as noted 
earlier these changes have already begun to appear on the international horizon. 
What is needed is the impetus that has been the driving power behind the creation of the 
International Criminal Court. The maxim ‘where there is a will there is a way’ will find its 
true meaning in this exceptionally challenging situation. One could also say that desperate 
cases require desperate remedies. In addition to this, if one takes into account the results that 
have been achieved so far in trying to secure the protection of human rights under existing 
mechanisms, one realises that the will for change by the international cummunity already 
exists and requires only implementation to become reality. 
Failure to act may well lead to further embarrassing situations which threaten to undermine 
the authority and integrity of the UNSC such as can be said to have occurred in the case of 
Kadi. 
576
Much has been written on these proceedings and it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
                                               
575 The first amendment was in 1972. The latest took place on 5 December 2000 and constitutes a revision of 
Articles 79 and 80 of the Rules of Court of 14 April 1978, and entered into force on 1 February 2001. Details 
of the changes can be seen in the Background Note by the Registry at htt://www.icj-cij.org 
/icjwww/ibas…ic_RulesofCourtbackgroundNote.htm, accessed 26/10/2011. 
 
576 Case C-402/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, see discussion on this and others in chapter 4. 
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discuss this matter in great detail
577
. It should be noted however that throughout the eleven 
years that Mr Kadi was listed and subjected to UN sanctions it may appear that the European 
Court of Justice contravened the will of the UNSC on two separate occasions, certainly many 
commentators have suggested this, due to its finding of a breach of human rights and a lack 
of judicial remedy available to him. However the European Union did not actually defy the 
will of the Security Council as Mr Kadi remained on the sanctions list throughout until as 
previously mentioned he was removed from the sanctions list on 5 October 2012.  
 
4 Stages of the Procedure 
Applications to the Court for judicial review should be dealt with under the proceedings of 
contentious and not of advisory cases. The stages of the proposed judicial review procedure 
would, therefore comprise three inseparable examination processes: receipt of 
communication, determination of the admissibility of communication and delivery of 
judgment
578
.
 
A further amendment to the Rules of Court would be necessary to accommodate these 
stages of procedure, for the present Rules do not make provisions for this procedure. 
Materiae of this possible amendment should cover the following issues. 
4.1  Receipt of Communication 
By virtue  of  the  provisions  set  out  in  the  present  Statute  and  Rules  of  Court,  all 
communications  with  the  Court  must  be  channelled  through  the  Registrar
579
.
   
In this 
proposed procedure, too, the Registrar should carry out his function accordingly. This 
                                               
577 For a further detailed discussion and case comment on Kadi case see; A Tzanakopoulo, Disobeying the 
Security Council Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions 2011, OUP, J Almquist, ‘A Human Rights 
Critique of European Judicial Review’: counter-terrorism sanctions’ (2008) ICLQ 57(2), 303-331, Amandine G, 
Cambridge Law Journal, 2006, Case Comment, ‘Is it really for the European Community to implement anti-
terrorism UN Security Council resolutions?’ C.L.J. 2006, 65(2), 281, A Aust: Kadi: ignoring international legal 
obligations. I.O.L.R. 2009, 6(1), 293-298, A Bianchi, ‘Security Council’s Anti-terror Resolutions and their 
Implementation by Member States: An Overview’, (2006) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1044, and A 
Bianchi, Assessing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council's anti-terrorism measures: the quest for 
legitimacy and cohesion. E.J.I.L. 2006, 17(5), 881-919, R Brown , Case Comment, Kadi v Council of the 
European Union and Commission of the European Communities: executive power and judicial supervision at 
European level, E.H.R.L.R. 2006, 4, 456, G Harpaz , Judicial review by the European Court of Justice of UN 
"smart sanctions" against terror in the Kadi dispute, E.F.A. Rev. 2009, 14(1), 65-88, C Tomuschat C, Case 
Analysis, 2006, 42 C.M.L.Rev. 5 
578 Details on the Proceedings before the Court are provided by: Chapter III, Articles 39 – 64 of the Statute and 
Part III,  Articles  30  –  101  0f  the  Rules  of  Court.  Details on the examination procedure under treaty 
monitoring bodies, refer to discussion in Chapter 6 
579 Articles 40 of the Statute, 26(1)(a), 30 and 31 of the Rules of Court. 
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procedure would either replace or enhance the role of the UN Ombudsperson (the current 
role and procedure of the Ombudsperson for those subjected to UN ‘targeted’ Sanctions is 
discussed in detail in chapter three) or alternatively, the registrar could work in conjunction 
with her office for those cases specifically involving UN Security Council Sanctions from 
the 1267 Committee. 
In accordance with Article 40 of the Statute, on receipt of a communication, the Registrar 
will forward it to all the parties’ concerned (paragraph 1). 
  
As noted, all communications including memorials, counter-memorials, replies and other 
documents in support of the evidence shall be addressed to the Registrar before the latter 
transmits them to all the parties concerned. An exception to this rule is made under 
Article 30(1) of the Rules of Court which states that “any request made by a party shall 
be addressed to the Registrar unless made in the course of the oral proceedings.”  
 
Pursuant to Articles 23 and 27 of the Rules of Court, a Deputy-Registrar shall assist the 
Registrar in the exercise of his function. Article 27 rules that if both the Registrar and the 
Deputy-Registrar are unable to carry out their duties, the President of the Court shall 
appoint an official of the Registry to discharge those functions for a period of time as may 
be necessary (paragraph 1). 
 
At present the Registrar is not permitted to request additional information relating to the 
application from the parties to a case. Under Article 31 of Rules of Court, the President shall, 
in every case submitted to the Court, ascertain the views of the parties with regard to 
questions of procedure. For this purpose, he or she, shall summon the agents, or 
representatives, of the parties to meet him, or her, as soon as possible after their 
appointment, and whenever necessary, thereafter. This first phase of procedure may be 
called ‘registration of application’. 
4.2 Admissibility of Communication 
In order to decide whether a judicial review communication is admissible or not, the Court 
would base its judgment on certain conditions. Rules concerning the admissibility 
requirements of such judicial review communications should be added to the Rules of Court. 
The present Rules of Court do not make any provision in this regard. With some adjustments, 
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(by using the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR as a model), the rules of the admissibility of 
communications could be stipulated as follows: 
a)  The communication must be compatible with the competence of the Court in 
accordance with (proposed) Article 34(2) of the Statute (i.e. to review UNSC 
Resolutions in respect of an individual or other entity that are allegedly in violation of 
international human rights provisions); 
b)  The communication must allege a violation of specific human rights provisions 
contained within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and/or other accepted 
international human rights documents as deemed applicable by the Court
580
; 
c)   The communication must be in writing; 
d)  The communication must come from an individual entity or a group or groups of 
people subject to the UNSC resolution complained of; 
e)  The communication must not be an “abuse of rights of submission” (that is, it 
should have facts or law to support the claim); 
f)   The communication must not be anonymous; 
g)  The violation referred to in the communication; although under examination by 
another international investigation, or settlement procedure, may still simultaneously 
be submitted to the Court
581. 
The first two requirements specify the characteristics of the cases that the Court will consider, 
namely that it must be a request to review an act, or resolution, from the UNSC the purpose 
of which is to clarify whether or not the Security Council has acted lawfully and is not in 
breach of its own human rights standards. Consequently, the submission of other 
communications which do not conform to the proposed Article 34(2) of the Statute will be 
rejected. Moreover, in such communications, it is not permitted to include any political 
motives or context as a basis for the Court’s consideration. The basis for consideration is 
legal only if it concerns the wording or interpretation of the resolutions, although the Court 
may consider how it has been interpreted by a national court or government and whether that 
interpretation has complied with the terms of the resolution. Therefore only those actions or 
                                               
580 That is, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights together with its two Optional Protocols and the Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
581 See and compare with Sarah Pritchard and Naomi Sharp, Communicating with the Human Rights 
Committee; a guide to the  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and political Rights (Human 
Rights Booklet No. 1) Sydney, Australian Human Right Information Centre, Faculty of Law UNSW 1996 
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laws legally in force as a direct result of the imposition and communication of Security 
Council Resolutions may be scrutinised. 
 
Furthermore, no communication will be declared admissible if it is not submitted in writing 
together with all necessary documents such as any official text and interpretation (where 
applicable) of the legislation in support of the communication. Oral communications will not 
be permitted. Although there will be no official or fixed form of written communication, a 
model communication shall be developed by the Court for efficiency's sake
582
. 
 
Individuals, or a group, or groups of people, or their representatives requesting judicial 
review from the Court must support their applications with strong evidence which clearly 
demonstrates the actual violation of an international human rights norms that are a direct 
result from Security Council Resolution
583
. Failure to meet this requirement leads to a 
declaration of inadmissibility. The said evidence should consist of a detailed explanation of 
the UNSC Resolution and how it has been interpreted by the national legal system, (this 
could include examination of any court decisions and other relevant decrees or regulations 
whose enactment alone may violate international human rights). To assist the Court in its 
examination, the evidence shall be provided in the original language, English and French.
584 
The author(s) must be clearly identified when submitting communications to the Court. 
No anonymous communications will be accepted. In the case of a communication being 
submitted by an individual, his or her name and signature must be clearly written at the 
end of the document. Where possible, the position, occupation and other relevant details of 
the individual are specified. If a communication is brought to the attention of the Court by a 
group or groups of people, the head and the secretary of the group, or other members 
appointed specifically for that purpose, are to sign the application. In the former situation, 
the individual concerned must enclose proof of personal identification while, in the latter 
situation, all members of the group(s) must put their signature to the letter of authorisation. 
 
If a communication invoking judicial review of the Court has already been submitted, be 
it by a private person, a group or groups of people, the same application will not be 
accepted a second time. This is understandable since this subsequent communication will be 
                                               
582 For a comparative purpose, see model communication developed under Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, at 
appendix three 
583 See for example the discussion on HM Treasury v A (and others) [2010] UKSC 2 in Chapter 4 
584 Article 39(1) rule, that the official languages of the Court shall be French and English. 
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seeking the same rule or order from the Court, namely to declare that the act or legislation 
is in breach of the human rights documents already stated and must therefore be modified or 
ceased in order to accord with internationally accepted human rights standards prevuosly 
discussed. 
 
The Court will decide this matter with the assistance of the screening function performed 
by the Registrar. In order to assist the Registrar to carry out this function, a summary of 
the communication needs to be completed by its authors. In this summary, the applicant 
should briefly explain what the complaint is all about (ratione materiae), who the parties 
are (ratione personae) and when the violation took place (ratione temporis). This last 
point is clearly related to the time when the legislation comes into force. 
 
If it is discovered that a communication pursues the same objectives as an earlier one, the 
Registrar will let all parties concerned know that the initial communication is currently 
being examined or has been examined by the Court and that, for this reason, the later 
communication will not be considered.  In deciding the matter the Registrar only needs to 
consult the Judge(s) assigned for that specific purpose and not necessarily via the process of 
the official hearing then these matters can be dispensed with by an interlocutory process 
rather than a full or formal hearing585.
 
The entire process of determining the admissibility 
of an application at this particular stage can be referred to as pre-trial proceeding, which 
was the case with the trial of the former president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic.586 
4.3 Determination of the Merits of Communication and Delivery of Judgment 
As is the case for treaty-based procedures, once the Court has decided that the 
communication is admissible, the parties concerned are asked to explain the problem in detail 
and to indicate whether anything has been done to resolve it. It may be that, during the period 
of registration of communication and pre-trial proceeding, the UNSC has changed its listings 
and removed the complainant or has put into place a new procedure under which the validity 
of the provisions  may be suitably reviewed to comply with the standards required under 
                                               
585 Compare with the Proceedings before the Chambers as laid down in Articles 26 and 29 of the Statute 
and Articles 90 – 93 of the Rules of Court. 
586 In one of the many Court’s pre-trial hearing in: Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, IT‐02‐54‐AR108bis & 
AR73. Mr Milosevic denied as unfounded all the charges put to him by the Prosecutor, Ms Del Ponte. This 
type of proceeding could also be instituted to determine the admissibility of judicial review applications 
brought before the Court by individuals, or a group, or groups of people. 
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international human rights standards. If this occurs then this will not bring to an end the 
proceedings if the parties wish to claim for damages as a result of the procedure already in 
place. 
Alternatively, it may also be that the UNSC wishes to counter the argumentation upon 
which the application is based. In countering the applicant's argumentation, for example, 
the Security Council may present evidence indicating that the application is legally 
unfounded due to abuses  of ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione personae,  
or  that  the  same  application  is  currently  being  examined  under  the  same procedure. 
In such cases, the Court will refer the matter back to the pre-trial Judges and the latter will 
decide it in Chamber-type proceedings (see above). 
 
According to Article 30 of the Rules of Court, all these disputes must go through the 
Registrar if the parties intend to put down their differences in writing. If the parties wish 
otherwise, they can also explain their case orally and the Registrar will document the 
proceedings accordingly587.
 
 
Once all these issues have been sorted out, the Court shall proceed to the next step of the 
procedure, which would be referred to as a determination proceeding. According to 
Article 43 of the Statute, the Court proceeding exists under two forms: written and oral 
(par. 1). The written proceeding shall consist of the communication to the Court and to 
the parties of memorials, counter-memorials and, if necessary, replies; also of all papers 
and documents in support of the evidence (par. 2) and all these shall be made through the 
Registrar in the order and within the time determined by the Court (par. 3). The oral 
proceeding shall consist of the hearing by the Court of witnesses, experts, agents or 
representatives, counsel and advocates (par. 5). 
 
Both the oral and written proceedings can be referred to as an examination of evidence 
proceeding.  In  this  examination  proceeding,  the  Court  will  gather  all  the  relevant 
information that it will use later on as a basis for its judgment directly from the parties 
involved, including witnesses and experts. Unlike proceedings under treaty-based procedures, 
the Court will collect this information not only in writing but also orally. In the examination 
                                               
587 The complete rules of written proceedings are set forth in Subsection 2, Articles 44 – 53 whilst the 
complete rules concerning oral proceedings provides Subsection 3, Articles 54 – 72 of the present rules of 
Court. 
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procedure under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, for instance, the HRC does not hear 
oral testimonies and relies solely on the written information provided by the author of 
communication or State party, as well as relevant supporting documentation.
588
 
 
The Court  should  set  a  general  rule  as  to  which  types  of  evidence  it  will  consider 
admissible. Such a rule will serve only as a guideline. Amongst other things, the Court could 
make provision that any information or documentation can be regarded as evidence as long 
as it has a direct connection with the case. The information or documentation might 
include statements from the parties including their witnesses and experts, medical and/or 
psychiatric reports, texts of domestic court judgments and texts of relevant laws, policies, 
and codes of practice, guidelines, decrees, executive orders and other relevant documents. 
 
Like the procedure before the Committees, the burden of proof should not rest upon the 
applicant alone. Often, evidential information is far more accessible to the Security Council 
than the applicant. The burden of proof should, therefore, also rest upon the Council. 
However, the applicant must at least be able to establish that there is prima facie a case to be 
heard.
589 
 
The Court should also determine the standard of proof it will use in the procedure. Unlike 
the standard of proof under treaty-based procedures, which is the “balance of probabilities”, 
the Court must at least measure its decision by the higher standard of “beyond reasonable 
doubt”.590 
When all these proceedings have been completed, the Court may deliver its judgment. 
But prior to handing down judgment, the Court shall, as in a normal court of law, hold 
deliberation sessions. These should be held in closed meetings and not be open to the 
public.
591  
By virtue of the provisions of the present Rules of Court, when the Court has 
completed its deliberations and subsequently adopted its judgment, the parties shall be 
notified of the date on which it will be read and this should take place in a session which is 
open to the public.
592 
                                               
588 See discussion on the procedures before various Committees in Chapter 6. 
589 See note 581 above. 
590 See note 581 above at para 22 
591 Compare with Article 54 of the present Statute of the Court. 
592 By virtue of, and compare with, Article 58 of the Statute and Article 94 of the Rules of Court. 
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In the same way as decisions made under treaty-based procedures, the said judgment, 
which shall state whether it is made by the Court or the Chamber, should include: 
• the date on which it is read; 
• the name of the judges participating in it; 
• the names of the parties; 
• the names of the agents, counsel and advocates of the parties; 
• a summary of the proceedings; 
• the submissions of the parties; 
• a statement of the facts; 
• the reasons in point of laws; 
• the operative provisions of the judgment; 
• the  necessary  steps  to  be  taken (e.g. adjustment or  amendment  of  resolution); 
• the decision, if any, in regard to costs; 
• the number and names of the judges constituting the majority, and 
• a statement as to the text of the judgment which is authoritative.593 
 
The judgment made by the Court should be similar to the decision made in cassation 
trials in the domestic legal system. The decision is thus final and there would be no 
recourse to appeal.
594 
The judgment shall become binding on the parties on the day of the 
reading.
595 
According to Article 58 of the Statute, the President and the Registrar shall put their 
signature to the decision. 
Pursuant to Article 88 of the present Rules of Court, the parties may, either jointly or 
separately, discontinue the proceedings before the final judgment has been delivered. 
Such request must be submitted to the Court in writing via the Registrar and he or she will 
issue an order indicating the discontinuance of the proceedings and the removal of the 
case from the list (par. 1). 
                                               
593 Compare Article 95 of the Rules of Court and the content of the views of the Human Rights Committee in 
Prichard & Sharp, 581 at para 23. 
594 Article 60 of Statute of the Court. 
595 Compare Article 94(2) of the Rules of Court. 
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If the parties have agreed to discontinue the proceedings resulting in the settlement of the 
dispute, the Court may record this in the aforementioned order.  Otherwise, the terms of the 
settlement may be entered into the order itself or else added on to it in an annexure (par.2). 
The rule concerning the discontinuance of proceedings would not be applied under the 
proposed international judicial review procedure. This is because the raison d’être of the 
application concerns the abuse of the international obligations of the Security Council of the 
United Nations to implement international standards of human rights on UNSC Resolutions.  
4.4 Appraisal and Prospects 
Unlike decisions made under treaty-based bodies, the judgment of the Court has legally 
binding force on the parties as it will be supported by the amendment of the relevant 
Security Council resolution. State compliance with the Court’s decision is  mandated by 
the Charter of the United Nations under article 103.
596 
As the measures have been put in 
place in the first instance as a result of Security Council compliance with obligations 
imposed under the UN’s Charter it is highly likely that the same States would comply if 
ordered to remove, alter, or amend, their practice in relation to the said individuals or 
entities. 
Pursuant to the provisions laid down in Article 94, each Member of the United Nations 
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to 
which it is a party (par. 1). This article extends a cautionary note to States making it clear 
that non-compliance with any judgment will render it liable to the imposition of sanctions by 
the United Nations. Paragraph 2 of the same article states that “if any party to a case fails to 
perform the obligations incumbent upon it under the judgment rendered by the Court, the 
other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, 
make recommendations or decide upon measures [sanctions] to be taken to give effect to the 
judgment”. In other words a successful application to the court could result in a rather 
bizarre situation in which the UN Security Council could impose sanctions on a state that did 
not remove sanctions from an individual who successfully argues their case. This is of 
course extremely unlikely and it is more probable that if the Security Council endorses a 
removal from the list by the International Court of Justice who have had an opportunity to 
examine all the evidence in the case then more probable is a state’s compliance.  
                                               
596 Article 94 of the Charter. 
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The underlying implication of this provision is that failure to comply with a decision of the 
International Court of Justice would create further political ramifications, and the Security 
Council is given wide powers to deal with the consequences. This type of situation would be 
similar to that which confronted the federal authorities of the United States in Brown
597
. In 
this case, the local educational authorities in Little Rock, Arkansas refused to comply with 
the Supreme Court’s decision not to remove black students from a high school. The situation 
forced former President Eisenhower to send federal troops to ensure compliance with the 
judgment. Whilst it is not suggested that the Un would use these methods the principles still 
exists. 
This kind  of  law  enforcement  is  certainly  not  ideal  as  a  means  of  ensuring  State 
compliance with the judgment rendered by the International Court of Justice in human rights 
related violations, especially in the proposed judicial review procedure. Not only could this 
sort of sanction lead to another human rights problem, but it could also be deemed rather 
‘inhumane’, rash and very costly.598It is suggested that removal from a sanctions list would 
be sufficient for the individual to entity to seek return of their assets and a removal of travel 
bans without recourse of further legal action.
 
 
Unlike the decisions resulting from treaty-based procedures, and even though the means 
available to the Court might not be as effective as those of a national legal system, the 
Court’s decisions, as the voice  of an international organisation, have generally been 
complied with satisfactorily; even in cases which were emotionally charged and involved 
important questions of national prestige and honour.
599 
 
It is therefore contended that the availability of a power to review the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution for breaches of human rights in relation to being named under 
security council resolutions as being involved in terrorism, should be vested with the 
International Court of Justice as the most qualified and logical judicial organisation to take on 
the role of human rights complience. It could certainly provide a more effective means to 
                                               
597 Brown v Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954)  for full discussion see Shabtai Rosenne, Terry D. Gill, 
Erik Jaap Molenaar, Alex G. Oude Elferink, The World Court: what it is and how it works, 6th Edition, United 
Nations Publications, 2003 
598 More details on the problems and difficulties in imposing United Nations sanctions including their types and 
effect so far and the guidelines to future use of sanctions, see, Willem van Genugten and Gerard A. de Groot 
(Eds) United Nations Sanctions, Effectiveness and Effects, Especially in the Field of Human Rights. A Multi-
disciplinary Approach: Intersentia, Holland, 2003 at 135 – 152.  
599 Shabtai n 597 at 48.  
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fight internationally recognised breaches of agreed human rights violations. This should not 
be dismissed as idealistic if sumum ius (supreme justice) is an international community 
priority and the particular breaches are occurring under the very auspices of United Nations 
actions
600
. 
 
                                               
600 For a full discussion on the development and working of the court and its relationship within the United 
Nations see Shabtai Rosenne, Yaėl Ronen,The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920–2005: The 
Court and the United Nations: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006 
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CHAPTER 9 
FURTHER RESEARCH- THOUGHTS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
 
1 Preliminary Remarks 
From the outset this thesis has been proposed as a discussion document with a theoretical 
solution proposed to a highly complex political/legal problem. It is by no means suggested as 
the only solution, or even a likely one in the near future concerning the way forward to deal 
with those subjected to smart sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. The chance 
of the Security Council being willing to devolving power to the ICJ in order for them to 
review or appeal their decisions may seem nothing more than a fanciful naive notion, 
however it has been shown by this study that it is based on sound legal reasoning and is not 
simply an exercise in academic endeavour.  
 
Ten years ago many would have thought that a functioning International Criminal Court was 
nothing more than a fantasy However whether this proposal is likely ever to succeed or not 
one thing does seem clear from almost every commentator on international law in general and 
those who represent international human rights in particular, that something within the United 
Nations in respect of international terrorism and the sanctions lists must change as the current 
system for dealing with the quasi-judicial/executive role of the UNSC it not fit for purpose in 
the 21
st
 C if human rights and the rule of law are to be encouraged and respected. Even with 
the UNSC resolutions designed to change to the role and remit of the UN Ombudsperson it 
can be said that these do not go far enough to address the real issues and represents nothing 
more than a temporary sticking plaster over a legal wound. Much of what has been achieved 
is down as much to the personality of the ombudsperson Hilary Prost as it is to the Security 
Council desiring an equitable solution. There is warning from history of the dangers of short 
term political gain on rights. Benjamin Franklin said, ‘those who would give up essential 
liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.’ 
 
There are many who complain that the UN cannot profess to uphold and support the rule of 
law in other whilst ignoring the concept in its own functions. Human rights are not items to 
be abandoned when the going gets tough as clearly the spectre of international terrorism is, 
but should be upheld to demonstrate universal principles of freedom and individuality. A 
policy of simply removing those who are listed if it becomes too politically embarrassing is 
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not really an acceptable legal method of dealing with these issues. It would be a whole 
different study to suggest that the Security Council rescinds its judicial powers in order to 
stops making these kinds of decisions which in the present case are more based on the 
Security Council’s distrust of certain states to add names to the international lists of terrorist 
suspects than a desire to follow the rule of law.  
2 Considerations Regarding Highly Sensitive material 
Another matter to consider is that whilst this thesis has not considered in detail the minutiae 
of how the actual practice of hearing evidence would work beyond how the legislation and 
function of the court itself would function from the legislative perspective, this could be the 
subject of further research. That is not to say it has not been considered during this study. 
One of the reasons for this consideration is that during the research it has become apparent 
that those placed on the lists maintained and approved by the UN are often done so with the 
use of highly sensitive secret material from the member states. Information that individual 
States would be reluctant to share in any open court system would be likely to cause an 
impasse? Quite possibly, particularly as the UN is not the repository for international terrorist 
intelligence and information, it is only a conduit for the results in order to publish the lists. 
This is in fact part of the problem in the ability of the UN to test the information given to it 
used to place individuals and entities on the lists in the first place. It must as an organisation 
rely on the member states to supply the details of those they want on the lists without 
disclosing the information or evidence that would make them liable for inclusion. However 
States are able to conduct hearings within their own municipal court setting involving ultra-
sensitive material and various systems have been developed to deal specifically with these 
situations. There of course is a plethora of debate regarding a number of legal issues 
surrounding these proceedings however suffice for this study to suggest that models do exist 
and that they could be modified to be of use at the international level in the given 
circumstances. Further study could examine best practice and suggest a model to be used in 
such cases that balances the needs of both the individual accused and the protection of the 
source of the information or whatever is the particular issue involved. 
3 Suggested model Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
One model that could be modified to be used by the ICJ in examine the merits of a person’s 
inclusion on a sanctions list is that of the UK’s Special Immigration Appeals Commission  
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3.1 Background to SIAC 
SIAC deals with appeals against decisions made by the Home Office to deport, or exclude, 
someone from the UK on national security grounds, or for other public interest reasons. It 
also hears appeals against decisions to deprive persons of citizenship status. 
The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) is a superior court of record created 
by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997. It deals with appeals in cases 
where the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Home Office) exercises statutory 
powers to deport, or exclude, someone from the UK on national security grounds, or for other 
public interest reasons. 
SIAC also hears appeals against decisions to stop someone becoming a British citizen, under 
the British Nationality Act 1981, as amended, (BNA 1981). Section 4 of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 introduced changes to the British Nationality Act 1981 
(BNA 1981) relating to the deprivation of British nationality or status. 
The BNA 1981 (as amended) provides that a person may be deprived of their citizenship 
status if the Secretary of State certifies that to do so would be conducive to the public good. 
A person may not be deprived of their citizenship status if this would make him stateless. 
Where the Secretary of State has certified that the decision to deprive was based wholly or 
partly in reliance on information which he believes should not be made public, the appeal is 
heard by SIAC. 
As specified in the 1997 Act, the SIAC panel consists of three members. One must have held 
high judicial office; and one must be or have been a senior legally qualified member of the 
Asylum & Immigration Tribunal (AIT). The third member will usually be someone who has 
experience of national security matters 
 
The presumption is that SIAC hearings are heard in open court and the public and press can 
attend. The judge can decide to hear evidence in closed sessions. In this case the public and 
press would be asked to leave. Most of the cases before SIAC are under anonymity orders so 
the individuals cannot be named. Appellants can apply to SIAC to waive their right to 
anonymity. 
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The Secretary of State may wish to rely on material which he or she objects to disclosing to 
the appellant or his representative for reasons of national security or public interest. In such 
cases, Section 6 of the SIAC Act 1997 allows for a Special Advocate to be appointed to 
represent the interests of the appellant in an appeal hearing before SIAC. 
 
Rule 35 of the SIAC Procedure Rules 2003 sets out the functions of a Special Advocate, 
namely to cross-examine witnesses, make written submissions and to make submissions at 
any hearings from which the appellant parties have been excluded. Onward appeal from 
SIAC is to the Court of Appeal on points of law. The special advocate system can operate in 
the Court of Appeal although, given that these appeals are on points of law, it is less likely to 
be necessary. 
It is fair to say the current system in the UK is not without its critics and it would be a 
challenging study to suggest a more equitable system that balances both halves of the fair 
trail need for secrecy equation. 
This notion would require additional research, but it appears there is a case to suggest the ICJ 
could adapt its procedures to utilise a similar structure. Article 26 of the ICJ Statute allows 
for the formation of ‘Special Chamber’ consisting of three or more judges. These could be 
staffed with additional specialist advisors in order to allow the process to proceed. 
 
4 Other International Groups 
One of the limitations of the current UN Ombudsmen system is that 1267 Committee only 
deals with those persons connected to the Al Qaida or the Osama bin Laden network, with the 
proposal made in the proceeding chapters an effective judicial review/appeal procedure 
would exist for all those listed as being connected to international terrorism and those who 
could be listed in the future with the legal safeguard of an effective tribunal capable of 
offering an effective relief.  
 
Some form of judicial review/appeal could also eventually be extended to cover other 
specific issues such as international or transnational crime involving drugs, people 
trafficking, arms smuggling and nuclear material where assets have been seized or 
restrictions imposed that have no domestic or regional legal solution. One of the main 
problems with the present system of smart sanctions is that they are based on an assumption 
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that freezing of assets will help prevent or suppress international terrorism. There is little 
evidence to support this and some to suggest the reverse. This may be because although much 
of the work of international terrorism is analogous to criminal activities in their organisation 
and methods of operation there are some fundamental differences, the most obvious being 
ideology
601
. As was shown after the investigation into 9/11, the financing of the attack was 
estimated between $4-500K. This was not an issue for a terrorist network that has an annual 
turnover of millions. As has been seen in London, Madrid and even Boston, it takes very little 
in the way of finance to create acts of terror
602
. Perhaps as was shown by the UK in its 
experience in Northern Ireland it takes number of different government approaches to both 
suppressive the activities of terrorist groups, combined with willingness to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement with them that inevitably involves some form of devolved power. 
Perhaps that is the only lasting solution to being able to defeat terrorism. A study into the 
effects of terrorist legislation on the activities of terrorism could be carried out to see what in 
those cases where it has been stopped effectively has brought about this solution to the 
problem. Where terrorism has not been eradicated it requires that the population needs to be 
vigilant and have resilience to cope in order to stop these actions from gaining a political 
foothold. That resilience is not only in the form of dealing with terrorist actions but being 
subjected to personal restrictions in a free society in order to combat them. A further study on 
the effect of terrorism legislation would give a better understanding of these issues. 
 
The issues of whether or not these individual sanctions have been effective if they have raised 
or lowered the threat of international terrorism would also make for some interesting further 
study, as would the personal effect of the current asset freezing legislation on those subjected 
to the freezing orders, which although highly contentious would an interesting study in being 
better able to understand the legislation and suggest any changes to it. 
 
These are only a few of the possible further areas of research that is suggested as a result of 
this study. 
                                               
601 J. Fisher, et al, Assessing the impact of the USA PATRIOT Act on the financial services industry, Journal of 
Money Laundering Control 2005, J.M.L.C. 2005, 8(3), 243-251 
602 According to According USA Department of treasury financial investigation centre (FinCENs) money 
laundering in the USA in 2002  totalled $123.4bn. Of that, the share laundered by terrorist groups was estimated 
at 0.26 per cent of the total. The rest involved drugs, smuggling, and other crime. From the 288,343 SARs 
completed by financial institutions in 2003, only 495 (0.17 per cent) refer to ‘terrorist financing’ as the reason 
for filing. Unlike traditional organised crime whose goal is to maximise income, terrorists require relatively 
small sums to commit the most heinous of crimes. 
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